Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India, Division Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B. Varale held that lands in Maharashtra could not be regarded as private forests vested in the State under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975. The Court directed that all related mutation entries and declarations be annulled and that revenue records be corrected, while permitting the State to initiate fresh proceedings only in accordance with law. In a reaffirmation of judicial hierarchy and discipline, the Bench stated that the judiciary draws its strength from discipline and not dominion, and that adherence to binding precedent is a constitutional duty. It further observed that a court acts contrary to law when it attempts to sidestep binding authority through distinctions that ignore the essence of the precedent

The matter concerns a batch of 96 civil appeals by landowners from Maharashtra challenging a Bombay High Court judgment dated 27 September 2018 that declined to interfere with revenue mutations and annotations recording their lands as affected by forest proceedings and vested in the State. The High Court proceeded on the footing that notices said to have been issued around the 1960s under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA) and published in the Official Gazette were sufficient to treat the lands as private forests under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA).

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The appellants (landowners) contended that such Section 35(3) notices were not served as mandated by Section 35(5) IFA; no inquiry on objections was held; no final notification under Section 35(1) IFA was issued; and possession remained with private owners. They asserted that, post-30 August 1975 (the appointed day under the MPFA), the State neither took possession under Section 5 nor paid compensation, while revenue and planning documents continued to treat the lands as private holdings. They also challenged the later annotations made in village records from around 2001 onward as contrary to the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (MLRC).

The State asserted that publication of notices in the Gazette and Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA sufficed for vesting, and that the impugned revenue entries were ministerial reflections of statutory consequences. The Supreme Court recorded statutory provisions central to the dispute, including IFA Chapter V (Sections 34-A, 35), the MPFA (Sections 2(c-i), 2(f), 3, 5, 24), and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, alongside the revenue framework under the MLRC.

The appeals also referenced Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2014), where a three-Judge Bench held that mere issuance, without service and a live process under Section 35 IFA, does not meet Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA; “stale” notices cannot trigger vesting; and mutation entries are ministerial.

The Court observed: “The judiciary draws its strength from discipline and not dominion.” It recorded: “Article 141… declares that the law laid down by this Court binds every court in the country. Further, Article 144… obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to act in aid of this Court.” It stated: “These are not ceremonial recitals. They are the structural guarantees that convert dispersed adjudication into a single system that speaks with one voice and commands public confidence.”

The Court observed: “When a superior court reverses, modifies, or remands, the court below must give full and faithful effect to that disposition.” It recorded: “Resistance or evasion does not merely disserve a party before the court, it erodes predictability, multiplies litigation, and weakens faith in the rule of law.”

The Court stated: “Judicial discipline is the ethic that turns hierarchy into harmony.” It recorded: “It requires courtesy, restraint, and obedience to binding precedent even where a judge is personally unpersuaded.” It observed: “The unlawful and unjust course is to distinguish in name while disregarding in substance.”

On statutory compliance, the Court stated: “For vesting to occur under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the footing of Section 2(f)(iii), a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA must not only be issued but must also be served upon the landholder.” It recorded: “The expression ‘issued’ in Section 2(f)(iii)… comprehends due service on the owner, because service alone triggers the owner’s right to object… and obliges the State to consider such objection.” It observed: “Mutation entries are ministerial in nature and cannot perfect an acquisition that lacks the statutory predicates.”

Assessing the record, the Court stated: “There is no proof of service of any Section 35(3) notice… There is no final notification under Section 35(1)… Actual possession has at all times remained with private owners… No possession was taken under Section 5 of the MPFA Act… and no compensation exercise was undertaken under Section 7.” It recorded: “The materials produced by the State include undated and unverified possession papers that do not inspire confidence when set against decades of undisturbed private possession.”

On construction of expropriatory statutes, the Court observed: “Expropriatory legislation must be construed strictly and Article 300-A… requires that no person is deprived of property save by authority of law.” It stated: “When a statute prescribes a manner of doing a thing, it must be done in that manner or not at all.”

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Concerning precedent, the Court recorded: “We accordingly hold that the present appeals are indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce.” It stated: “Fidelity to binding precedent and to the statutory scheme admits of no other conclusion than that the impugned order must be set aside.”

The Court directed: “The impugned judgment and order dated 27.09.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 6417 of 2015, amongst others, is set aside. The writ petitions before the High Court in the aforementioned matter are allowed. All mutation orders and any declarations treating the subject lands as private forests are quashed and set aside. Consequential corrections be made in the revenue records.”

“Liberty is reserved to the State to initiate such proceedings, in accordance with law, as per the relevant Statutes and to bring them to a logical conclusion after following due process of law.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

Case Title: Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1296
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 5454 of 2019 & connected appeals
Bench: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Prasanna B. Varale