Delhi HC Upholds One-Year ‘Watch Period’ For Convicts Readmitted After Appeal Dismissal; Furlough Not Permissible During Period
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Delhi Division Bench of Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela dismissed a plea challenging Clause F(3) of Standing Order No. 1/2019 issued by the Director General (Prisons). The Bench upheld the one-year “watch” period for convicts re-admitted to jail after dismissal of their appeals, finding that the instruction supplements Rule 1223 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 and does not offend Articles 14 or 21. Consequently, the Court affirmed the refusal of furlough prior to completion of one year from re-admission and directed that any application made after 13 November 2025 be decided promptly in accordance with law. The dispute concerned furlough eligibility following appellate proceedings and the validity of the waiting-period requirement.
The petitioner, Deepak Srivastav, was convicted on 10.12.2003 for offences under Sections 304B, 498A, 406, and 34 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment along with other terms of rigorous imprisonment and fines. He filed an appeal before the High Court, and during its pendency his sentence was suspended on 02.06.2006. The appeal was dismissed on 30.08.2017. He then approached the Supreme Court, which suspended his sentence during the pendency of the appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence under Section 304B IPC to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and directed him to surrender within three weeks. He surrendered and was re-admitted to jail on 13.11.2024.
The petitioner thereafter applied for furlough in December 2024, asserting completion of seven years of actual imprisonment and fulfillment of Rule 1226 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018, including three Annual Good Conduct Reports. Since his application was not decided, he filed W.P.(CRL) 2026/2025, and the High Court directed consideration of his furlough plea on 07.07.2025. The Director General of Prisons rejected the application on 23.07.2025 citing Clause F(3) of Standing Order 1/2019, which mandates a one-year watch period for convicts re-admitted after dismissal of their appeal. He was informed he could reapply after 13.11.2025.
The petitioner challenged (i) Clause F(3) as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21, (ii) the rejection order dated 23.07.2025, and (iii) sought directions for release on furlough. He argued that the Director General lacked authority to issue the Standing Order, the watch period violated Articles 14 and 21, and an alternative six-month period should apply. He relied on distinctions between parole and furlough and cited Rule 1210(V) and Rule 1257 to contend that shorter watch periods existed in comparable contexts.
The respondents argued that the Standing Order was issued pursuant to the High Court’s earlier directions, served administrative purposes, supplemented Rule 1223, and ensured jail discipline and public safety. They further stated that furlough was not an absolute right.
The Court recorded that the Standing Order 1/2019 was issued “in compliance of an order dated 29.08.2018 passed by this Court… to streamline the system and for framing uniform guidelines for grant of furlough/parole.” It stated that Rule 1223 requires not only three AGCRs but also “continued good conduct”, and that Clause F(3) merely provides a method for determining whether that continued good conduct exists. The Court observed: “Clause F(3)… provides a mechanism to determine the fact as to whether the convict seeking furlough has continued to maintain good conduct.”
It noted that the Standing Order “is nothing but a compilation of instructions… to appropriately apply the rules,” and held that the Director General may issue such instructions under general administrative and supervisory powers. It stated: “Such provision does not, in any manner, infringe or contradict any provision either of the Act, 2000 or of the Rules, 2018.”
Regarding Article 21, the Court observed: “Right to seek furlough is not an absolute right; it is rather a right governed by the statutory prescriptions embodied in the Act, 2000 and the Rules made thereunder.” It further recorded that since the petitioner was a convict whose conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court, denial of furlough pursuant to statutory rules could not constitute a violation of personal liberty.
Quoting the Supreme Court in Narayan, the Bench noted: “Although furlough can be claimed without a reason, the prisoner does not have an absolute legal right to claim furlough… The grant of furlough must be balanced against the public interest and can be refused to certain categories of prisoners.”
Addressing Article 14, the Court observed that those who appeal and whose appeals are dismissed are unlike those who do not file appeals. It recorded: “The factum of filing of appeal and its dismissal… itself is the basis of differentiating between these two sets of convicts.” It further stated: “Once a convict is released on bail or suspension of sentence and is out of jail, he would take some time to become accustomed to the discipline of the jail… Such an occasion does not arise for convicts who have not preferred the appeal.”
The Court also evaluated the petitioner’s comparison with parole and premature release. It recorded that parole and furlough serve different purposes: “Parole is generally granted in case of short-term imprisonment, whereas furlough is granted in case of long-term imprisonment… For parole, specific reason is required, whereas furlough is meant for breaking the monotony of imprisonment.” It held that such distinctions justified differing watch periods.
The Court stated: “For the reasons given and discussion made above, we do not find any good ground either to interfere in the impugned Clause F(3) of the Standing Order No. 01 of 2019… or in the impugned order dated 23.07.2025, whereby the petitioner has been held to be ineligible for grant of furlough.”
It recorded that “the writ petition fails which is hereby dismissed along with pending application(s), if any. In case the petitioner applies for grant of furlough after 13.11.2025, such prayer shall be attended to by the authority concerned and shall be decided at the earliest in accordance with law.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Chowdhary, Advocate with Mr. Faheem, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Rahul Tyagi, ASC (Crl.) with Mr. Sangeet Sibou, Mr. Aniket Kumar Singh, and Mr. Priyansh Raj Singh Senger, Advocates for R-1 to R-3.
Case Title: Deepak Srivastav v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:9736-DB
Case Number: W.P.(CRL) 2639/2025
Bench: Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, Justice Tushar Rao Gedela
