Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale dismissed the appeal filed by a faculty member of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, holding that her complaint of sexual harassment against the Vice-Chancellor was barred by limitation under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The Court ruled that the last incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023 and subsequent administrative actions did not constitute continuing harassment under the statute. While upholding the Local Complaints Committee’s rejection of the complaint as time-barred, the Court directed that the record of the alleged misconduct be permanently reflected in the Vice-Chancellor’s resume, ensuring the wrongdoing is not forgotten.

The appellant, a faculty member of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), lodged a formal complaint on 26 December 2023 before the Local Complaints Committee (LCC) alleging sexual harassment by the Vice-Chancellor. The alleged incidents began in September 2019, when the Vice-Chancellor called the appellant to his office, insisted she accompany him for dinner, and touched her hand in a manner that made her uncomfortable. In October 2019, he again called her to his office, repeated the proposal, and demanded sexual favours, allegedly threatening detrimental consequences if she refused.

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The appellant’s promotion was subsequently put on hold by the Executive Council in October 2019, though it was approved in April 2022. In April 2023, the Vice-Chancellor allegedly asked the appellant to accompany him on a trip to a resort, and upon her refusal, threatened that her career would suffer. Later, on 29 August 2023, she was removed from her position as Director of the Centre for Financial, Regulatory and Governance Studies. Around the same period, the Executive Council initiated a preliminary inquiry into alleged misutilisation of grants, following complaints from the National Foundation of Corporate Governance.

The LCC rejected her complaint as barred by time, noting that the last incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023, and the complaint was filed beyond the three-month limitation and the extendable six-month period prescribed under Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act).

The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, where a Single Judge quashed the LCC’s decision and directed rehearing on merits, reasoning that threats and hostile treatment extended the limitation period. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s order, holding that subsequent administrative actions were collective decisions of the Executive Council and not acts of sexual harassment.

The matter reached the Supreme Court, where the central issue was whether the complaint was time-barred under the POSH Act. Evidence relied upon included the appellant’s written complaint dated 26 December 2023 and correspondence with the Chancellor and Executive Council. The statutory provisions in focus were Sections 2(n), 3, and 9 of the POSH Act, defining sexual harassment and prescribing limitation for filing complaints.

The Court observed that “‘sexual harassment’ is defined in Section 2(n) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 to include any one or more of the unwelcome act or behaviour… such as physical contact and advances; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or making sexually coloured remarks; or showing pornography; or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature.”

It further stated that “Section 3 of the POSH Act, while providing that no woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace, describes certain circumstances that would amount as an act or behaviour of sexual harassment, i.e., implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her employment; or implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her employment; or implied or explicit threat about her present or future employment status; or interference with her work or creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her; or humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.”

The Bench recorded: “a complaint of sexual harassment is mandatorily required to be filed within a period of three months from the date of the last incident of such harassment or within a further extended period of three months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months from the date of the last incident of sexual harassment.”

On the complaint, the Court stated: “The sexual harassment, if any, of the appellant at the hands of respondent no.1 commenced sometime in September 2019, and the last incident in that connection took place in April 2023. Thereafter, no incident of sexual harassment is alleged to have taken place except for the fact that on 29.08.2023, the appellant was removed from the post of Director… or that a preliminary inquiry was instituted against her by the Executive Council.”

The Court observed: “The actions taken against the appellant in August 2023, are administrative in nature and does not create a gender based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.”

It recorded that “The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter… The subsequent events have no connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours amounting to sexual harassment.”

Finally, the Court stated: “we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.”

The Bench recorded: “we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.”

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“It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget the wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed against the appellant may not be investigated on technical grounds, but it must not be forgotten.”

“The incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever. Thus, it is directed that this judgment shall be made part of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which shall be strictly ensured by him personally.”

“The appeal is dismissed with the observations made above. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioner: Senior Advocate Meenakshi Arora

For the Respondents: Senior Advocate Madhavi Divan

Case Title: XXX v YYY
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1106
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. ___ of 2025 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 17936 of 2025)
Bench: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Prasanna B. Varale