Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Joymalya Bagchi held that allegations of touching the private parts of a minor do not satisfy the ingredients of rape under Section 375 read with Section 376AB of the Indian Penal Code, nor penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Instead, the Court determined that such acts constitute aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act and outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 354 IPC, warranting modified conviction and sentence.

The matter arose from a criminal appeal challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court, which had found the accused guilty under Section 376AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Trial Court sentenced the accused to twenty years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of ₹50,000, with a default sentence of one year. This judgment was subsequently affirmed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur on 28 January 2025.

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The prosecution’s case originated from a complaint made by the mother of a minor girl below twelve years of age. It was alleged that the accused touched the private parts of the child and, at the same time, touched his own sexual organs. The victim repeated these allegations consistently—first in the First Information Report, later in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and again during trial. However, at no stage did she describe penetration. The medical report also did not indicate any act of penetration.

Before the Supreme Court, senior counsel for the appellant argued that the ingredients of rape under Section 375 IPC and penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 POCSO Act were not established. It was submitted that, at most, the facts disclosed offences under Section 354 IPC, which criminalises assault with intent to outrage modesty, and Section 9(m) POCSO Act, which defines aggravated sexual assault on a child below twelve years of age. Attention was also drawn to the fact that the appellant had already spent over five years in custody.

Counsel for the State opposed the appeal, asserting that the acts described in the complaint and victim’s deposition met the definition of rape under Section 375 IPC and penetrative sexual assault under Section 3(c) POCSO Act, and therefore the conviction and sentence required no modification.

The Supreme Court examined the FIR, the depositions of the victim, and the medical evidence. It concluded that the allegations did not establish penetration, and therefore the convictions under Section 376AB IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act could not stand. The conduct, however, was found to constitute offences under Section 354 IPC and Section 9(m) POCSO Act.

The Bench began by assessing the definition of rape under Section 375 IPC and penetrative sexual assault under Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act. It noted: “A plain reading of the evidence and other materials on record reveal that the offence made out from such allegation do not satisfy the ingredients of either Section 375 of the IPC or Section 3(c) of the POCSO Act. Thus, to that extent, the conviction cannot be sustained.”

It observed: “The presumption by the Trial Court as upheld by the High Court that there was penetrative sexual assault, cannot be sustained for simple reason that the same is neither supported by the medical report nor by the statement of the victim herself on three different occasions as also, that of the mother of the victim.”

It stated: “From the said reading of all the three statements which have common thread, the direct allegation is of touching the private parts of the victim and also at the same time, the appellant touching his private organs. In such view of the matter, we find that the conviction recorded under Section 376 AB of the IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, cannot be sustained.”

It recorded: “What has come right from the beginning by way of complaint/FIR, subsequent deposition of the victim as also, the other witnesses, the so-called act of the appellant will come under the purview of Section 354 of the IPC and Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act.”

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“For reasons aforesaid, we modify the conviction of the appellant to that under Section 354 of the IPC and under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. Accordingly, the sentence of the appellant also stands modified to that of R.I. of five years under Section 354 of the IPC and seven years under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. However, the said sentences shall run concurrently.”

“As far as the fine amount is concerned, the same is retained as Rs.50,000/ (Rupees Fifty Thousand) and should be paid to the victim as compensation within two months from today. The appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Mr. Ranji Thomas, Senior Advocate; Mr. Mohan Raj A, Advocate; Ms. Charulata Chaudhary, AOR; Ms. Kshirja Agarwal, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Advocate; Ms. Rajnandani Kumari, Advocate; Mr. Kapil Katare, Advocate; Mr. Ambuj Swaroop, Advocate; Ms. Minakshi Pandey, Advocate; Mr. Prashant Singh, AOR

Case Title: Laxman Jangde v State of Chhattisgarh
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2025 (@SLP (Crl.) No.10377 of 2025)
Bench: Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice Joymalya Bagchi