Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan, while adjudicating a property dispute arising from a court-conducted auction sale, held that an auction purchaser who is already in possession of the suit property cannot be denied an injunction against a person with no title, solely on the ground that possession was not obtained through the formal procedure prescribed under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court set aside the Madras High Court's order, which had dismissed both suits on the ground that the auction purchaser had failed to establish lawful possession, and restored the second appeals for fresh consideration. The dispute involved conflicting claims of ownership and possession over the same property — one party deriving title through an auction sale followed by a registered sale deed, and the other through a registered Will executed by the original owner.

The dispute concerned two civil suits seeking permanent prohibitory injunction over the same immovable property. One suit was instituted by the appellant claiming ownership and possession based on a sale deed executed in his favour by a purchaser who had acquired the property in a court-conducted auction held during execution of a money decree. The appellant asserted that the property originally belonged to an individual against whom the decree had been passed, following which the property was auctioned and later transferred to him through a registered sale deed dated 15.10.1991.

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The opposing party instituted a separate suit asserting ownership of the same property on the basis of a registered will allegedly executed by the original owner before his death in an accident. Both parties claimed that they were in possession of the property and alleged unlawful interference by the other side. The trial court decreed the suit filed by the appellant and dismissed the rival suit.

First appeals were preferred against the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the decree of the trial court. Though no specific issue regarding possession had been formally framed, both parties led oral and documentary evidence on that question during trial. The appellate court considered various records, including revenue documents, tax receipts, certificates related to the operation of a tapioca mill on the property, and commissioner’s inspection records, which were relied upon to indicate possession.

Subsequently, second appeals were filed before the High Court. The High Court partly allowed the appeals and dismissed both suits, recording that the appellant had not proved lawful possession of the property on the date of institution of the suit due to absence of documentary proof of possession obtained in accordance with procedure. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Court recorded the legal position regarding title obtained through auction sale, stating that “it is trite law that title in immovable property vests in the auction purchaser on confirmation of sale.”

The Bench further observed that even though procedural provisions exist for delivery of possession after auction, the entitlement to injunction depends on actual possession at the time of filing the suit. It stated that “Order 21 Rule 95 CPC provides for the procedure to take possession by an auction purchaser but if the auction purchaser gets possession and is in possession on the date of institution of the suit, in our view, he cannot be denied injunction against a non-title holder seeking to interfere with his possession.”

Regarding the absence of a framed issue on possession, the Court recorded that “where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduce evidence relating thereto, they cannot claim prejudice for the issue being not specifically framed.”

The Court also examined the findings recorded by the courts below on the question of possession and noted that documentary evidence had been relied upon by them. The Bench stated that “a perusal of the lower court(s) judgment would indicate that they had taken notice of the documentary evidence which disclosed that there was a running factory over the suit property, and some documents pertaining to the factory reflected the name of the current appellant.”

Referring specifically to the appellate court’s findings, the Court observed that “the first appellate court, in paragraph 19 of its judgment, has referred to various documentary evidence available on record to indicate the possession of the present appellant over the suit property.”

The Bench then addressed the limits of second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It recorded that “when the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC, particularly where there are concurrent finding(s) of fact by two courts below, interference with it is permissible on limited grounds such as where the finding in question is perverse, or is based on consideration of inadmissible evidence, or by misreading or grossly misconstruing the evidence, or is recorded without considering relevant evidence.”

Examining the impugned judgment, the Court recorded that “the second appellate court i.e., the High Court has not at all adverted to the documentary evidence relied by the first appellate court in support of its order affirming the trial court decree.” It further stated that “the second appellate court has not even framed a question of law much less a substantial question of law to test the finding of the first appellate court on the issue of possession within the scope of Section 100 of CPC.”

Consequently, the Bench observed that “the matter requires reconsideration by the High Court as it had set aside the decree of the court below without considering whether the finding(s) of the court(s) below on plaintiff’s possession over the suit property on the date of institution of the suit was amenable to interference within the scope of jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC.”

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The Bench directed that “the appeal(s) are, accordingly, partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The second appeal(s) shall stand restored on the file of the High Court to be decided afresh in accordance with law.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Petitioners: M/S. KSN & Co., AOR; Mr. V. Balachandran, Advocate; Mr. Siddharth Naidu, Advocate; Mr. Saurabh Bharadwaj, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mrs. Malavika Jayanth, AOR; Ms. Isha Singh, Advocate

Case Title: P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan & Ors.
Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. /2026 @ SLP (C) Nos. 1989-1990/2024
Bench: Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Manmohan