Section 5 Limitation Act Inapplicable To Municipal Election Petitions Under Municipalities Act, 1916: Allahabad High Court
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow, Single Bench of Justice Subhash Vidyarthi set aside the condonation of delay granted for a municipal election challenge and dismissed the election petition as time-barred, restoring the returned candidate’s continuance in office. The case arose from a petition questioning the election to the post of Chairperson of a Nagar Panchayat, filed beyond the statutory time limit and entertained by the trial court after condoning the delay. The Court held that the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is unavailable for such election petitions under the Municipalities Act, 1916, since they are not suits, even though they are tried using the procedure followed in suits.
The writ petition arose from an election dispute concerning the office of Chairperson of a Nagar Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner, a returned candidate in the municipal election, challenged orders passed by the Additional District Judge allowing an election petition that had been filed beyond the statutory limitation period prescribed under the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The election results were declared in May 2023, whereas the election petition questioning the result was filed in July 2023, beyond the prescribed period of thirty days.
The election petitioner sought condonation of a delay of seventeen days by filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, citing court vacation and receipt of certain information and documents as reasons for delay. The petitioner opposed the application, contending that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable to election petitions under the Municipalities Act.
The trial court allowed the application for condonation of delay and subsequently allowed the election petition, resulting in the declaration of vacancy of the elected office. Aggrieved, the returned candidate approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging both the order condoning delay and the final judgment allowing the election petition.
The Court examined whether a District Judge deciding an election petition under the U.P. Municipalities Act acts as a court and whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to such proceedings. It recorded that “while deciding an election petition, the District Judge acts as a ‘Court’.” The Court analysed the statutory framework and noted that the Municipalities Act originally provided for filing election petitions before a court, later substituting the expression with “District Judge,” without altering the judicial character of the authority.
On the applicability of limitation provisions, the Court observed that “the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self-contained code which does not admit of the introduction of the principles or the provisions of law contained in the Indian Limitation Act.” It held that similar principles governed election petitions under the Municipalities Act.
The Court further stated that “when the legislature has specifically provided for application of a particular provision of the Limitation Act and has not made the other provisions applicable to it, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply.” Referring to the proviso to Section 23 of the Municipalities Act, it noted that only Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act had been expressly made applicable.
It was also observed that “although an election petition filed under Section 20 of the Municipalities Act is not a suit, it is an original proceeding which has to be decided in the manner provided for decision of suits,” and since Section 5 does not apply to suits, it could not be invoked for election petitions. The Court concluded that the trial court erred in condoning the delay and proceeding to decide the election petition on merits.
The Court directed that “the impugned order dated 04.11.2025, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, allowing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is unsustainable in law and the same is set aside. The judgment and order dated 15.11.2025 allowing the election petition is also unsustainable in law as being barred by the limitation period. The election petition was liable to be dismissed.
“Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 04.11.2025, passed by learned Additional District Judge (F.T.C.-I), Ambedkar Nagar in Election Petition No.4 of 2023 is set aside. Consequently the judgment and order dated 15.11.2025 passed in the aforesaid case is also set aside and the election petition is dismissed. All necessary consequences shall follow. It goes without saying that the office order dated 19.11.2025 issued by the District Magistrate, Ambedkar Nagar, appointing an administrator as the office of the Chairman, Nagar Panchayat, had fallen vacant consequent to the election petition being allowed, would ipso facto stand nullified consequent to the dismissal of the election petition and consequently the petitioner shall be entitled to continue as Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat concerned.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Sri J. N. Mathur, Senior Advocate; Sri Mudit Agarwal, Advocate
For the Respondents: Sri Rahul Shukla, Additional Chief Standing Counsel; Dr. L. P. Mishra, Advocate; Sri Syed Aftab Ahmad, Advocate; Sri Ayush Chaudhary, Advocate; Sri Abhishek Mishra, Advocate; Sri Anurag Kumar Singh, Advocate; Sri Sajjad Husain, Advocate
Case Title: Omkar Gupta v. State of U.P. & Others
Neutral Citation: 2025: AHC-LKO:80035
Case Number: WRIT – C No. 11631 of 2025
Bench: Justice Subhash Vidyarthi
