Accused Cannot Seek Company, Bank Records Under CrPC Section 91 During Probe To Answer Queries; Delhi High Court
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna has dismissed an accused’s plea seeking production of company and bank records from the investigating agency and lender banks during an ongoing probe. The Court found that Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked at the investigation stage merely to obtain documents to help the accused answer questions in interrogation, as this would allow interference with the investigation. The allegations concern diversion of term-loan funds raised from multiple banks, causing an alleged wrongful loss of about ₹806.07 crore. While upholding the refusal to order production, the Court directed the investigator to give adequate time to peruse voluminous or old documents when confronting the accused.
The proceedings arose from a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging an order passed by the Special Judge (PC Act) (CBI), New Delhi, rejecting an application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. The petitioner, who was formerly a director of a company that had availed term loans from a consortium of banks, sought directions for production of documents from the Central Bureau of Investigation and the respondent banks during the course of an ongoing investigation.
The company had entered the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, following which its board of directors stood suspended and custody of records vested with the resolution professional. A criminal case was subsequently registered by the CBI on the basis of a complaint by a member bank of the consortium, alleging offences relating to diversion and misuse of loan funds.
During investigation, the petitioner was summoned to answer queries relating to transactions carried out several years earlier. Contending that he was unable to respond effectively without access to company and bank records, the petitioner sought production of documents under Section 91 Cr.P.C. The trial court rejected the application as premature, leading to the present petition before the High Court.
The Court examined the scope and applicability of Section 91 Cr.P.C. and noted that “from bare perusal of Section 91 Cr.P.C., it emerges that this power of issuing summons to produce documents or other things can be exercised either by the Court or any Officer in-charge of the Police Station” and that such power is not confined to the post-chargesheet stage. However, the Court clarified that the requirement of necessity or desirability must be assessed “with reference to the stage, when the prayer is made for the production.”
Addressing the petitioner’s contention that he could not answer queries without records, the Court observed that “the purpose of interrogation is to elicit the truth based on the personal knowledge of the accused.” It recorded that if the accused does not remember details due to passage of time or lack of records, “he is entitled to state the same to the Investigating Officer.”
The Court further recorded that the documents sought were already in possession of the investigating agency and that the petitioner had been confronted with those documents during questioning. It noted that seeking copies of such material at the investigation stage amounted to “an oblique way to procure the documents.”
Relying on settled principles, the Court stated that investigation is the exclusive domain of the investigating agency and “the accused cannot guide the investigation or demand that specific documents be collected and supplied to him.” It also observed that accepting such a plea would result in a “mini-trial” at the investigation stage. The Court distinguished precedents relied upon by the petitioner, recording that those decisions related to stages after filing of the charge sheet and were therefore inapplicable.
The Court recorded that “the power under Section 91 Cr.P.C. is discretionary and must be exercised only when the Court considers the production ‘necessary or desirable’.” It stated that “the learned Special Judge had exercised this discretion judiciously while rejecting the application, noting that the investigation was at an initial stage and that the accused could not seek production of documents merely because he was unable to answer queries appropriately”.
The Court directed that “where Petitioner is being confronted with voluminous or old documents, the I.O. shall give sufficient time to the Petitioner to go through the documents to be able to give complete and informed answers, to ensure effective and meaningful investigations and in the process, ensure fairness of the entire procedure.” The petitioner “may inform the Investigating Officer of his inability to answer specific questions and seek time to go through the documents.”
The Court found “no illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the Impugned Order dated 20.12.2023.” Accordingly, it ordered that “the Petition is dismissed and the Impugned Order dated 20.12.2023 is upheld. The pending Applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Mr. Arshdeep Singh Khurana, Ms. Neena Nagpal, Mr. Malak Bhatt, Mr. Vishvendra Tomar, Mr. Tannavi Sharma, Mr. Rashvendra Tomar, Ms. Nishtha Juneja, Advocates
For the Respondents: Mr. Anupam S. Sharrma, Special Public Prosecutor with Ms. Harpreet Kalsi, Mr. Vashisht Rao, Mr. Ripudaman Sharma, Mr. Vishesh Jain, Ms. Riya Sachdeva, Mr. Anant Mishra, Advocates; and respective standing counsel for the respondent banks
Case Title: Shantanu Prakash v. CBI & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:11111
Case Number: CRL.M.C. 579/2024
Bench: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna
