
A person to be guilty under Section 34 IPC must share both in the "criminal act" and in the "common intention, holds Supreme Court
- Post By 24law
- February 16, 2025
Isabella Mariam
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a mother-in-law accused of murdering her daughter-in-law by setting her on fire, while acquitting the woman’s husband, who was allegedly present during the tragic incident. The judgment came in the Criminal Appeal filed by both the accused – the mother-in-law and the husband – challenging the Karnataka High Court’s decision that overturned their acquittal in the original trial.
The bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan ruled on the matter by emphasizing the key principles of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which relates to offenses committed with a common intention. The judges observed that for a person to be guilty under Section 34, they must share both in the "criminal act" and in the "common intention." This common intention refers to a premeditated plan where all parties involved act in concert to commit the crime. The Court held that an individual’s participation in the criminal act – even if minimal or indirect – and their involvement in the common intention are essential elements under Section 34 IPC.
The Supreme Court rejected the defense argument that the mention of Section 34 in the charge misled the accused or caused them prejudice. It further stated that a defendant must be aware of the law and cannot use a misunderstanding of its application as a defense. The judges clarified that Section 34 doesn’t absolve the individual of their personal role in the offense; it doesn’t permit the omission of one’s individual liability in committing a joint crime. This key aspect distinguished it from related offenses like conspiracy or abetment.
The Court explained that under Section 34, participation in the crime is a prerequisite for conviction. A mere presence at the crime scene is insufficient to establish liability; there must be clear evidence that the accused not only shared the intention to commit the crime but also took active steps or failed to take action in furtherance of the crime. The judgment reiterated that unlike Section 149 (which pertains to unlawful assembly), Section 34 requires the individual’s participation in the criminal act.
In this case, the Court found that while the accused mother-in-law played an active role by allegedly pouring kerosene and setting her daughter-in-law on fire, the husband’s involvement was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. The Court found that the husband's actions, including his attempt to put out the fire, were inconsistent with a shared intention to murder his wife. This lack of direct involvement and the absence of proof indicating common intention led to his acquittal.
The Facts of the Case
The incident, which occurred after eight years of marriage, involved the deceased woman’s ongoing harassment by her husband and in-laws over dowry and household chores. On the day of the incident, it was alleged that the mother-in-law poured kerosene on the woman’s body and set her on fire, causing severe burn injuries. The woman was rushed to the hospital by neighbors, where she later succumbed to septicemia caused by the burns after a week. Following the woman’s death, her mother lodged a First Information Report (FIR), and the police charged both the husband and the mother-in-law with murder and dowry-related offenses under the IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The Trial Court’s Ruling and the High Court’s Reversal
Initially, the Trial Court acquitted both the accused, citing insufficient evidence to prove their guilt. However, the High Court, in its appeal, reversed the acquittals, finding both the husband and mother-in-law guilty under Sections 498A (dowry harassment), 302 (murder), 504 (intentional insult), and Section 34 of the IPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The High Court sentenced them to life imprisonment with fine.
Supreme Court’s Reasoning and Conclusion
Upon examining the case, the Supreme Court noted that while mere presence at the scene does not establish participation under Section 34, there must be some affirmative act or conduct indicating involvement in the commission of the crime. In this case, the mother-in-law’s act of setting the woman on fire, with no attempt to extinguish the flames, clearly pointed to her active participation in the crime. In contrast, the husband’s actions, including his attempt to extinguish the fire and his subsequent disappearance from the scene, suggested that he did not share the common intention to murder.
The Supreme Court made it clear that for the husband to be convicted under Section 34, the prosecution must prove that he not only shared the intention to murder but also participated in the act itself. Since the evidence failed to establish that the husband had a pre-arranged plan or intention to kill his wife, his acquittal was warranted.
The Court further emphasized the importance of participation in a criminal act for Section 34 to be invoked. It was not enough for the husband to simply be present; he had to be an active participant in the crime or share the intention to commit the murder, which the evidence failed to prove.
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s decision to convict the mother-in-law was justified, but the conviction of the husband was erroneous. The Court upheld the conviction of the mother-in-law for the murder of her daughter-in-law but acquitted the husband of all charges.
The Supreme Court, in its judgment, partly allowed the appeal, convicting the mother-in-law and acquitting the husband.
Case Title : Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr Vs. The State of Karnataka
Case No: Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 2022
Coram:Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
[Read/Download Order]
Comment / Reply From
You May Also Like
Recent Posts
Recommended Posts
Newsletter
Subscribe to our mailing list to get the new updates!