Article 21 Speedy Trial Right Applies Regardless Of Alleged Offence; Continued Undertrial Custody Without Trial Commencement Or Reasonable Progress Turns Punitive: Supreme Court
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe allowed an appeal and granted bail to an accused former promoter of an auto components group in a money-laundering probe linked to alleged bank-loan fraud and diversion of funds. The Court held that the Article 21 guarantee of a speedy trial applies regardless of the nature of the alleged offence, and that extended custody of an undertrial without the trial starting or moving forward in a reasonable manner turns pre-trial detention into punishment. Noting that the prosecution case was largely documentary, cognizance had not been taken and the trial was unlikely to begin soon, the Bench directed release on bail on conditions to be set by the trial court, including passport surrender and travel restrictions.
The appeal arose from the rejection of a regular bail application filed by an accused under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The appellant was a former promoter and non-executive Chairman of a company forming part of a larger corporate group against which Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process proceedings had been initiated during 2017–2018.
FIRs were registered at the instance of public sector banks alleging offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, involving alleged bank fraud aggregating over INR 670 crores. Based on these FIRs, the Directorate of Enforcement registered Enforcement Case Information Reports alleging laundering of proceeds of crime.
The appellant was summoned, searched, and arrested in July 2024. A prosecution complaint and a supplementary complaint were filed naming multiple accused persons and companies. Out of several individuals arrayed as accused, only the appellant was arrested. Bail applications before the Special Court and the High Court were rejected, except for interim medical bail.
The appellant contended that investigation against him had concluded, documentary evidence was already seized, no cognizance had been taken, and prolonged incarceration violated Article 21 of the Constitution. The respondent opposed bail citing gravity of offence, alleged influence over witnesses, and dissipation of attached properties.
The Court recorded that “the court while dealing with the prayer for grant of bail has to consider gravity of offence, which has to be ascertained in the facts and circumstances of each case.” It noted that “all economic offences cannot be classified into one group as it may involve various activities and may differ from one case to another.”
On the issue of prolonged incarceration, the Court stated that “if the State or any prosecuting agency including, the court, concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused, to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.”
The Bench observed that “Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.” It further recorded that under statutes such as the PMLA, “prolonged incarceration pending trial may warrant grant of bail by Constitutional Courts, if there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time.”
Considering the facts of the case, the Court noted that “out of 28 individuals, only the appellant has been arrested,” and that “the order dated 20.08.2025 of the Special Court records the submission of ED that investigation qua the appellant has concluded.”
The Court found that “no cognizance has been taken on the prosecution complaint and the proceeding is at the stage of scrutiny of documents,” and that “there is no likelihood of trial commencing in the near future.” It observed that the evidence was “primarily documentary in nature” and already in the custody of the prosecution.
On allegations of influencing witnesses, the Court stated that “the allegation does not inspire confidence,” particularly as “the appellant has been in custody prior to concerned witness being formally arrayed as a witness.”
Regarding delay, the Court recorded that “the delay in the trial is thus attributable only to the respondent, not the appellant.” On alleged dissipation of properties, it held that “there is no evidence that the appellant was signatory to any sale document,” rendering the allegation “untenable at this stage.”
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The Court directed that “the impugned judgment and order dated 19.08.2025 is quashed and set aside. The appellant shall be released on bail during the pendency of the trial arising out of the prosecution complaints,” with the terms and conditions to be fixed by the Trial Court.
The appellant “will provide one telephone/mobile number on which he can be contacted by the officers of the Directorate of Enforcement to ascertain his whereabouts while he is on bail.” The appellant was also directed to “surrender his passport to the Trial Court and not leave India without permission of the Trial Court.”
Case Title: Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 12
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 15478 of 2025)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Kumar, Justice Alok Aradhe
