DV Act Does Not Confer Indefeasible Right On Woman To Re-Enter Abandoned Matrimonial Home When Alternate Accommodation Exists: Delhi High Court
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja dismissed a petition by a wife seeking a residence order under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to secure restoration and re-entry into a property that she had earlier left. The Court held that the Act does not confer an indefeasible right on an aggrieved woman to insist on residence in a particular premises abandoned by her when suitable alternate accommodation of a similar standard is available. It found that the petitioner had shifted to and settled in another residence and was not rendered roofless or forcibly dispossessed and therefore was not entitled to a direction to return to the earlier property. The Court noted that compelling restoration would unsettle the current occupants’ settled possession and extend the statute beyond its protective object.
The petitioner/wife challenged orders dated 29th February 2024 and 07th September 2024 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge respectively, arising from proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. As recorded on pages 1–2 of the judgment, she had resided in the matrimonial home at C-7, Green Park since her marriage in 1964. She later shifted on 13th April 2023 to a property at B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave, owned by respondent No. 1, citing medical treatment. On 08th July 2023, she attempted to re-enter the Green Park premises and alleged that she was denied entry.
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She filed an application under Sections 19 and 23 of the DV Act seeking a residence order. The Magistrate dismissed the application, noting she was residing at the Safdarjung property. Her appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act was also dismissed. The petitioner contended that the Green Park property constituted a shared household and that denial of re-entry amounted to economic abuse. The respondents argued that she voluntarily shifted and was not rendered roofless, and that alternate accommodation was available.
The Court observed that “this Court is of the prima facie view that the present proceedings predominantly arise out of an inter se property dispute between the parties rather than a case warranting interference under the protective framework of DV Act.” It further recorded that “the material on record demonstrates that the petitioner is not without shelter and has been residing in the property bearing No. B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi.”
Referring to Section 19, the Court observed that “Section 19 of the DV Act empowers the Magistrate to pass residence orders to ensure that an aggrieved woman is not rendered roofless or left without a safe place of residence.” It stated that “the object of the statute is protective and remedial and not to confer an indefeasible right upon the aggrieved person to insist upon residence in a particular property when suitable alternate accommodation of the same standard is available and offered.”
On the concept of shared household, the Court recorded that “a mere fleeting or casual living at a different place would not constitute a shared household and therefore it is important to consider the intention of the parties, nature of living and nature of the household to determine whether the premises is share-hold.” It noted that the petitioner had mentioned Safdarjung Enclave as her address in complaints and affidavits.
The Court stated that “both the courts below, on appreciation of material on record, concluded that petitioner voluntarily shifted from Green Park premises to Safdarjung Enclave house, owned by respondent No. 1.” It referred to the statutory scheme and observed that “the statutory scheme is aimed to protect dispossession and not to revive residential arrangements consciously given up.” Further, it recorded that “a shared household must be a subsisting sharehood in presenti, not one surviving merely in historical memory.”
The Court observed that “it is a settled law that where the wife voluntarily establishes a separate residence or has access to alternate accommodation, a direction or restoration to a previously occupied premises is not automatic and may be declined.” It added that “the DV Act secures protection against dispossession, it does not compel reinstatement into a residence abandoned by choice.”
On the facts, the Court observed that “such shifting is not shown to be compelled by violence or coercion.” It concluded that “the premises at Green Park, though previously occupied by the petitioner after marriage, do not qualify as a ‘shared household’ in presenti under Section 2(s) of the DV Act.” It further observed that “the alleged denial of re-entry into the Green Park premises does not, in the facts of the case, constitute domestic violence in the nature of economic abuse.”
The Court recorded that “this Court finds no perversity, infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned orders dated 29th February, 2024 and 07th September, 2024 warranting interference in exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner is not roofless, the statutory object of the DV Act stands satisfied and the relief sought would effectively convert a property dispute into a domestic violence proceeding, which is impermissible. The petition is accordingly dismissed.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Suhail Sehgal, Mr. Prashant Drolia, Advocates
For the Respondents: Ms. Sudershani Ray, Ms. Poonam Prajapati, Advocates
Case Title: X v Y
Neutral Citation: 2026: DHC:1066
Case Number: CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
Bench: Justice Ravinder Dudeja
