Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan held that under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now reflected in Section 243 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, a joint trial may be conducted when several accused are alleged to have participated in offences springing from the same transaction. The Court clarified that directing a separate trial is justified only where the individual acts attributed to each accused are independent and clearly severable. Applying this principle, it set aside the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s order segregating proceedings against a sitting MLA in the Nuh violence cases.

The matter arose from a series of criminal cases registered following incidents of communal violence in Nuh, Haryana. The appellant, Mamman Khan, a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly, was implicated along with other accused persons. The allegations against him were included in charge sheets filed by the State police in connection with the violence.

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The Trial Court had permitted segregation of the trial against the appellant, directing that he be tried separately from the other accused. This order was affirmed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court recorded that given the appellant’s political position, a separate trial was warranted.

Challenging this order before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the offences alleged arose out of the same transaction and that the segregation of his trial was impermissible under law. He argued that Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 243 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) permits a joint trial where multiple accused are involved in offences springing from the same transaction. It was submitted that directing a separate trial solely on the basis of his status as a legislator was discriminatory and contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The State defended the High Court’s order, maintaining that the trial against the appellant could be conducted separately. It argued that given the nature of allegations and the appellant’s distinct role, segregation would not cause prejudice and would facilitate effective adjudication.

The dispute thus centered on whether the appellant was entitled to a joint trial with other accused in terms of Section 223 CrPC, or whether the High Court was justified in upholding a separate trial. The factual matrix included the commonality of charges stemming from the same episode of violence, the nature of allegations against the appellant, and the statutory framework governing joint and separate trials.

The Court observed: “Separate trial is the rule under Section 218 of the CrPC; a joint trial may be permissible where the offences form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Sections 219–223 of the CrPC are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion.”

It further stated: “The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons.”

The Court recorded: “The two paramount considerations in such decision making are whether a joint trial would cause prejudice to the accused, and whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time.”

It also stated: “Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated.”

The Court noted: “An order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely because a joint or separate trial was possible; interference is justified only where prejudice or miscarriage of justice is shown.”

Turning to the facts, the Bench recorded: “Section 223 of the CrPC, now Section 243 of the BNSS, makes it very clear that persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction may be charged and tried together.”

It stated: “The principle that flows is that a joint trial is permissible where the offences alleged arise from the same transaction. It is only in cases where the acts attributed to the accused are distinct and severable that separate trials would be warranted.”

The Court observed: “The High Court was not right in affirming the direction for a separate trial solely on the basis of the appellant’s political position. Such segregation has no foundation in law and would amount to discriminatory treatment.”

It further stated: “Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution demand equality before law and fair trial. To direct a separate charge sheet and trial against a single accused on account of his political status is antithetical to these constitutional guarantees.”

Prefacing its orders, the Court stated that “while expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is undoubtedly desirable, such administrative prioritization cannot override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Cr.P.C. or the constitutional mandate of equality. Segregating the appellant’s trial solely on account of his political office, in the absence of any legal or factual necessity, amounts to arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process.”

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The Court ordered: “In view of the foregoing, the impugned orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024 passed by the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court in its judgment dated 12.12.2024 are hereby set aside. The direction to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant and the consequential segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused are quashed.”

“The matter is remitted to the trial Court with a direction to conduct a joint trial of the appellant along with the co-accused, in accordance with law. The trial Court shall be at liberty to regulate the schedule of proceedings to ensure expeditious disposal, but shall do so, without compromising procedural safeguards and only after hearing all concerned parties.” This restores a joint trial framework while expressly permitting the trial court to manage timelines consistent with fairness obligations.

“Accordingly, both the criminal appeals are disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.”

Case Title: Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1113
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 4002 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1829 of 2025) with Criminal Appeal No. 4003 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 18089 of 2024)
Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R. Mahadevan