Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court has acquitted an individual convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, setting aside the judgment of the Madras High Court that had upheld his conviction and life sentence. The bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah held that the conviction, which was primarily based on a dying declaration, could not be sustained due to contradictions in the deceased’s statements and lack of corroborative evidence. The Court found that multiple versions of the incident given by the deceased created doubt regarding the reliability of the prosecution’s case. The appellant was ordered to be released from custody immediately.

The case originated from an incident on September 12, 2008, in which the appellant was accused of pouring kerosene on his wife and setting her on fire at their residence in Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu. The couple lived with their two-and-a-half-year-old child, and the deceased’s parents resided in a nearby street.

According to the prosecution, the incident occurred in the evening when the deceased called her mother to take care of the child. Shortly thereafter, neighbors informed the deceased’s parents that she had caught fire. She was initially taken to a local hospital and later transferred to the Government Hospital at Thoothukudi.

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on the same day, a police officer (PW-9) recorded the deceased’s first statement at the hospital. In this statement, she stated that she had caught fire accidentally while cooking, and that her husband, the appellant, was asleep at the time but attempted to douse the flames when he woke up. Based on this statement, the police initially recorded a general diary entry without registering a criminal case.

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Three days later, on September 15, 2008, the deceased gave a second statement in which she alleged that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. She claimed that she had not disclosed this earlier because the appellant was present when her first statement was recorded. Following this, the case was altered from one of accidental fire to an offence under Section 307 of the IPC (attempt to murder). When the deceased succumbed to burn injuries on October 2, 2008, the charge was modified to Section 302 of the IPC (murder).

On September 18, 2008, prior to her death, a judicial magistrate recorded a third statement from the deceased. This statement, which attributed the incident to the appellant, was treated as her dying declaration and became the primary basis for the conviction.

The trial court, relying on the judicial magistrate’s recording of the dying declaration and the testimony of the deceased’s parents, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The High Court upheld the conviction on February 28, 2012. The appellant subsequently challenged the decision before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined the reliability of the dying declaration and the evidentiary inconsistencies in the case. The Court reiterated the settled legal principle that a dying declaration is an important piece of evidence and can form the sole basis for conviction, provided it is free from doubt and corroborated by other evidence. However, where multiple dying declarations exist with inconsistencies, the Court must carefully scrutinize which statement can be relied upon.

Citing Uttam v. State of Maharashtra (2022) 8 SCC 576, the Court noted:

"In cases involving multiple dying declarations made by the deceased, the question that arises for consideration is as to which of the said dying declarations ought to be believed by the court and what would be the guiding factors for arriving at a just and lawful conclusion. The problem becomes all the more knotty when the dying declarations made by the deceased are found to be contradictory. Faced with such a situation, the court would be expected to carefully scrutinise the evidence to find out as to which of the dying declarations can be corroborated by other material evidence produced by the prosecution."

The Court noted that the deceased had made two earlier statements, on September 12, 2008, and September 15, 2008, which contradicted her later statement of September 18, 2008. The first two statements indicated an accidental fire, whereas the last statement implicated the appellant.

The Court found it difficult to accept the prosecution’s explanation that the deceased initially concealed the truth due to the appellant’s presence. It stated:

"It is very difficult to believe this version of the deceased because no other evidence corroborates the deceased’s statement that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire."

The Court also observed that the judicial magistrate (PW-12), who recorded the deceased’s final statement, failed to inquire about her previous inconsistent statements. The Court recorded:

"In cross-examination, Judicial Magistrate (PW-12) admitted that he did not question the deceased with regard to the details of her previous statements made before the police. The deceased did not tell the Magistrate that she lied in her statement of 12.09.2008."

The Court further noted that the medical evidence did not support the prosecution’s case. The doctor (PW-13), who examined the deceased immediately after the incident, testified that she had told him that she caught fire while cooking. He also stated that there was no smell of kerosene on her body.

The Court recorded:

"Normally, where the death is caused by burning through kerosene, the smell of kerosene would definitely remain for a few hours. However, in the present case, the doctor (PW-13) states that there was no such smell."

The Supreme Court found that the prosecution had not established a clear motive for the alleged crime. The deceased’s statement attributed the incident to an argument with the appellant over disciplining their child. The Court noted that, according to the deceased’s version, “I had beaten my son Rubiston. My husband had asked me why you are beating the child. My husband had abused me with filthy language. I told him that I am going to die. He said that why do you die and he himself had poured kerosene and burnt me.”

The Court found this reasoning doubtful, particularly when examined alongside the timeline of events. It observed that the deceased’s mother (PW-1) had taken the child to her home at approximately 2 p.m., while the incident occurred later that evening at around 6 p.m. The Court stated that “all of this makes the dying declaration extremely doubtful.”

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Further, the Court noted that there was no prior history of domestic violence or dowry-related harassment, stating that “it is not a case of dowry harassment as all such possibilities were already ruled out during the investigation.” Considering the absence of corroborative evidence supporting the alleged motive, the Court found that the prosecution’s explanation did not inspire confidence.

The Supreme Court held that, given the inconsistencies in the deceased’s statements, the absence of corroborative evidence, and the contradictions in the prosecution’s case, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt. It stated:

"In cases where the dying declaration is suspicious, it is not safe to convict an accused in the absence of corroborative evidence. In a case like the present one, where the deceased has been changing her stance and has completely turned around her statements, such a dying declaration cannot become the sole basis for the conviction in the absence of any other corroborative evidence."

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment dated February 28, 2012, stating:

"We accordingly allow this appeal and acquit the appellant by setting aside the order of the High Court dated 28.02.2012. The appellant shall be released from jail forthwith."

Case Title: Suresh v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 318
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 540 of 2013
Bench: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah

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