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Section 250(1) BNSS | 60-Day Deadline To File Discharge Application Does Not Extinguish Accused's Right If Sufficient Cause For Delay Is Shown: Gujarat High Court

Section 250(1) BNSS | 60-Day Deadline To File Discharge Application Does Not Extinguish Accused's Right If Sufficient Cause For Delay Is Shown: Gujarat High Court

Safiya Malik

 

The High Court of Gujarat Single Bench of Justice P. M. Raval has held that Section 250(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, permitting an accused to file a discharge application within sixty days of committal to the Court of Session, regulates procedure and does not extinguish the right where delay is satisfactorily explained. The Court set aside the Sessions Court's orders rejecting condonation applications filed by hospital directors, a chief executive officer, and medical practitioners charged with conducting medically unnecessary cardiac procedures under a government health scheme, causing two patient deaths.

 

The case arose from an FIR registered at Vastrapur Police Station, Ahmedabad, alleging that directors, a non-executive director, a chief executive officer, and medical practitioners associated with a private hospital in Ahmedabad conspired to derive pecuniary advantage under the Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana. It was alleged that patients were induced to undergo angiography, angioplasty, and stent implantation procedures without medical necessity, that false medical records were prepared to obtain consent, and that two patients died as a consequence. Following investigation, a charge-sheet was filed for offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the case was committed to the Court of Session.

 

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The accused thereafter filed applications seeking discharge under Section 250 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Certain applications were filed beyond the prescribed sixty-day period, accompanied by separate delay condonation applications. The Sessions Court rejected the condonation applications and declined to entertain the discharge applications, prompting the present revision applications before the High Court.

 

The Court addressed the nature of the sixty-day period under Section 250(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and observed that "the Legislature has consciously introduced a defined time frame to promote expeditious Sessions trials." It recorded that permitting accused persons to file discharge applications at any stage without reference to limitation would render the statutory prescription nugatory.

 

The Court, however, stated that "limitation provisions ordinarily regulate the remedy and not the underlying defence." It further observed that "the right to seek discharge is not extinguished automatically upon expiry of sixty days; rather, the remedy becomes subject to the Court's discretion in condoning delay upon sufficient cause being shown." The Court additionally noted that "even if the accused does not prefer an application for discharge the Court is duty bound to apply its judicial mind before framing of the charge and if no sufficient material for framing of charge is found the Court has to discharge the accused."

 

On the definitive interpretation of Section 250(1), the Court stated that "by virtue of Section 250(1) an accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under section 232, if at all he desires to prefer such an application, but, in the considered opinion of the Court, it does not exclude the judicial discretion in appropriate cases or where delay is not attributable to the accused as in the present facts of the case. Thus, it can be held that 60 days period under Section 250(1) of the BNSS regulates the procedure and it does not extinguish the right to seek discharge. It also does not exclude the judicial discretion in appropriate cases where delay is not attributable to the accused while considering the condonation of delay as it reflects prima facie from the facts of the present case."

 

On the question of non-supply of documents, the Court observed that "supply of documents is indeed a condition precedent for meaningful defence." It recorded that "committal proceedings are administrative in nature and not adjudicatory on merits" and that "unless failure of justice is shown, committal cannot be declared void for every procedural lapse." The Court further stated that "if the prosecution seeks to rely upon additional documents beyond the charge-sheet record, such materials must ordinarily be brought on record in accordance with law and furnished to the accused before being relied upon." It observed that "such subsequent supply, by itself, would not retroactively invalidate the committal or the opening of the case unless prejudice affecting fair trial is established."

 

On the appropriate remedy, the Court stated that "the appropriate remedy is not to declare the committal void ab initio but to ensure that discharge applications are considered afresh after complete supply of all materials sought to be relied upon by the prosecution."

 

On the question of condonation, the Court observed that the maximum delay beyond sixty days was "approximately of 140 days" in certain matters and recorded that "considering the fact that certain documents were supplied subsequently and that the right of discharge is a valuable statutory safeguard, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown."

 

The Court further observed that the Sessions Judge, while rejecting condonation, had adverted to the merits of the case, and stated that "such approach is impermissible." It recorded that "criminal jurisprudence must reconcile expeditious trial with fairness" and that a rigid and technical approach in the present facts "would defeat substantial justice."

 

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The Court directed: “the impugned orders in these revision applications… are quashed and set aside. The delay in filing the discharge applications is hereby condoned. The learned trial Court is directed to decide the discharge applications afresh, on merits, after ensuring that all documents sought to be relied upon by the prosecution are duly furnished to the accused, and after affording full opportunity of hearing to both sides. The learned Court shall remain uninfluenced by any observations contained in the earlier orders or in this order. Rule is made absolute accordingly.”

 

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. J. M. Panchal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ajj H. Murjani; Mr. N. D. Nanavati, Senior Advocate with Mr. Jigneshkumar P. Pandav; Mr. Mihir Joshi, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rahul Dholakia; Mr. Ankit Shah, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mr. Hardik Dave, Public Prosecutor with Mr. Rohan Raval, Additional Public Prosecutor

 

Case Title: Kartikbhai Jashubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat
Neutral Citation: 2026: GUJHC:16436
Case Number: R/Criminal Revision Application No. 2627 of 2025 with connected matters
Bench: Justice P. M. Raval

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