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S. 37 NDPS Act | “Reasonable Grounds” Not Equivalent To BSA Proof Standard; Reading It As Proof Would “Set At Naught” Bail Power, Grants NDPS Bail: J&K&L High Court

S. 37 NDPS Act | “Reasonable Grounds” Not Equivalent To BSA Proof Standard; Reading It As Proof Would “Set At Naught” Bail Power, Grants NDPS Bail: J&K&L High Court

Safiya Malik

 

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh Single Bench of Justice Mohd. Yousuf Wani has granted bail to an accused prosecuted by the Narcotics Control Bureau for alleged financing of illicit trafficking and being the intended recipient of codeine-based cough syrup and tramadol capsules recovered from a co-accused, with reliance placed on Section 67 statements and online transfers. Interpreting the NDPS Act’s restrictive bail threshold, the Court held that the expression “reasonable grounds” in Section 37 cannot be stretched to mean “proved” under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, warning that such an approach would “set at naught” the power vested in a court to grant bail pending trial. It described the standard as more than suspicion or conjecture but less than proof. Bail was made subject to bonds and conditions on attendance and non-interference.

 

The matter arose from a successive bail application filed by an accused under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, in connection with a case registered by the Narcotics Control Bureau, Jammu Zonal Unit. The prosecution alleged recovery of commercial quantity narcotic substances from a co-accused during interception of a bus travelling from Delhi to Katra. The applicant was not present at the spot and no recovery was affected from his possession or at his instance.

 

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The applicant was implicated primarily on the basis of statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act and alleged financial transactions made to the co-accused through online banking. It was alleged that these transactions constituted financing of illicit trafficking and that the applicant was the intended receiver of the seized contraband. The prosecution also relied on call detail records showing contact between the applicant and the co-accused.

 

The applicant denied involvement and contended that the alleged transactions were small, isolated, and unrelated to narcotics. It was asserted that the statements relied upon were inadmissible and had not led to any recovery or discovery of new facts. The prosecution opposed bail citing the embargo under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, seriousness of the offence, and apprehension of misuse of liberty.

 

The Court examined the scope of consideration at the bail stage and recorded that “this court without making any comment regarding the merits of the case is of the opinion that it may meet the ends of justice in case the petitioner-accused is admitted to bail.”

 

While addressing the statutory bar, the Court observed that “a criminal court while recording his satisfaction as to whether there appear ‘reasonable grounds’ of involvement of an accused in the commission of an offense attracting the bar in terms of provisions of Section 37 NDPS Act, has to use his discretion in a judicious manner so that no miscarriage of justice happens either by grant of bail or by denial of the same.”

 

The judgment clarified the meaning of reasonable grounds by stating that “the words ‘reasonable grounds’ cannot be read to mean proved,” and that such grounds “would obviously mean something more than mere suspicion and conjectures and something less than proof.” The Court further recorded that “the Court is supposed to consider the broader probabilities to reach its supposition regarding the existence of reasonable grounds of involvement of the accused.”

 

On the nature of evidence, the Court noted that “whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is guilty of such an offence depends on what evidence is offered by the prosecution to the charge against him.” It was also observed that “in considering an application for bail, court is not required to conduct a preliminary trial,” and that determining guilt is a matter “which can only be determined at the trial stage.”

 

With respect to personal liberty, the Court reiterated that “the grant of bail or the denial of the same falls within the purview of the judicial discretion meant to be exercised on sound legal principles,” and that such discretion must balance individual liberty with societal interest. The Court further recorded that there was “nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner if admitted to bail will jump over the concession by absconding at the trial or repeating the commission of crime.”

 

The Court directed that “the petitioner-accused is admitted to bail, subject to his furnishing surety and personal bonds to the tune of Rupees One lac each.” It was further specified that “surety bond of Rupees One lac [is] to be furnished by two sureties from amongst the relatives of the petitioner-accused each liable to the extent of Rupees fifty thousands,” to the satisfaction of the learned trial court and the Superintendent of Jail concerned.

 

“The petitioner-accused shall remain punctual at the trial of the case,” and that “the petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any of the unexamined complaint’s witnesses so as to dissuade them from making their factual statements at the trial. The petitioner shall not leave the limits of UT of J&K without the prior permission of the learned trial court,” and that “the petitioner shall not repeat the commission of any crime.”

 

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“In case the requisite surety bonds are furnished to the satisfaction of the learned trial court and duly attested, a formal release order shall be issued by learned trial court directing the release of the petitioner-accused from the place of his lodgment,” subject to furnishing of the personal bond before the Superintendent of Jail. “Learned trial court shall be competent to proceed against the petitioner-accused in terms of provisions of sections 491 and 492 BNSS in the event of violation of any bail conditions.”

 

“Nothing in this order shall be construed as any interference with or pre-judging of the merits of the case which obviously shall be subject matter of the final outcome of the trial case.”

 

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioner: Mr. Prince Khanna, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Vishal Sharma, Deputy Solicitor General of India

 

Case Title: Arfaz Mehboob Tak v. Union of India & Ors.
Case Number: Bail App No. 144/2025
Bench: Justice Mohd. Yousuf Wani

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