Isabella Mariam

The High Court of Rajasthan Single Bench of Justice Farjand Ali dismissed a criminal miscellaneous petition that, in substance, sought to re-agitate an order already examined in revision, holding that a second revisional challenge cannot be entertained merely by changing the drafting or label of the proceeding. The dispute arose from a cheque dishonour complaint in which the complainant sought interim compensation of 20% of the cheque amount; the Magistrate declined the request and the Sessions Court upheld that view. The Bench noted that “the true nature of a proceeding” turns on the relief claimed, not its nomenclature.

The petitioner–complainant instituted proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and moved an application before the Metropolitan Magistrate No.3, Jodhpur under Section 143A of the Act, seeking interim compensation to the extent of 20% of the cheque amount. By order dated 01.02.2023, the Magistrate declined the request after considering the factual matrix and rival submissions.

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Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a revision before the Additional Sessions Judge No.2, Jodhpur. The revisional court, by order dated 24.11.2023, affirmed the determination of the trial court, resulting in concurrent findings against the petitioner.

The petitioner thereafter approached the High Court by way of the present petition, challenging the refusal to grant interim compensation. The core issue before the High Court was whether the petition, in substance, amounted to a second revision against concurrent orders declining interim compensation under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The Court observed, “When the matter has now been brought before this Court, it assumes immediate procedural significance that the present petition, though couched under a nomenclature distinct from that of a criminal revision, in essence seeks reconsideration of the very order which has already been subjected to revisional scrutiny.”

It further recorded, “A careful and analytical reading of the pleadings, grounds, and the relief sought leaves no room for doubt that the substance of the challenge remains unchanged. The transformation in procedural attire cannot alter the juridical character of the proceedings.”

On the procedural history, the Court stated, “The procedural history unequivocally demonstrates that the petitioner, having suffered an adverse order from the Magistrate, availed the statutory remedy of revision before the Sessions Court and, upon failure therein, has attempted to re-open the identical issue before this Court. Such a course, irrespective of the terminology employed, partakes of the character of a second revision.”

The Court observed, “It is a settled tenet of procedural law that courts must look beyond form to substance. The true nature of a proceeding is to be determined by the essence of the relief claimed and not by the nomenclatural device adopted by the litigant. Judicial scrutiny cannot be thwarted by semantic innovation.” It added, “Where the legislative scheme imposes an embargo, the same cannot be diluted by procedural ingenuity.”

Referring to Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court stated, “Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts a clear prohibition against entertaining a second revision at the behest of the same party.” It further observed that the object of the provision is “to ensure finality in adjudication, to maintain procedural discipline, and to prevent multiplicity of challenges that would otherwise impede the expeditious administration of criminal justice.”

On inherent jurisdiction, the Court recorded, “This Court is not unmindful of the amplitude of its inherent and supervisory jurisdiction… However, such extraordinary powers are not to be employed as a substitute for revisional remedies already exhausted. Their exercise is reserved for rare and compelling situations where palpable injustice stares at the face of the record.”

In the facts of the case, the Court observed, “In the case at hand, no such exceptional or extraordinary circumstance has been demonstrated.” It further noted, “The petitioner has not been able to point out any perversity, arbitrariness, material irregularity, or jurisdictional infirmity in the concurrent orders passed by the courts below.”

On merits, the Court stated, “The learned Magistrate exercised the discretion conferred under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act in a judicious and balanced manner.” It clarified, “The provision confers a discretionary authority and does not mandate automatic award of interim compensation.” It further recorded, “The exercise of such discretion is contingent upon the factual substratum of each case and the equities emerging therefrom.”

Finally, the Court observed, “The concurrent findings thus rest upon sound legal footing and cannot be characterized as capricious or perverse.”

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The Court recorded, “In view of the statutory bar against a second revision, coupled with the absence of any manifest illegality or miscarriage of justice, this Court finds no lawful basis to unsettle the determinations rendered by the courts below. Consequently, the present petition, being procedurally untenable and substantively devoid of merit, stands dismissed. All consequential directions shall follow in accordance with law.”

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioners: Ms. Radha Bishnoi

For the Respondents: Mr. Surendra Bishnoi, AGA; Mr. Sukesh Bhati

Case Title: Jai Kishan v. State of Rajasthan & Anr.

Neutral Citation: 2026: RJ-JD:7499

Case Number: S.B. Criminal Misc (Pet.) No. 2676/2024

Bench: Justice Farjand Ali