Victim’s Appeal Against Accused’s Acquittal Can Be Summarily Dismissed If Victim Shows No Prima Facie Arguable Case; Kerala High Court
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Kerala Division Bench of Justice Dr. A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian dismissed, at the admission stage, a victim’s appeal against acquittal, holding that an appeal under the proviso to Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita can be summarily dismissed when there is no prima facie material to indicate an arguable case. The court also held that the summary-dismissal power under Section 425 applies to victim appeals under Section 413.
The case arose from allegations made by the victim that on 3 December 2018, while she was waiting outside a house in Kasaragod, the accused allegedly took her to a rocky area and committed sexual assault, followed by threats of death if the incident was disclosed. The prosecution case rested on the assertion that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community and that the accused was aware of her social status at the time of the alleged offence.
The Sessions Court, after trial, acquitted the accused. Aggrieved by the acquittal, the victim preferred an appeal before the High Court under the proviso to Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The appeal challenged the findings of the trial court, particularly its assessment of the victim’s testimony, delay in lodging the complaint, and absence of corroborative evidence.
The State was represented through the Public Prosecutor and supported the impugned judgment. The appeal came up for admission before the Division Bench, which examined whether the matter disclosed prima facie grounds warranting admission or whether it was liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
The Division Bench observed that “the right of a victim to file an appeal is a statutory right” and that in cases involving sexual offences, such appeals would ordinarily merit admission if there existed “at least prima facie, an arguable case in favour of the victim.” However, the Court also recorded that “the inconvenience and stigma that may be caused to the accused until the appeal is finally decided cannot be ignored.”
The Bench stated that once an accused has secured an acquittal, casual admission of an appeal could result in proceedings “hanging as a ‘Damocles’ sword’ over his head until the appeal is concluded.” The Court further noted that allegations of sexual offences may sometimes be raised for extraneous reasons, while also acknowledging instances where acquittals occur due to improper appreciation of evidence.
On the scope of appellate interference, the Court observed that “an appellate court would not interfere with a judgment of acquittal unless it is demonstrated that the trial court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or grossly unjust.” It recorded that where two views are possible and the trial court has adopted one leading to acquittal, substitution of that view is ordinarily unwarranted.
Assessing the evidence, the Court noted that the prosecution relied solely on the testimony of the victim and that the trial court had found her evidence “neither convincing nor trustworthy.” The Bench observed that the trial court found it suspicious that no alarm was raised when the alleged incident occurred and that the victim did not disclose the incident even when confronted by her husband immediately thereafter.
The Court also recorded that the explanation regarding delay in lodging the complaint was found unsatisfactory, noting contradictions between the statement under Section 164 CrPC and later testimony. It further observed that the absence of physical injuries or damage to clothing was taken into account by the trial court while assessing consent and credibility. The Bench concluded that “the view taken by the trial court cannot be said to be patently erroneous, perverse or contrary to the settled principles of law.”
The Court recorded that “this appeal has been filed against an order of acquittal” and reiterated that “an interference in such an order cannot be done in a casual manner.” Since “there is already an order of acquittal, a prima facie presumption of innocence is available in favour of the accused,” and that interference would be justified only if the view of the trial court was shown to be “perverse, illegal, or grossly unjust.”
“The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita does not contain any specific provision for the summary dismissal of an appeal filed by a victim challenging an order of acquittal. The provision for summary dismissal of appeals under Section 425 BNSS will apply mutatis mutandis to the summary dismissal of an appeal filed by a victim under the proviso to Section 413 BNSS.”
“There is not even prima facie material to show that the victim has an arguable case in her favour.” It therefore held that “the present appeal challenging the judgment of acquittal is liable to be summarily dismissed. We therefore dismiss the appeal in limine.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Appellant/Victim: Smt. Sherly Mol Thomas, Advocate
For the Respondents/State: Smt. Sheeba Thomas, Public Prosecutor
Case Title: X v. Gopalan K.T.
Neutral Citation: 2025: KER:95873
Case Number: CRA(V) No. 81 of 2025
Bench: Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, Justice Jobin Sebastian
