Isabella Mariam

The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Single Bench of Justice Farhan P. Dubash, dismissed an interim application filed by a son seeking the appointment of an independent Medical Board to examine his father's mental condition in the midst of an ongoing property dispute between them. The Court held that directing a Mental Health Review Board under Section 105 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 to assess a person's mental health based on proof adduced by an adversarial party would convert a welfare-driven statutory protection into a litigation weapon, contrary to the Act's rights-based framework designed to protect and empower persons with mental illness.

The dispute arose from a suit seeking partition of ancestral property, where the plaintiff filed an interim application under the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, his father, suffered from mental illness and was incapable of contesting the proceedings.

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In support of this claim, the plaintiff relied on a medical certificate issued by a clinic, which recorded certain symptoms experienced by the defendant. The plaintiff further alleged that he was denied access to the defendant by the step-mother, who is a medical professional. On this basis, the plaintiff sought the appointment of an independent medical board to assess the defendant’s mental condition.

The defendant, through counsel, opposed the application, denying any mental illness and contending that the allegations were false. It was argued that the application was not maintainable under Section 105 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, and constituted an abuse of process. The defendant also pointed out that a similar application had previously been filed and withdrawn unconditionally by the plaintiff, thereby barring the present attempt.

Justice Farhan P. Dubash observed that “Section 105 governs the course of action to be adopted by a court during any judicial process where proof of mental illness is produced and the same is disputed by the other party." The Court stated that “Upon proof of mental illness being produced and contested before it, a court is duty-bound to refer the matter to the Mental Health Review Board constituted under the MHA for further scrutiny.”

However, the Court recorded that “What is implicit in a collective reading of these provisions, however, is that their underlying objective is the protection of the rights of persons with mental illness not the creation of a mechanism that may be weaponised by a party to gather proof of mental illness against an adversary with a view to securing a tactical advantage in subsisting litigation.”

The Court further observed that “To permit such a course of action would be to arm unscrupulous litigants with the provisions of the MHA, including Section 105, as instruments of harassment rather than protection."

On the medical evidence, the Court noted that “The Medical Certificate merely records that Defendant No. 1 is a diabetic patient who experiences hypoglycaemic episodes following insulin administration, manifesting in transient symptoms such as delusions, confusion, forgetfulness, and perspiration.”

It was recorded that “Significantly, the Medical Certificate itself acknowledges that these symptoms are temporary in nature and resolve upon restoration of normal blood glucose levels. The Court stated that “episodic and reversible symptoms arising from an underlying metabolic condition cannot, prima facie, be equated with or construed as mental illness within the meaning of Section 2(1)(s) of the MHA.”

The Court also observed that “the Applicant had previously filed Interim Application (L) No. 34827 of 2025 seeking reliefs substantially identical to those sought in the present IA, which came to be unconditionally withdrawn without any liberty to file a fresh application.”

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The Court held: “The present IA is independently liable to be rejected on an additional ground. It is borne out from the record that the Applicant had previously filed Interim Application (L) No. 34827 of 2025 seeking reliefs substantially identical to those sought in the present IA, which came to be unconditionally withdrawn without any liberty to file a fresh application. The present IA neither discloses nor pleads any new facts or changed circumstances that would justify a second invocation of the same reliefs. In view of such unconditional withdrawal, the Applicant is estopped in law from reagitating the same reliefs by way of the present IA and cannot be permitted to do so. To hold otherwise would be to render the unconditional withdrawal wholly nugatory and to countenance an abuse of the process of this Court.”

The Court directed: “The present Interim Application stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. Jitendra Gorakh Megh, Applicant/Plaintiff in-person
For the Respondents: Mr. Aditya Sharma a/w. Hitesh Gupta a/w. Vipul Makwana and Mohiteshwari Prasad for Defendant

Case Title: Jitendra Gorakh Megh vs. Gorakh Govind Megh & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:5270
Case Number: Interim Application No. 7713 of 2025 in Suit No. 1215 of 2019
Bench: Justice Farhan P. Dubash