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Delhi High Court Upholds Order Refusing to Discharge TV Today Network in 2011 Defamation Case Over Gang Rape Broadcast Involving MLA’s Relative

Delhi High Court Upholds Order Refusing to Discharge TV Today Network in 2011 Defamation Case Over Gang Rape Broadcast Involving MLA’s Relative

Isabella Mariam

 

The High Court of Delhi, Single Bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja on Tuesday refused to discharge TV Today Network Limited, the parent company of Aaj Tak and India Today, in criminal defamation proceedings initiated over a 2011 news telecast. The case arose from a broadcast reporting on a gang rape and abduction incident involving a person described as the brother-in-law of the nephew of a then-sitting MLA from Tughlakabad Constituency. The report had alleged police inaction in arresting the said individual while his co-accused had already been taken into custody. The Court dismissed the media company’s petitions, holding that a Magistrate has no power to discharge an accused in a summons trial and that such pleas are not maintainable once cognizance has been taken and process issued.

 

The petitions were filed by TV Today Network Limited and its officials under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of an order dated December 13, 2018, of the Metropolitan Magistrate that dismissed their applications for discharge in two complaint cases. The complaints had been filed in 2011 by two individuals who alleged that a televised report on a gang rape and abduction case had falsely connected them with the accused and damaged their reputation. The broadcast aired on August 10, 2011, on the petitioner’s news channel under the Aaj Tak/India Today group, reported that one of the accused, described as the brother-in-law of the nephew of an elected MLA from Tughlakabad Constituency, had not been arrested despite the detention of co-accused.

 

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The complainants contended that the report was defamatory, malicious, and misleading, asserting that it implied political interference in a criminal investigation. The petitioners submitted that the telecast was a bona fide and factual report based on police records, broadcast in public interest, and protected under Exceptions 1 and 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. They argued that no direct imputation was made against the complainants and that the news coverage amounted to fair comment. The petitioners further argued that a corporate entity cannot possess mens rea or be prosecuted for defamation under Section 500 IPC without specific allegations of intent.

 

The trial court had issued summons under Sections 499 and 500 IPC after recording evidence under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC. The petitioners’ discharge plea was dismissed, leading to the present petitions. The principal question before the High Court concerned whether a Magistrate possesses power to discharge an accused in a summons trial after cognizance has been taken and process issued.


Justice Ravinder Dudeja observed that “the challenge in the petitions mainly pertains to the order dated 13.12.2018, passed by the learned trial court, whereby, the plea of the petitioners, seeking discharge, was rejected mainly on the ground that the court of learned MM does not have the power of discharge in a summons triable case.”

 

He stated that “vide order dated 20.09.2014, petitioners were summoned under Section 500/501 IPC, which provide punishment up to two years or fine. The offences punishable with imprisonment up to two years are triable by the Magistrates as summons cases.” The Court recorded that Section 245 CrPC applies to warrant cases and not to summons trials and that “Section 258 CrPC applies only to cases instituted otherwise than on a complaint.”

 

Quoting the Supreme Court in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, the Court observed that “the concept of discharge is alien to summons trials.” It stated that “once the plea of the accused is recorded under Section 252 CrPC, the Magistrate is bound to proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Chapter XX till the conclusion of the trial.” The Court further noted that “there is no intermediary stage providing for dropping of proceedings akin to discharge under Section 239 CrPC.”

 

Referring to Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, the judgment recorded that “a Magistrate who has issued process under Section 204 CrPC becomes functus officio for that stage and cannot therefore recall or review that order.” The Court further cited the Constitution Bench in In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 N.I. Act, which held that “judgments of this Court in Adalat Prasad and Subramanium Sethuraman have interpreted the law correctly and we reiterate that there is no inherent power of Trial Courts to review or recall the issue of summons.”

 

The Court also referenced the Division Bench ruling in Court on Its Own Motion v. State (Crl. Ref. 4/2019), which held that “the Court of a Magistrate does not have the power to discharge the accused upon his appearance in Court in a summons trial case based upon a complaint in general.”

 

Justice Dudeja recorded that “the applications filed by the petitioners before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate sought ‘discharge’ on the premise that the complaint lacked the essential ingredients of criminal defamation and that the broadcast in question was made in good faith and in public interest.” However, he observed that “the learned Magistrate dismissed the applications holding that such pleas can only be examined at the stage of trial and that there is no statutory power to discharge an accused in a summons case.”

 

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He stated that “once the Magistrate has taken cognizance and issued summons upon satisfaction that a prima facie case exists, he is left with no power to recall or annul his earlier order by entertaining a discharge application.”


Justice Ravinder Dudeja held that “in light of the settled position of law and judicial precedents, the Court is of the view that the applications filed by the petitioners before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate seeking discharge were not maintainable.” The Court declared that “the impugned order dated 13.12.2018, dismissing the same, therefore, does not suffer from any legal infirmity.” It further recorded that “petitioners have not challenged the summoning order dated 20.09.2014 in the present petition, and therefore in view of the same, the relief sought for discharge, cannot be granted.” The petitions were accordingly “dismissed and disposed of along with pending applications, if any.”

 

Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, Mr. Utkarsh Dwivedi, and Mr. Kumar Kshitij, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Kirti Uppal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Amit Tiwari, Mr. Shekhar, Mr. Aditya Raj, Ms. Ayushi Srivastava, and Mr. Ayush Tanwar, Advocates.

 

Case Title: TV Today Network Ltd. & Ors. v. Ramesh Bidhuri & Anr.
Case Number: Crl.M.C. 1250/2019 & Crl.M.C. 1255/2019

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9668
Bench: Justice Ravinder Dudeja

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