“No Suit Shall Lie to Set Aside a Decree on the Ground That the Compromise Was Not Lawful”: Supreme Court Dismisses Appeal Challenging Consent Decree in Partition Suit
Safiya Malik
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah dismissed a civil appeal seeking to challenge a compromise decree passed in a partition suit concerning ancestral property. The Court held that the filing of a separate civil suit to nullify a consent decree is expressly barred under Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Bench affirmed that the remedy against such a decree lies not in initiating a new proceeding, but in approaching the court which recorded the compromise.
The matter originated in a family partition. In 1974, a partition took place between the appellants’ father, his five brothers, and their father. The partition was registered and concerned the family’s ancestral property.
In 1998, the appellants filed Original Suit No. 219 of 1998 against their father and mother seeking partition and division of the ancestral property. During the pendency of this suit, the appellants’ grandfather filed another partition suit, O.S. No. 58 of 1999, against his six sons, including the appellants’ father. In this suit, it was claimed that 7 acres of joint family land had been omitted from the 1974 partition. On 18.01.2000, a compromise was reached among the parties, and the Trial Court passed a consent decree dividing the 7 acres equally among the grandfather and the six sons.
By this arrangement, the appellants’ father received one acre. Subsequently, on 02.08.2002, the Trial Court decreed O.S. No. 219 of 1998 and declared that the appellants were jointly entitled to half of their father’s share in the property, amounting to 0.5 acres.
In 2003, the appellants filed a new suit, No. 1 of 2003, challenging the legality of the compromise decree dated 18.01.2000. They argued that the 7-acre property was not ancestral but had been purchased by their grandmother in the name of their father. It was claimed that their father, grandfather, and uncles colluded to execute the compromise without their knowledge, resulting in the dilution of their share. They sought cancellation of the consent decree and a fresh partition of the 7 acres.
The Trial Court dismissed the 2003 suit. The appellants then filed a first appeal before the High Court, which was also dismissed on 23.09.2022. The High Court ruled that the suit was barred under Order 23 Rule 3A of the CPC and that the appellants’ contentions were meritless in light of the earlier proceedings.
The appellants then approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4812 of 2023. On grant of leave, the matter was heard as a civil appeal. The appellants contended that the compromise was executed without authority and amounted to fraud. The respondents opposed the appeal, submitting that the compromise was lawful, the appellants were adequately represented through their father, and their entitlement had already been adjudicated.
The Court examined the complete litigation history and considered the legal issues arising from the appellants’ challenge to the compromise decree. It recorded: “There are concurrent findings of the Courts below against the appellants.”
The Court noted the appellants’ contention that the 7-acre property was not ancestral. It stated: “The appellants vehemently argue that since the suit property is not an ancestral property, it cannot be partitioned amongst their father, grandfather and father’s brothers.”
After examining the evidence, the Court stated: “The appellants miserably failed to prove that the suit property is not a part of the ancestral property.”
The Bench held that the Trial Court had correctly determined the nature of the property, stating: “Although the suit property was purchased in the name of the appellants’ father, it was purchased from the family funds and, thus, it is a joint family property.”
Addressing the status of the compromise decree, the Court stated: “The appellants’ interest was represented by their father, and pursuant to the compromise decree, the appellants’ father received his part of the share.”
The Bench also referred to the outcome of the 1998 suit filed by the appellants, noting:
“As per the decree dated 02.08.2002 passed in Suit No.219/1998 filed by the appellants, the appellants have also been held jointly entitled to a half share of their father’s share of the suit property.”
Regarding the allegation of collusion and fraud, the Court stated: “We are unable to understand how the appellants can claim it to be an act of fraud.”
The Court then examined the legal bar to the appellants’ suit. Citing Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, it quoted: “No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”
It then referred to the precedent in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566, stating: “The only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise.”
The Court explained that even if the appellants’ father had been coerced, the remedy did not lie in a fresh suit. It stated: “Even if we accept the contention of the appellants that their father was coerced… a fresh suit is still not a valid remedy.”
The Court noted that the appellants’ father had never challenged the compromise decree. It stated: “The appellants’ father has never done so! Moreover, he had admitted the consent decree and never questioned its validity.”
The Bench further stated: “If the father of the appellants has no grievance against the consent decree, then we are unable to understand how the appellants can be allowed to challenge it.”
The Court also found that the suit was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and by the doctrine of res judicata. It stated: “The present suit is also hit by the principles of res judicata or by constructive res judicata…”
The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal was devoid of merit and declined to interfere with the order of the High Court dated 23.09.2022. It held that no relief could be granted under the procedural and substantive law applicable to the case.
The Court directed that the civil appeal be dismissed, thereby affirming the correctness of the High Court’s order. This dismissal confirmed the bar on instituting a separate suit to challenge the legality of a compromise decree.
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. C.M. Angadi, Advocate; Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advocate-on-Record
For the Respondents: Mr. Sanket M. Yenagi, Advocate; Mr. Nikhil Jain, Advocate-on-Record; Mr. Chinmay Deshpande, Advocate; Mr. Anirudh Sanganeria, Advocate-on-Record
Case Title: Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi and Anr v. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead Through LRs)
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 517
Case Number: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 4812 of 2023
Bench: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
[Read/Download order]
