‘Violence, Lynching and Vigilantism Order of the Day’ — Allahabad High Court Questions Casual FIRs and Seeks Affidavits from DGP and Principal Secretary on Misuse of Law
Sanchayita Lahkar
The High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow, Division Bench of Justices Abdul Moin and Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary took serious note of the casual manner in which police authorities have been registering cases under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, and the recurring issue of cow vigilantism in the State. While directing that no coercive action be taken against the petitioner—owner of a vehicle involved in cattle transport—the Court found that no offence was made out as the animals were alive. It further directed the Principal Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police to file personal affidavits explaining the basis for such FIRs.
The matter arose from a petition seeking quashing of a First Information Report registered under Sections 3, 5A, and 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, at Police Station Kotwali Nagar, District Pratapgarh. The petitioner, owner of a Bolero pickup vehicle, contended that the vehicle was driven by his employee who failed to return after taking it out, and that he later learned of the FIR lodged in connection with alleged transportation of cattle for slaughter.
According to the FIR, police authorities received information that progeny of cows were being transported from Amethi to Pratapgarh for slaughter. The police intercepted a pickup vehicle matching the description, whose occupants fled upon seeing them. Upon inspection, nine cow progeny were found bound with ropes and in a state of distress inside the vehicle. The vehicle was identified as belonging to the petitioner, leading to registration of the FIR under the aforementioned statutory provisions.
The petitioner asserted that he was not present in the vehicle and had not engaged in any act constituting slaughter or cruelty. He argued that transportation within the State did not attract Section 5A of the 1955 Act, and that no offence was made out under Sections 3 or 8 since the animals were alive and unharmed.
The Court examined the FIR and observed that it contained no allegation of interstate transport or slaughter. It referred to earlier rulings holding that movement of cattle within the State does not violate Section 5A, and that mere preparation for slaughter is not an offence under the 1955 Act.
The Division Bench recorded that “from a perusal of the First Information Report it emerges that the progeny of the cow totalling nine in number were being carried in the Pickup vehicle.” It further noted that “the vehicle was also from the side of Amethi and going towards the Pratapgarh meaning thereby that there is no allegation in the First Information Report of the progeny of the cow being transported outside the State.” The Court cited its earlier decision in Kaliya v. State of U.P. (2023 SCC OnLine All 1974) to affirm that “transportation of progeny of cow within the State is not a crime and the provisions of Section 5(A) of the Act, 1955 would not be attracted.”
The Bench held that since no slaughtering or maiming was alleged, the provisions of Section 3 of the Act were also not applicable. “It is also not the case of respondents that the petitioner had indulged in slaughtering of the progeny of the cow inasmuch as the progeny of the cow has been found alive,” the judgment recorded. The Court observed that consequently, “the penalty as prescribed under the provisions of Section 8 of the Act, 1955 would also not be attracted.”
Regarding the allegation under Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, the Court stated that the provision applies where a person “beats, kicks, over-rides, over-drives, tortures or otherwise treats any animal so as to subject it to unnecessary pain or suffering.” Since the petitioner was only the registered owner of the vehicle and was not present during the incident, “prima facie it cannot be said that any offence under Section 11 of the Act, 1960 are attracted against the petitioner.”
This Court is deluged with such matters on the basis of First Information Reports being filed left and right by the authorities and complainants under the provisions of the Act, 1955,” the Bench observed.
Quoting from the 1962 precedent Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz (AIR 1962 All 22), the Bench reiterated that “mere preparation for slaughter of an animal is not an offence.” It further cited the Supreme Court judgement in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narayan Singh (1989) 3 SCC 596, which clarified that “in the commission of an offence there are four stages, namely intention, preparation, attempt, and execution. The first two stages would not attract culpability.” The Bench concluded that “from a perusal of First Information Report, it does not come out that the persons had made any attempt to slaughter or had executed the slaughter.”
Based on the findings, the Court held that “until further order of this Court, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner in pursuance to the impugned First Information Report.” The petitioner was directed to cooperate with the investigation.
The Bench directed the Principal Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, to file personal affidavits within three weeks. The affidavits must explain “why such casual First Information Reports are being filed against persons left and right which has resulted in various petitions being filed before this Court even though the provisions of the Act, 1955 are not attracted.” The Court also required the officials to state what action would be taken against police personnel and complainants responsible for filing such FIRs.
The Court further recorded that the issue of vigilantism was becoming increasingly serious, referring to a recent case where vigilantes stopped a vehicle and it later became untraceable. It invoked the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) 9 SCC 501, observing that “mob vigilantism and mob violence are to be prevented by the Governments by taking strict action.” The Bench expressed concern that despite the apex court’s directions, “violence, lynching and vigilantism is the order of the day.”
It held that “prima facie the circular as issued by the Director General of Police does not conform to the direction as issued by the Apex Court… a Government order should have been issued in this regard which should reflect the official decision, policy or administrative directions of the Government.” The Bench therefore directed that the affidavits must also indicate what steps the State Government has taken to comply with the Supreme Court’s directives in Tehseen S. Poonawalla and Kodungallur Film Society v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 713.
Citing Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 470, the Bench observed that frivolous litigation wastes valuable judicial time and causes unwarranted hardship to innocent individuals. It stated that “on account of filing of frivolous First Information Reports… the aggrieved persons are constrained to approach this Court for the redressal of their grievances whereby spending their valuable money and time and at the same time, the precious judicial time of the Court is also wasted.” The Court warned that if such cases continued, it might consider imposing exemplary costs on authorities filing FIRs without proper application of mind.
The matter was directed to be listed on 07.11.2025 as fresh, and in case of non-compliance, “the Principal Secretary (Home) and Director General of Police shall appear in person before this Court along with record to assist the Court.”
Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Petitioner: Ravendra Pratap Singh, Advocate
Case Title: Rahul Yadav v. State of U.P. through Secretary, Home, Lucknow and Others
Case Number: Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9567 of 2025
Bench: Justice Abdul Moin, Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary
