Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar held that the power to dismiss a government servant without holding a departmental enquiry cannot rest on bare presumption — the authority's satisfaction that conducting such an enquiry is not reasonably practicable must be grounded in concrete material. Setting aside the dismissal of a police constable accused of robbery, the Court ordered his reinstatement with continuity of service and 50% back wages, while leaving open the option of initiating fresh departmental proceedings.

The dispute concerned the dismissal of a Delhi Police constable by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, through an order dated 18.07.2017. The dismissal was passed under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution without conducting a departmental inquiry. The disciplinary authority relied on a preliminary inquiry conducted by an Assistant Commissioner of Police which suggested that a regular inquiry would not be reasonably practicable due to a belief that the complainant and witnesses could be threatened or influenced, creating the possibility of tampering with evidence.

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The constable had been implicated in a criminal case registered on 28.06.2017 relating to robbery of sandalwood. According to the material collected during investigation, the complainant and police officials involved in the investigation recorded statements describing the alleged incident and the role attributed to the constable. The constable was arrested during investigation and remained in custody from 29.06.2017 until his release on bail on 14.10.2017.

The dismissal order was challenged before the appellate authority, which affirmed the decision of the disciplinary authority. The constable then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking quashing of the dismissal order, but the Tribunal declined to interfere. A writ petition filed before the High Court was also dismissed, accepting the reasoning of the disciplinary authority that dispensing with a departmental inquiry was justified under Article 311(2)(b). The constable subsequently approached the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal from service and the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a departmental inquiry lightly or arbitrarily. Drawing from the Constitution Bench judgment in Tulsiram Patel, the Court recorded: "A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail."

On the standard of "reasonable practicability," the Court stated that the threshold under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) is not one of absolute impossibility: "It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation."

On the requirement of objective material, the Court observed: "Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry."

The Court further observed that no material on record established any connection between the appellant, his associates, and criminals that could reasonably demonstrate a possibility of witness intimidation: "No material showing connection of the appellant and his associates with criminals which may reasonably demonstrate that there is a possibility of the complainant or witnesses being approached through his associates with an intent to threaten, intimidate or induce them to withdraw from the case or turn hostile is on record. In absence of any material, in our view, it is merely a presumption of the ACP who conducted the preliminary enquiry and it cannot form the basis of a reasonable apprehension which may be sufficient to dispense with the regular disciplinary inquiry."

Noting that the dismissal order was passed while the appellant was in custody, the Court stated: "In the case at hand after registration of the FIR when the appellant was in custody the order of dismissal was passed. He was released only thereafter. As such, without indicating any instance of intimidation, traumatising, threatening or persuading the complainant or the witness to turn hostile from inside the jail, the belief or presumption as recorded by the disciplinary authority is not sufficient to bring the present case within the exception to Article 311(2) by applying clause (b) of second proviso thereto."

The Court additionally quoted with approval the observation in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 362: "The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer."

On the scope of judicial review, the Court stated: "The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty."

Examining the relevance of reasons recorded by the authority, the Court observed: "If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated."

Summarising the intent of Article 311(2), the Court recorded: "On overall analysis of the intent of Article 311(2), it is vivid that an employee holding a post in Union or State ought not to be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by which he was appointed. It is further specified that a person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank after an inquiry supplying the charges if any against him and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The applicability of the said clause is restricted in a situation wherein his conduct led to his conviction of criminal charges or where the authority empowered who dismissed, removed or reduced in rank records reason in writing upon satisfaction that it is not 'reasonably practicable' to hold an enquiry against him."

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The Court directed that “the order passed by the CAT and the High Court and to quash the order of dismissal passed by the DCP and confirmed by the appellate authority.” The appellant “shall forthwith be reinstated with continuity of service. The appellant “shall be entitled for all consequential benefits notionally” while specifying that “back wages from the date of dismissal till reinstatement are restricted to 50%.”

“The setting aside of the order passed under Article 311(2) proviso (b) of the Constitution and direction for reinstatement shall be without prejudice to the right of the respondent to take recourse… by initiating a departmental enquiry in accordance with law.” The appeal was accordingly allowed and parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv. Mr. Sandeep Choudhary, AOR Mr. Ram Niwas Buri, Adv. Mr. Basudeb Biswas, Adv. Mr. Naresh Sharma, Adv. Ms. Sreepriya K, Adv. Mr. Praveen Jain, Adv.

For the Respondents: Mr. Brijender Chahar, A.S.G. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Adv. Mr. Mili Baxi, Adv. Mr. Rajat Nair, Adv. Mr. Vibhu Shanker Mishra, Adv. Mr. Aaditya Vikram, Adv.

Case Title: Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 234
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 13860 of 2024
Bench: Justice J.K. Maheshwari, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar