Safiya Malik

The Supreme Court has set aside an order of the High Court that had quashed criminal proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Bench comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra observed that “the High Court has exceeded the well-established principles for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” The Court found that the inherent powers under Section 482 were invoked on grounds already examined during earlier proceedings and held that such intervention was not legally sustainable.

The present matter arises from criminal proceedings initiated under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The respondent had joined public service as a surveyor in 1980 and was serving as an Assistant Director in the Nagercoil Local Planning Authority during the relevant period. Based on a complaint alleging possession of disproportionate assets, an investigation was conducted concerning the check period from 1 January 2001 to 31 August 2008.

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Following the investigation, the authorities found assets allegedly disproportionate to known sources of income, initially valued at ₹43,78,383 and subsequently revised to ₹26,88,057 after the prosecution accepted certain explanations. An FIR bearing No. 11/AC/2009/CC-III was registered under the PC Act on 27 July 2009. Sanction to prosecute was granted on 8 July 2013, and a charge sheet was filed on 23 September 2013.

The respondent filed a discharge application under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. before the Special Court, which was dismissed on 27 January 2016. The Special Court recorded that “whether the petitioner's daughter's grandfather had source of income to gift Rs. 7,80,000 /- are all can be considered only after full trial” and that “documents produced by the prosecution prima facie establishes there are materials for framing charges against the accused u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.”

A revision petition was subsequently filed before the High Court, which upheld the Special Court’s dismissal of the discharge plea. The High Court observed that “all the material records were placed by the prosecution, and therefore, it is incorrect to state that the since the said letter, dated 05.01.2009 was not placed, the trial court ought to have allowed the discharge petition.” The High Court concluded: “I do not find any valid ground to interfere with the impugned order of the trial Court, as this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the same.”

Despite this, the respondent approached the High Court once again within seven months, invoking Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to seek quashing of the proceedings. The petition raised grounds substantially similar to those previously urged in the discharge application.

The Supreme Court examined the matter in light of established jurisprudence governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It recorded that the High Court, in entertaining the quashing petition, revisited issues that had already been decided during the dismissal of the discharge application and the revision petition.

The Court referred to the precedent in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, noting that “while the bar under Section 397(3) of the CrPC does not curtail the remedy under Section 482, it is trite that inherent powers must be exercised sparingly.” The Bench further quoted from the decision: “Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant — cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention.”

Citing Renu Kumari v. Sanjay Kumar, the judgment reiterated that “it would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with,” and that courts should avoid conducting a “mini trial at this stage.”

The Court examined the High Court’s reliance on findings related to the validity of sanction for prosecution and held that the challenge raised by the respondent concerning the date of receipt of the sanction request and the authority of the person issuing sanction had not been raised at any earlier stage. The State contended that a typographical error had caused confusion regarding the dates, and the correct date of the request was 20 February 2013, not 20 December 2013.

The Supreme Court stated that “this is typically the problem that would arise when the High Court seeks to interdict proceedings and quash the criminal case before the relevant material to support the case of the prosecution is brought on record.” It held that such issues must be determined during trial and recorded that “findings regarding the legality, validity, or delay in grant of sanction were premature.”

It referred to Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of India, stating: “All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same category… the challenge to which can always be raised in the course of trial.” The Bench also cited Director, CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aswal, observing that: “the validity of a sanction order, if one exists, has to be tested on the touchstone of the prejudice to the accused which is essentially a question of fact and, therefore, should be left to be determined in the course of the trial.”

The Court ultimately concluded that the High Court’s interference under Section 482 was unsustainable in law. It recorded that “the High Court jumped to the probable conclusion of trial by not appreciating the limited scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C.” and had “asked the wrong question as to, ‘whether that would warrant a conviction.’”

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The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 21 April 2017. It directed that “C.C. No. 30/2013 [is] restored to the record of the Court of the Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Chennai, for the continuation of the trial from the stage the trial was interdicted.”

Further, the Court requested the trial court to conclude the proceedings at the earliest. The Bench noted, “Since the matter pertains to the check period 2001-2008, we request the Trial Court to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible.”

Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Sabarish Subramanian, Advocate-on-Record
For the Respondents: Abhishek Gupta, Advocate

Case Title: State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 397
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1405/2019
Bench: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Manoj Misra

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