Divorced Muslim Woman Entitled To Recover Cash And Gold Given To Husband At Marriage Under Section 3(1) Of Muslim Women (Protection Of Rights On Divorce) Act: Supreme Court
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N Kotiswar Singh on Tuesday, December 2, held that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled, under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, to recover from her former husband cash and gold ornaments he received from her father at the time of marriage. Allowing the woman’s appeal against her former husband, the Court addressed a dispute over Rs 7 lakh and 30 bhori of gold jewellery recorded in the marriage register (qabilnama) as gifts from her father to the bridegroom and set aside a Calcutta High Court decision that had rejected her claim. The respondent has been directed to remit the amount to the woman’s bank account in terms of the Court’s directions.
The case arises from a marriage solemnised on 28 August 2005. Differences developed and the wife left the matrimonial home on 7 May 2009. She then initiated proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The marriage was dissolved by divorce on 13 December 2011. Thereafter, she filed an application under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 seeking return of Rs 17,67,980, comprising dower, alleged dowry of Rs 7 lakh, 30 bhori of gold ornaments, and various household articles.
The trial court partly accepted her claim and, on remand, granted Rs 8 lakh and 30 bhori of gold, relying on entries in the marriage register (qabilnama) and the husband’s inability to disprove them. The respondent challenged these findings in revision, leading to further remand and additional evidence, including the marriage registrar’s testimony and two versions of the qabilnama (Exhibits 7 and 8).
The Sessions Court later dismissed the respondent’s revision. The respondent then approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, contending that the evidence, particularly the father’s statement in earlier proceedings under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, showed the amount and gold were given to him.
The Court first examined the scope of Section 3 of the 1986 Act, stating that “The Section quoted above deals with mehr/dower and/or other properties given to a woman at the time of her marriage-clearing the way for the woman to set up a claim against her husband in the above situations, or claim back from her husband properties given, as the case may be.”
It referred to Daniel Latifi, noting that “Section 3 opens up with a non obstante clause overriding all other laws …” and that “Where such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower due has not been made and paid or the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or anyone duly authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate…”
Assessing the High Court’s approach, the Bench recorded: “It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the High Court.” It noted that “The primary basis for not giving the amount and gold in question to the appellant, as it appears from the perusal of the judgment, was the apparent contradiction between the statement of the Kazi i.e. marriage Registrar and the father of the appellant.”
The Court then observed: “What, apparently, the High Court lost sight of is the end result of the proceedings in which the said statement of the father was given. Those proceedings were concerned with Section 498A-IPC and Section(s) 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and despite such a direct statement by the father of the appellant the learned Trial Court seized of the matter acquitted the respondent, a conclusion which appears to have attained finality. Then, it cannot be said, in our view, that the evidentiary value of that statement is either equal to or greater than the statement of the marriage registrar.”
It added: “When that is the case, we are at a loss to understand why his statement in entirety should not be accepted. Mere allegation as to his conduct being suspicious on account of overwriting in the marriage register is not sufficient to discard his testimony.”
On interpretative principles, the Court stated: “This case presents the possibility of two interpretations and whereas it is a settled rule that this Court under its plenary, Article 136 jurisdiction does not interfere with the findings of the High Court simply because there are two views possible, this case, in our considered view, does not fall under this exception for the High Court missed the purposive construction goalpost and instead proceeded to adjudicate the matter purely as a civil dispute.”
It then articulated the constitutional context: “The Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all, i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved. Courts, in doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social justice adjudication. To put it in context, the scope and object of 1986 Act is concerned with securing the dignity and financial protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with the rights of a women under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The construction of this Act, therefore, must keep at the forefront equality, dignity and autonomy and must be done in the light of lived experiences of women where particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still the order of the day.”
The Court directed: “The question framed above is answered accordingly. The Appeals are allowed as aforesaid. The judgment and order passed by the High Court of Calcutta with particulars as contained in paragraph 2, is set aside.”
“Learned Counsel for the Appellant would supply the bank and other relevant details to the learned counsel for the respondent within three working days from the date of this judgment. The amount be directly remitted into the bank account of the Appellant. The Respondent is directed to file an affidavit of compliance with the Registry of this Court within six weeks thereafter. The said compliance certificate shall be placed on record. If the needful is not done, the respondent, would be liable to pay interest @9% per annum.”
Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Petitioners: Mr. Syed Mehdi Imam, AOR Mr. Mohd Parvez Dabas, Adv. Mr. Uzmi Jamil Husain, Adv. Mr. Tabrez Ahmad, Adv. Ms. Pooja Kumari, Adv.
For the Respondents: Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Adv. Mr. Sukesh Ghosh, Adv. Ms. Sadhana Sandhu, AOR Ms. Shikha Sandhu, Adv. Ms. Pooja Rathore, Adv. Ms. Hemangi Saikia, Adv. Mr. Kunal Mimani, AOR Ms. Shraddha Chirania, Adv.
Case Title: Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin @ Sk Salauddin & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1375
Case Number: Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
