Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice B. V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan on Thursday (February 5) quashed the criminal proceedings against an advocate from Chhattisgarh accused of repeatedly having sexual intercourse with a married woman colleague on an alleged promise of marriage. Setting aside the High Court of Chhattisgarh order that declined to terminate the case, the Court quashed the FIR, charge-sheet and the related trial proceedings. The Bench held that sexual relations following an assurance of marriage do not by themselves constitute rape, and that a prosecution on this basis requires material indicating the promise was false from the outset and directly induced the woman’s consent.

The complainant, a married advocate with a minor son, alleged that she developed acquaintance with the accused, also an advocate, in September 2022. According to the FIR, the accused allegedly assured her of marriage, applied vermilion on her head, and engaged in repeated physical relations. She further alleged that upon becoming pregnant, she was compelled to consume abortion pills and was later assaulted and threatened when she approached the accused’s residence.

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The accused filed a complaint alleging harassment and blackmail by the complainant. He sought anticipatory bail, which was granted. A final report was subsequently filed and a Sessions case was instituted. The accused contended that the relationship was consensual and that the complainant, being married and aware of her legal status, could not have been misled into believing a promise of marriage. The State and the complainant contended that the promise vitiated consent and attracted Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

On the facts, the Court observed: "It is an admitted fact that the complainant-respondent No.3, within the first initial meetings told the accused-appellant that she was a married woman with divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court. Therefore, in the same breath, she cannot be allowed to claim and allege that she was also coaxed by the accused-appellant into having a physical relationship with him on the false pretext of marriage as the two facts cannot stand together on the same plane and simultaneously as both are antagonistic and antithetical to each other. In our opinion, the facts of the present case clearly indicate a consensual relationship gone sour whereas both the parties should have exercised restraint and should have refrained from involving the State into their personal relationship turning rancour."

The Bench recorded that “The law prohibits bigamous unions and therefore disallows parties from entering into a second marriage during the subsistence of their first marriage. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the view that the complainant-respondent No.3, who herself is an advocate, was oblivious to the said settled position of law and hence was duped and induced by the accused appellant into having sexual relations with him on different occasions on the pretext of marriage especially when both the parties were cognizant of the marital status of the complainant respondent No.3.”

The Court recorded: “It has been time and again settled by this Court, that the mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.”

The Court added: "The Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in identifying the genuine cases filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC by identifying the essential ingredients to constitute the said offence i.e. there should be a promise of marriage made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement or a future change of mind."

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The Court directed: “we set aside the impugned order dated 03.03.2025 of the High Court and consequently, FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered with Sarkanda Police Station at district Bilaspur and the Chargesheet No.269/2025, and the consequent proceedings arising out of the said proceedings in Sessions Case No.89/2025 are quashed. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.”

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioners: Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Adv. Mr. Jugul Kishor Gupta, AOR Mr. Anchal Kumar Matre, Adv. Mr. Ankit Borker, Adv. Mr. Ankit Tiwari, Adv.

For the Respondents: Mr. Praneet Pranav, D.A.G. Mr. Vinayak Sharma, Standing Counsel, Adv. Mr. Ravinder Kumar Yadav, AOR Dr. Rajesh Pandey, Sr. Adv. Ms. Ayushi Pandey, Adv. Ms. Aswathi M.k., AOR Mr. Rishabh, Adv

Case Title: PN v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 124

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. of 2026

Bench: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan