Working “For” an Organisation Not Same as Working “In” It | Delhi High Court Quashes Termination of BIS Assistant Director Under Recruitment Regulations, 2020
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Manoj Jain allowed a writ petition challenging an order of termination issued against a probationary officer in a statutory body under the Union Government. The Court quashed the termination memorandum and declared that the petitioner would be deemed to be in continuous service with all consequential benefits. The Court held that there was no misrepresentation or suppression of facts by the petitioner and directed that the termination order be set aside. The Court recorded that since the petitioner had already acquired the requisite experience while serving in the organization, there was no justification for termination of service. The judgment concluded that the writ petition deserved to be allowed, and the petitioner was entitled to continuity in service without any break.
The petitioner, a law graduate enrolled as an advocate in October 2011, was appointed as Assistant Director (Administration & Finance)-Legal in the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), a statutory body under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. The BIS had issued an advertisement on 5 September 2020 inviting applications for various posts including Assistant Director (Administration & Finance)-Legal. The eligibility criteria for the post required a degree in law and three years’ experience in the relevant field in Central/State/Union Territory Government or Statutory/Autonomous Body/Public Sector Undertaking or a reputed Government agency.
The petitioner applied for the post and after a detailed scrutiny of eligibility, was shortlisted, interviewed, and appointed by letter dated 29 July 2021. She joined on 1 September 2021. During her service, she received positive Annual Performance Appraisal Reports (APARs) and also applied for the higher post of Director (Legal). However, on 13 April 2022, she was issued a show cause notice alleging concealment of facts regarding qualifications and experience. The notice particularly questioned her experience with IEC University and her disclosure of LLM degrees.
The petitioner responded with a detailed reply on 25 May 2022, asserting that she had fully disclosed her eligibility, that her experience certificates had been duly verified, and that her engagement with IEC University as an empanelled advocate met the prescribed criteria. She argued that she had neither misrepresented nor suppressed any information and further stated that the Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs had categorically clarified her eligibility in December 2023.
The respondents contended that the petitioner did not meet the requisite experience criteria, as her association with IEC University as an empanelled advocate could not be considered as experience "in" an organization, and that she had concealed material facts. It was argued that her probationary status allowed the employer to terminate her service without stigma or violation of principles of natural justice. The Executive Committee of BIS, in its meeting on 6 August 2024, interpreted the regulations to exclude empanelled advocates from eligibility. Based on its recommendation and approval from the Central Government, BIS issued the impugned termination memorandum on 12 November 2024.
The petitioner had earlier approached the Rajasthan High Court, which stayed the operation of the termination order. Later, due to jurisdictional objections, the petition was withdrawn with liberty to approach the Delhi High Court. The interim order was directed to continue for eight weeks, after which the present writ was filed before the Delhi High Court.
The petitioner argued that she was victimized for filing a complaint under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 against a senior officer. It was further submitted that her termination was arbitrary, contrary to natural justice, and actuated by malafides. She relied on various precedents including Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain (1976) 2 SCC 58, M.S. Mudhol v. S.D. Halegkar (1993) 3 SCC 591, and Varinder Hans v. Union of India, among others.
The respondents, represented by the Additional Solicitor General, opposed the petition, asserting that the termination was valid, based on ineligibility, and not stigmatic. They relied on decisions such as State of Haryana v. Suman Dutta (2000) 10 SCC 311, Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya (2021) 13 SCC 151, and Pratibha v. Union of India, to argue that termination of probationary employees is permissible.
Justice Manoj Jain recorded that the core issue was whether the petitioner satisfied the eligibility criteria of three years’ experience "in" Central/State/Union Territory Government or Statutory/Autonomous Body/Public Sector Undertaking or reputed Government agency. The Court observed: “Unquestionably, ‘working for organization’ cannot be equated with ‘working in organization’. A person may represent a governmental body before a Court of law but that would not mean that he is also working in such organization or governmental body.”
The Court further stated: “This one small word ‘in’ suggests the real intent and objective of BIS. Had the position been thrown open for mere practicing advocates, it could have been easily mentioned by BIS in the advertisement itself.”
However, the Court stated that there was no misrepresentation by the petitioner: “Fact remains that there was never any misrepresentation or submission of any false certificate by her. She had submitted two certificates… The aforesaid certificates clearly indicated that she was never working in IEC University and was rather continuously practicing as an advocate.”
The Court noted that the Selection Committee, despite initial reservations, found her fit and recommended her appointment after due verification. The Court recorded: “If the Committee was not satisfied with her work-experience certificate or was of the view that it is not in synchronization with the eligibility criteria described in the advertisement, it should have, then and there, declared her unfit.”
On the issue of concealment of LLM degrees, the Court observed that the minimum qualification required was a Bachelor’s degree in Law and therefore, non-disclosure of higher degrees did not materially affect her eligibility. The Court remarked: “Ideally, she should have disclosed the same but her non-disclosure would not be taken adverse to her selection, in the present context.”
The Court noted that the Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, had specifically clarified that the petitioner fulfilled the eligibility criteria. Despite this, BIS constituted an Executive Committee and obtained Central Government approval to terminate her, without giving her a fresh opportunity to respond. The Court recorded: “Admittedly, when the matter was pending consideration before the Executive Committee, XX was never afforded any opportunity to represent her case. To me, even if, on previous occasions, she was heard and her response was also sought, there was no automatic absolution and BIS should have sought her response afresh, instead of going ahead with the meeting and deliberation, in one-sided manner.”
The Court referred to the principle that termination of probationers may be permissible but must not be stigmatic. It observed: “Quite obviously, when a probationer’s appointment is terminated, the message, direct or indirect, is that probationer is unfit for the job… Therefore, generally speaking, stigma would be inherent in any such termination and, therefore, the task is to find out the real cause.”
The Court concluded that in the present case, the termination order carried stigmatic implications since it alleged suppression and ineligibility, despite there being no concealment or fraud by the petitioner. It recorded: “Thus, the manner of termination, for all purposes, has the trappings of stigma.”
Relying on the precedent of M.S. Mudhol v. S.D. Halegkar, the Court held that where a candidate has not misrepresented facts, but the selection committee erred in interpretation, the employee should not suffer, particularly after having acquired the requisite experience during service. The Court stated: “Illegality, if any, was committed by the Selection Committee and they alone were to be blamed for the same.”
The Court quashed the termination memorandum dated 12 November 2024. It directed that the petitioner would be deemed to be in continuous service with all consequential benefits. Justice Jain stated: “In view of my foregoing discussion, writ petition is allowed and, consequently, the Termination Memorandum dated 12.11.2024 is hereby quashed.” The Court further directed: “Since petitioner continues to be in service, there is no requirement of passing any further direction. Needless to say, she would be deemed to be in continuous service with all consequential benefits.”
The Court also recorded that there would be no order as to costs.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Mr. Jaideep Gupta, Senior Advocate, Mr. Jatan Singh, Senior Advocate, Mr. K.K. Mannan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rana S. Biswas, Mr. Vivek Jain and Mr. Puneet Parihar, Advocates
For the Respondents: Mr. S.D. Sanjay, ASG with Mr. Gaurav Sharma, SPCUOI, Mr. Sachin Singh, Advocate and Ms. Vidhi Gupta (GP), Mr. Tarun Agarwal, Ms. Parthvi Ahuja, Mr. Akshat Agarwal, Mr. Bhaskar Agarwal, Mr. Shrey Patnaik, Mr. Ritwik Batra and Ms. Mitali Karwa, Advocates
Case Title: XX v. Union of India & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:7413
Case Number: W.P.(C) 9931/2025
Bench: Justice Manoj Jain
