Criminal Liability Not A Purchasable Commodity: Punjab & Haryana High Court Dismisses Quashing Plea In 304-A Death-By-Negligence FIR
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana Single Bench of Justice Sumeet Goel declined to quash proceedings arising from allegations of causing death by negligent driving, holding that neither the FIR nor the conviction for this offence could be set aside on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the family of the deceased. The Court cautioned that efforts to terminate such prosecutions through compromise risk weakening judicial integrity, especially when serious offences are treated as matters that can be resolved privately. Justice Goel noted that settlements of this nature—often involving financial terms—may foster a public impression that criminal responsibility is negotiable, thereby undermining the broader societal interest implicated in offences resulting in loss of life.
The matter concerns a petition filed by the accused seeking quashing of an FIR registered for offences relating to causing death by alleged rash and negligent driving under Section 304-A and Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code. The FIR was based on a complaint stating that the deceased and another individual were travelling on a motorcycle when a JCB machine, allegedly driven negligently by the accused, struck their vehicle, resulting in serious injuries. The deceased was taken toward the hospital but passed away en route, while the other rider was admitted for treatment.
The petitioner contended that he had been wrongly implicated and that the incident had been resolved through a written compromise with the complainant, the father of the deceased. A copy of the compromise was placed before the Court, stating that the parties had agreed to settle the matter and that the family of the deceased would support closure of proceedings. It was also conveyed that a monetary payment was part of the settlement.
The State opposed the plea, asserting that the challan had been filed, evidence was led, and the petitioner had already been convicted by the trial court. It argued that offences resulting in death are not private disputes and referenced statutory provisions governing quashing powers. The complainant supported the compromise and stated no objection to discontinuing proceedings.
The Court examined the contours of its inherent powers and stated that Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS preserve authority “to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” It recorded that the language of both provisions is identical and therefore “the above principle(s) … would apply with complete vigour.”
While assessing when criminal proceedings may be quashed on compromise, the Court stated that the exercise of inherent powers requires that offences be “overwhelmingly and predominantly civil” or “private or personal in nature.” It recorded that such a course is unavailable in cases involving death, noting that the “prime factors for consideration… is the consent of the victim.” In this context, the Court stated that “the primary victim is the deceased, whose demise is directly attributable to the accused’s alleged rash and negligent act,” and that the deceased “is no longer capable of expressing consent or grievance, rendering any compromise with the informant incongruous with this foundational principle.”
Addressing the impact of compromise settlements in serious offences, the Court stated that “this practice of entering into compromise, more often than not, involves pecuniary consideration; proffered as reparation or compensation to the victim's family; creates deeply deleterious impact on the societal psyche that the criminal justice system is available for commodification.” It further recorded that “such a scenario suggests that penal absolution is a purchasable commodity, thereby, implying that serious public wrongs, in which society as a whole has stakes, can be put to naught by the accused person's financial capacity.”
The Court stated that “such an outcome is antithetical to the Rule of Law, which demands that the severity of a crime and penal consequences must remain insulated from the private financial arrangements of the parties, thereby, maintaining public confidence in the impartiality and deterrent efficacy of the justice delivery system.” It added that “the inherent powers of this Court, ought not be employed for privatization of criminal liability.”
To illustrate the imbalance between offender-focused narratives and victim interests, the Court quoted an “old age adage”: “Why in history has everyone always focused on the guy with the big stick, the hero, the activist, to the neglect of the poor slob who is at the end of the stick, the victim, the passivist… maybe he asked for it?”
The Court added that “the terminus of criminal justice system must transcend beyond the mere safeguarding of rights of an accused and must encompass the preservation and effective vindication of the rights of a victim.”
Referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India Vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1, the Court quoted: “While considering the problem of penology we should not overlook the plight of victimology and the sufferings of the people who die, suffer or are maimed at the hands of criminals.”
The Court recorded its conclusion stating that, “In view of the discussion in law and facts hereinabove, petition in hand ought not to be entertained and deserves rejection.”
The Court directed: “The petition in hand seeking quashing of FIR No.48 dated 09.06.2022 registered under Sections 304-A and 279 IPC at Police Station Ajitwal, District Moga, along with all proceedings arising therefrom, including the judgment of conviction dated 04.04.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class in case No.CHI/282/2022 titled “State versus Satnam Singh,” on the basis of a compromise deed dated 07.04.2024, is dismissed.”
“Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove shall not have any effect on the merits of the case and the appellate Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without being influenced with the same.”
“No deposition as to costs.” and that “Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Kamaldip Singh Sidhu, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Amit Kumar Goyal, Additional Advocate General, Punjab; Ms. Kirandeep Kaur, Advocate.
Case Title: Satnam Singh v. State of Punjab and Another
Neutral Citation: 2025: PHHC:162281
Case Number: CRM-M-59021-2025
Bench: Justice Sumeet Goel
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