Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Calcutta, Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya, on Thursday (January 29), dismissed an appeal that sought to invalidate a Single Bench decision solely because it was delivered around 18 months after the final hearing concluded. The appellants, a cooperative housing society, argued that the delay undermined fairness in the adjudication of their writ petition against a metropolitan development authority and others, which had been dismissed by the Single Judge. Declining to interfere on that limited ground, the Division Bench noted its dissatisfaction with the prolonged interval but held that the judgment could not be set aside merely due to the delay.

The appeal arose from a writ petition dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court, in which the appellants had challenged actions of a statutory development authority. The writ petition was filed in 2016 and was heard finally, with arguments concluding in December 2023. Judgment was reserved thereafter. The Single Judge delivered the judgment in June 2025, nearly eighteen months after conclusion of arguments.

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In appeal, the appellants confined their challenge to a preliminary issue, contending that the prolonged delay in pronouncement of judgment vitiated the decision itself. It was argued that such delay defeated the adversarial process, violated principles of natural justice, and rendered it impossible for the Judge to recall arguments advanced. Reliance was placed on multiple decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts addressing delayed judgments and guidelines governing timely pronouncement.

The respondents opposed the challenge, asserting that delay alone could not invalidate a judgment, particularly where the entire judgment was delivered together and no prejudice was demonstrated. They contended that established Supreme Court guidelines provided procedural remedies during pendency and did not mandate automatic invalidation of judgments delivered after delay.

The Division Bench observed that “the short preliminary issue which arises for consideration before this Court is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the impugned judgment should be set aside on the sole ground of the delay of about eighteen months after conclusion of arguments.”

After examining binding precedent, the Court recorded that “none of the guidelines contemplate setting aside the judgment outright on the sole ground of delay but merely leave it to the discretion of the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court.”

The Bench noted that “mere alteration of determination or passage of time cannot denude a Bench of subject-matter jurisdiction to pass final judgment.” It was further stated that “law recognises generally that once a hearing is concluded, it is only the Judge before whom the same was heard who shall pass the final judgment.”

Addressing the argument regarding loss of recollection, the Court stated that “it cannot automatically be inferred that the concerned Judge did not have the benefit of the arguments of both parties merely because of the lapse of time.” The Bench recorded that “judgments of an otherwise competent court of law cannot and ought not to be set aside on the sole ground of delay without anything more.”

The Court also observed that “even the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stopped short of holding that a judgment passed after the stipulated timeline is automatically rendered a nullity.”

On facts, the Bench recorded that “the impugned judgment reflects clearly and lucidly the arguments advanced by the respective parties as well as the judgments cited.” It concluded that “there is no indicator other than delay to suggest that the learned Single Judge was oblivious of the arguments or failed to consider the merits.”

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The Court directed that “the preliminary challenge raised by the appellants against the judgment to the effect that the same is liable to be set aside solely on the ground of delay in delivery of judgment is hereby turned down on contest.”

“All other contentions of the respective parties are kept open for being argued on merits at the final hearing of the appeal,” and that “the observations made herein are restricted to the adjudication of the preliminary challenge on the ground of delay in delivery of the impugned judgment. The observations made above shall not be deemed to be conclusive or binding on the parties in any manner at any further stage of the appeal or elsewhere.”

“The connected application, bearing CAN 1 of 2025, be posted for hearing under the heading ‘Application’ in the Monthly List of February, 2026.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Appellants: Mr. Pramit Kumar Ray, Senior Advocate; Mr. Sumitava Chakraborty, Advocate; Ms. Atmaja Bandyopadhyay, Advocate; Mr. Sounak Mandal, Advocate; Mr. Sounak Chatterjee, Advocate

For the Respondents: Mr. Satyajit Talukdar, Advocate; Mr. Arindam Chatterjee, Advocate

Case Title: New Parijat Co-operative Housing Society Limited and Another v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority and Others
Case Number: M.A.T. No. 1067 of 2025
Bench: Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, Justice Supratim Bhattacharya