Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra has set aside an order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which had dismissed a writ petition seeking quashing of a First Information Report. The Supreme Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Bombay High Court for fresh consideration, holding that the Division Bench had jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Court observed that the High Court had misapplied the precedent of Neeta Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, resulting in failure of justice, and accordingly revived the writ petition for determination on merits.

The petitioner had approached the High Court of Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The relief sought was quashing of a First Information Report registered at M.I.D.C. Police Station, Solapur. The FIR, dated 12 September 2024, was registered as C.R. No. 648 of 2024 under Sections 420, 406, and 409 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

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During the pendency of the writ petition, the investigation was completed by the police authorities and a charge sheet was filed before the trial court on 14 May 2025. Based on this development, the Bombay High Court Division Bench, by an order dated 1 July 2025, held that the petition had become infructuous. The High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Neeta Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 13578 of 2024 decided on 15 October 2024.

The Bombay High Court recorded that the ratio of Neeta Singh was applicable since, after filing of the charge sheet, a petition for quashing of the FIR could not be entertained. It consequently disposed of the matter, reserving liberty to the petitioner to move an application for discharge before the trial court.

The petitioner, dissatisfied with the High Court’s disposal of the writ petition, filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed before the Court the “Sitting List” of Judges of the Bombay High Court effective 9 June 2025. The list showed that the Division Bench concerned had jurisdiction to hear criminal writ petitions and applications for quashing of FIRs, charge sheets, and related orders under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 175(3) of the BNSS from the year 2023 onwards.

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the Division Bench had jurisdiction to hear such writ petitions, the matter ought not to have been dismissed as infructuous solely because a charge sheet had been filed. It was argued that mere filing of a charge sheet under Section 193 BNSS did not render a writ petition for quashing of an FIR infructuous.

It was further submitted that the precedent of Neeta Singh was distinguishable. The writ petition in that matter had been filed only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. Moreover, in Neeta Singh, cognisance of the offence had already been taken by the criminal court. The petitioner's counsel contended that in the present case, whether cognisance had been taken was not clear from the impugned order, and therefore the Bombay High Court erred in relying on the precedent without proper application to the facts.

The Supreme Court considered these submissions and proceeded to assess whether the Bombay High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner’s request under Article 226 and Section 528 of the BNSS, and whether the precedent relied upon had been correctly applied.

The Supreme Court carefully recorded its reasoning with reference to the factual distinction between the two matters. The Court observed: “Since a question has been raised as to whether the ratio of the decision in Neeta Singh has correctly been applied by the Bombay High Court while disposing of the writ petition of the petitioner, the need has arisen to clarify the point.”

The Bench noted the basis of the Allahabad High Court’s order in Neeta Singh, stating: “The writ petition in Neeta Singh was only under Article 226 of the Constitution, as evident from the first sentence of the relevant order. Moreover, a bare reading of paragraph 8 thereof reveals that the relevant Bench’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had not been invoked.”

It further recorded: “It is in such circumstances that we had the occasion to uphold the order under challenge of the Allahabad High Court, whereby the writ petition only under Article 226 of the Constitution was held to have become infructuous by reason of subsequent events, relying on several authoritative pronouncements of this Court including Constitution Bench decisions.”

Turning to the present case, the Bench stated: “From the preamble of the writ petition filed by the petitioner before the Bombay High Court, it is evident that the same sought to invoke the twin jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 528 of the BNSS for having the FIR quashed.”

The Court highlighted that the investigation had culminated in filing of a charge sheet but clarity on cognisance was absent: “It is true that the police report (charge-sheet) had been filed on 14th May, 2025 upon completion of investigation of the FIR, but whether or not cognisance had been taken by the jurisdictional magistrate is not too clear from the impugned order.”

On the scope of powers, the Bench observed: “So long cognisance of the offence is not taken, a writ or order to quash the FIR/charge-sheet could be issued under Article 226; however, once a judicial order of taking cognisance intervenes, the power under Article 226 though not available to be exercised, power under Section 528, BNSS was available to be exercised to quash not only the FIR/charge-sheet but also the order taking cognisance, provided the same is placed on record along with the requisite pleadings to assail the same and a strong case for such quashing is set up.”

The Court noted the reasoning in Neeta Singh and clarified its applicability: “Significantly, it was reasoned by us in Neeta Singh that a judicial order not being amenable to challenge before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution and there being no prayer either under Article 227 thereof or Section 482, Cr. PC, the Allahabad High Court was right in holding the writ petition under Article 226 to have been rendered infructuous.”

Finally, the Bench concluded that the High Court had erred: “In the present case, certainly the Division Bench could have examined the grievance of the petitioner for quashing of the FIR together with the charge-sheet following it, as well as the cognisance taking order, if any, since its jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS was also invoked and the relief claimed could have been suitably moulded.”

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“We have no hesitation to hold that the Division Bench did have the jurisdiction to pass such an order as per the ‘Sitting List’. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court misread Neeta Singh, inadvertently omitted to notice the factual dissimilarity as indicated above and consequently, misapplied the ratio of such decision to spurn the challenge laid by the petitioner resulting in a failure of justice.”

“For the reasons aforesaid, the order impugned stands set aside. The special leave petition is disposed of at the admission stage, even without notice to the respondents, by ordering a remand.”

“The writ petition of the petitioner shall stand revived for being considered afresh by the roster bench of the Bombay High Court, in accordance with law.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioner: Mr. Kisalaya Shukla, AOR; Mr. Satyam Pandey, Adv.; Mr. Sandeep Kumar Dwivedi, Adv.; Mr. Krishna Kant Shukla, Adv.; Mr. Awadhesh Kumar, Adv.

Case Title: Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

Case Number: Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.13424 of 2025

Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta; Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra