Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Kerala Division Bench of Justice Dr. A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian, in an intra-court reference arising from a case filed by a divorced Muslim woman against her former husband, has held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications seeking fair and reasonable provision and maintenance under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Reaffirming its earlier view in Hassainar v. Raziya that such claims are subject to a three-year limitation period, the Court treated proceedings under Section 3 as civil in nature and directed that the petition be remitted to the Single Judge to determine whether the husband has sufficient means and to dispose of the matter in light of this finding.

The matter arose from an Intra Court Reference placed before a Division Bench following an order of a Single Judge questioning the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to claims under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The proceedings originated when the petitioner challenged the judgment of the Sessions Court that had upheld dismissal of her claim for fair and reasonable provision and maintenance under Section 3 of the 1986 Act. The Magistrate had dismissed the claim on two grounds: first, that the application was barred by limitation as it was filed nine years after the dissolution of marriage; and second, that the petitioner had executed an agreement relinquishing her rights at the time of talaq.

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In revision, the Sessions Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that limitation did not apply but held on facts that the claim was within time since it was filed within three years of alleged refusal of maintenance. The Sessions Court nevertheless dismissed her claim on the grounds of relinquishment and failure to prove the husband’s sufficient means.

Before the Single Judge, the petitioner disputed the findings on relinquishment and the husband's lack of means. There was no challenge to the limitation finding. The Single Judge decided the issue of relinquishment but referred the question of limitation to the Division Bench.

The Division Bench examined the statutory framework of the 1986 Act, including Sections 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), and 4, and evaluated whether proceedings under Section 3 were civil or criminal in nature.

The Court recorded that the question of limitation “did not really arise for consideration in the Crl.M.C before the learned Single Judge,” noting that the Sessions Court had already found the claim within time. It further stated that the Single Judge had considered only one issue—whether the agreement precluded the petitioner’s rights—and that the issue of the husband’s financial capacity “was not considered by the learned Single Judge.”

The Bench observed that proceedings under Section 3 of the 1986 Act were wrongly assumed to be criminal. It stated that the reference order “proceeds on an erroneous premise viz. that the proceedings under Section 3 of the 1986 Act are criminal proceedings.” The Court explained that criminal proceedings are exempt from limitation based on the principle that “crime never dies,” citing the Latin maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi.

The Bench stated that proceedings under Section 3 “are not criminal proceedings but civil proceedings, although the adjudicatory forum might be a Magistrate’s court.” It added that “the nature of the right envisaged to a claimant under the 1986 Act... being of a civil nature, the adjudication proceedings have necessarily to be seen as civil proceedings.”

The Court recorded that the enforcement mechanism under the CrPC “does not take away from the fact that the adjudication proceedings themselves are civil proceedings,” and clarified that the proceedings become criminal only at the stage of execution.

Referring to the earlier judgment in Hassainar, the Bench stated: “We see no reason to take a different view. We therefore affirm the view of the learned Single Judge in Hassainar…” that Article 137 applies to claims under Section 3.

The Court also addressed reliance on judgments concerning Section 125 CrPC. It recorded: “We find ourselves unable to accept the said proposition,” observing that Section 125 has a built-in protection for the husband through subsection (2), which limits maintenance to the date of the application. By contrast, Section 3 of the 1986 Act provides a specific substantive right dependent on proof of need and neglect.

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The Court stated: “In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, by affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Hassainar… to the extent it holds that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to applications for adjudication made under Section 3 of the 1986 Act.”

“The Crl.M.C is now remitted back to the learned Single Judge for deciding the correctness of the finding of the Sessions Court, that the petitioner had not proved that her husband had sufficient means to pay the amount claimed by her.” The Bench added that the matter shall be disposed of by the learned Single Judge “based on the finding already entered in the reference order on the issue of the petitioner’s claim not being affected by the agreement entered into between her and her husband, and the answer provided herein to the question referred to us.”

“The Registry is directed to place the file before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders on the administrative side.”

Advocates Representing The Parties

For the Petitioner:Sri. Prashanth Padmanabhan, Advocate; Smt. K.V. Bhadra Kumari, Advocate

For the Respondents:Smt. Sheeba Thomas, Public Prosecutor; Sri. B.J. John Prakash, Advocate; Sri. P. Pramel, Advocate; Sri. Sooraj M.S., Advocate; Smt. Varsha Vijayakumar Nair, Advocate; Smt. Anagha Madath Thekkepatte, Advocate; Smt. Sona A.B., Advocate; Sri. Colin Alex, Advocate

Case Title: Safia P.M. vs State of Kerala & Another
Neutral Citation: 2025: KER:91029
Case Number: ICR (Crl.M.C). No.14 of 2025 and Crl.M.C No.3126 of 2022
Bench: Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar; Justice Jobin Sebastian