Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered against a sitting Member of Parliament, holding that the contents of a poem recited in a video and posted on social media did not constitute any offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The Court held that the allegations made in the FIR did not attract the ingredients of Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 or 57 of the BNS. Referring to the importance of constitutional protections under Article 19(1)(a), the Court stated: “Liberty of thoughts and expression is one of the ideals of our Constitution.” The Division bench, comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, observed that the FIR reflected a mechanical application of the law and “virtually borders on perversity.” Directing the quashing of the FIR, the Court stated that the message conveyed by the poem did not promote any enmity or disharmony and instead “preaches non-violence” and “encourages people to desist from resorting to violence and to face injustice with love.”

The matter arose from an FIR lodged on 29 December 2024 at the Jamnagar Police Station, State of Gujarat, wherein the appellant, a Member of Parliament, was accused of promoting enmity between communities and hurting religious sentiments by posting a video of a public event on the platform ‘X’. The video depicted scenes from a mass wedding function and included a background audio recitation of a poem. The FIR invoked offences under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57, and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

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The complainant alleged that the poem incited communal hatred, affected national unity, and was detrimental to public order. The appellant filed a petition before the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS read with Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking quashing of the FIR. The High Court rejected the plea, noting that the matter was at a nascent stage of investigation.

Pursuant to the High Court's direction, the appellant filed an affidavit stating that the poem was sourced from online platforms and popularly attributed to poets Faiz Ahmed Faiz or Habib Jalib, though he could not ascertain its definitive authorship. He stated: “I am not the writer of the song/poem in question.” He described the poem as a message of love and non-violence.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the FIR was a violation of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). He submitted that the poem, on its plain reading, did not promote disharmony or hatred and was a poetic expression advocating resistance to injustice through non-violent means. The Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, submitted that the attribution of the poem to well-known poets was inaccurate but otherwise left the matter to the discretion of the Court.

The Court examined both the original Urdu poem and its English translation. It stated: “This poem has nothing to do with any religion, community, region or race.” It found that the poem: “does not jeopardise the sovereignty, unity, integrity or security of India” and that it “preaches non-violence” by advocating the meeting of injustice with love. The references to the “throne” in the poem were held to be symbolic, referring to power structures or rulers, not communities or religions.

On examining the contents of the FIR, the Court found that the poem did not refer to any religion, caste or community and could not be said to promote enmity or affect national unity. Referring to Section 196 of the BNS, which criminalizes promotion of disharmony on various grounds, the Court stated: “On a plain reading of the poem, we find that the same has nothing to do with any religion, caste, community or any particular group.”

Regarding Section 197, which relates to assertions prejudicial to national integration, the Court stated: “It does not make or publish any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal likely to cause disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill will.” For Section 299, dealing with insulting religion with malicious intent, the Court remarked: “To say the least, it is ridiculous to say that the act of the appellant is intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.”

On the allegation under Section 57 of abetment by more than ten persons, the Court observed: “We fail to understand, even if it is assumed that the appellant has committed some offence, how he has abetted the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten.”

The Court also noted the constitutional obligations of police officers under Article 51-A(a), stating that they “must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals.” It called for “massive training programs” to educate police on the ideals of liberty and freedom of speech.

In evaluating the High Court's rejection of the quashing petition, the Court remarked: “Registration of such FIR virtually borders on perversity.” It held that there is no absolute bar on High Courts quashing FIRs at the initial stage, stating: “It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the offence.”

The Court summarised its findings and issued a comprehensive set of conclusions from pages 48 to 54 of the judgment, holding:

Sub-section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of CrPC. It permits preliminary inquiry into cognizable offences punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years to determine whether a prima facie case exists. In contrast, Section 154 CrPC permits only a limited inquiry to determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed.

Under sub-section (3), after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer concludes that no prima facie case exists, the informant must be informed forthwith so they may pursue remedies under sub-section (4).

To assess offences under Sections 196, 197, 299, and 302 of BNS, the police must read and interpret the language used. This does not amount to a prohibited preliminary inquiry.

Police officers are constitutionally bound under Article 12 and Article 51-A(a) to uphold the ideals of the Constitution, including liberty of thought and expression.

Clause (2) of Article 19 acts as an exception to Article 19(1)(a), but any law made under it must impose only reasonable restrictions. Police must assess whether the alleged offence genuinely falls within this exception before registering an FIR.

The legal standard to judge the impact of words under Section 196 must be based on “reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals,” and not on those “with weak and oscillating minds.”

There is no blanket rule that FIRs cannot be quashed at an early stage of investigation. Courts must retain the discretion to quash FIRs where no offence is disclosed.

Freedom of expression, including literature, satire, and drama, makes life more meaningful. Courts are duty-bound to protect these freedoms under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21.

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The Court concluded that 75 years into the republic, “we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or, for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities.”

Accordingly, the Court quashed FIR No. 11202008250014 of 2025 registered with City A-Division Police Station, Jamnagar, as well as all further proceedings arising therefrom. The appeal was allowed.

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Sugandha Anand, Advocate

For the Respondents: Swati Ghildiyal, Advocate

Case Title: Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat and Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 410
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2025
Bench: Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

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