Isabella Mariam

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana Division Bench of Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice H.S. Grewal held that orders passed by regulatory authorities, appellate authorities, and adjudicating officers under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, must be executed separately by the respective bodies. The Court quashed a State notification that purported to vest adjudicating officers under RERA with the powers of the Collector for execution of all recovery certificates, including those passed by other authorities. The Bench ruled that such delegation was in derogation of the statutory framework, specifically Section 40(1) of the 2016 Act and Rule 27 of the 2017 Rules. The Court clarified that execution must proceed through statutory procedure and by the respective adjudicating body, using land revenue recovery mechanisms, and not by intermixing jurisdictions.

The petitioner, a private real estate entity, filed a writ petition challenging Notification No. 50/15/2024-5S(1) dated 11.05.2024, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Haryana. The impugned notification vested adjudicating officers appointed under Section 71 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, with the powers of the Collector under the Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887, to execute recovery certificates issued by HRERA at Gurugram and Panchkula.

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The petitioner contended that the said notification was patently illegal, arbitrary, and issued sub coloris officii. It argued that vesting such executory authority in adjudicating officers contradicted Section 40(1) of the 2016 Act, which delineates specific recovery mechanisms and prescribes that orders pertaining to interest, penalty, or compensation shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue, in the manner prescribed.

The Court examined the structure of the 2016 Act, highlighting Section 40 and the delegation clause in Section 81. The petitioner submitted that Section 40(1) allows for execution of orders only “in such manner as may be prescribed,” referencing Rule 27 of the Haryana Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017. Rule 27 provides for enforcement of orders by the same authority that passed them, either as civil court decrees or by transferring execution to a civil court.

The petitioner further referred to the judgment in M/s International Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Aditi Chauhan & Ors. (CWP-7738-2022), where the same High Court had directed the State to make provisions to enforce recovery as arrears of land revenue and to amend Rule 27 accordingly. That ruling also suggested posting revenue officers with HRERA to handle such recoveries.

However, the petitioner asserted that in contravention of the above decision, the State had instead issued the impugned notification, assigning broad execution powers to adjudicating officers, even for orders not passed by them, including those issued by the regulatory authority or appellate tribunal. The petitioner maintained that the adjudicating officer’s powers under Section 71 of the 2016 Act are limited to adjudging compensation under Sections 12, 14, 18, and 19, and not to executing penalty or interest orders passed by other statutory bodies under the Act.

The State of Haryana, through its Additional Advocate General and Deputy Advocates General, supported the notification, asserting that it was issued under the combined authority of Sections 10 and 27 of the Haryana Land Revenue Act, 1887, and Section 83 of the 2016 Act. The notification was intended to enhance administrative efficiency and decentralize execution of recovery proceedings.

The Union of India and HRERA officials were also arrayed as parties. The respondents defended the validity of the delegation made via the notification, relying on Section 81 of the 2016 Act which allows the Authority to delegate its powers to members, officers, or any other person.

The core issue that emerged was whether an adjudicating officer under Section 71 of the 2016 Act could be lawfully vested with the power to execute recovery certificates pertaining to penalty or interest imposed by authorities other than itself—namely, the Regulatory Authority or the Appellate Tribunal.

The Court framed the statutory landscape by interpreting Section 40(1) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016: “The adjudicated lis appertaining to levy of penalty and interest upon the concerned, as made by the regulatory authority concerned, or the appellate authority concerned, thus is permitted to be executed by the adjudicating officer/authority, only if explicitly so provided.”

Discussing the different statutory functions assigned to various authorities under the Act, the Court recorded: “There are separately conferred functional adjudicatory fields rather respectively upon the regulatory authority or upon the appellate authority besides upon the adjudicating officers/ authorities concerned.”

It further clarified that: “The adjudicating officer/authority is empowered to adjudicate compensation under Sections 12, 14, 18, and 19… but this does not extend to executing interest or penalty imposed by other authorities.”

The Bench observed that Section 40(1) provides a common recovery mechanism—recovery as arrears of land revenue—but not a common executory authority: “The commonality qua foisting of executory jurisdiction cannot be extended to empower the adjudicating officer/authority to execute orders appertaining to levying of interest and penalty.”

The Court addressed the scope of delegation under Section 81: “Even the said provision was not recoursable… it would make an open rife conflict with the specifically statutorily earmarked fields of adjudication.”

Citing Rule 27 of the 2017 Rules, it held: “It is explicitly enunciated that the adjudicated lis can be effectively executed as a decree of the civil court, besides obviously as arrears of land revenue.”

Referring to Section 67 of the 1887 Land Revenue Act, the Court examined processes like writs of demand, arrest and detention, distress and sale, and attachment of estates, concluding: “The remedies are expansive and work as a sufficient deterrent against the person concerned, upon whom the levies are fastened.”

The Court also rejected the argument that Section 27 of the 1887 Act permitted the conferment of Collector’s powers to adjudicating officers: “There cannot be any co-mingling of separately created adjudicatory fields… there cannot be any coalescing of the apposite executory jurisdictions.”

Regarding the prior ruling in M/s International Land Developers, the Court stated that it was rendered “per incuriam the provisions embodied in Rule 27 of the Rules of 2017.”

Ultimately, the Bench ruled that “orders passed by the regulatory authority or by the appellate authority or by the adjudicating officer/authority, as created under the Act of 2016, shall become separately executed by them… in terms of Section 40(1).”

The Court held that the writ petition had merit and issued the following directions: “The writ petition is allowed. Resultantly, the impugned notification dated 11.05.2024 (Annexure P-1) is hereby quashed and set aside.”

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It further clarified the correct executory pathway under the statute: “The orders respectively passed by the regulatory authority or by the appellate authority or by the adjudicating officer/authority, as created under the Act of 2016, shall become separately executed by them, through the apposite application(s) in terms of Section 40(1) of the Act of 2016.”

The Court instructed that such applications must proceed in accordance with the prescribed recovery mechanism:

“They shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue in terms of Rule 27 of the Rules of 2017, besides in terms of Section 67 of the Act of 1887.”

Lastly, the Court directed:“All authorities shall ensure that the apposite orders are executed in the same manner, as decrees rendered by civil court of competent jurisdiction, thus are executed.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioner: Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Senior Advocate and Mr. Anand Chhibbar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vaibhav Sahni and Mr. Venket Rao, Advocates.

For the Respondents: Mr. Satya Pal Jain, Additional Solicitor General of India with Mr. Shobit Phutela, Senior Panel Counsel; Mr. Ankur Mittal, Additional Advocate General, Haryana; Ms. Svaneel Jaswal, Additional Advocate General, Haryana; Mr. P.P. Chahar, Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana; Mr. Saurah Mago, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana; Mr. Gaurav Bansal, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana; Mr. Karan Jindal, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana; Mr. Ankur Mittal, Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur Manchanda, Ms. Gurcharan Kaur, Mr. Sandeep Chabbra, and Ms. Saanvi Singla, Advocates.

Case Title: M/S Vatika Limited v. Union of India and Others

Neutral Citation: 2025: PHHC:052003 -DB

Case Number: CWP-14937-2024 (O&M)

Bench: Justice Sureshwar Thakur, Justice H.S. Grewal

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