Kerala HC Quashes Case Against Man for Throwing Files in Tahsildar’s Office | Bureaucracy Must Act With Humane Touch
Isabella Mariam
The High Court of Kerala Single Bench of Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan delivered an order on 14 August 2025, allowing a criminal revision petition. The Court modified an earlier order and directed that the petitioner be discharged from all charges, including the offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court concluded that the prosecution’s allegations, even if accepted in full, did not constitute criminal force or assault under the statutory provisions invoked. Consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner were quashed in entirety.
The matter arose from a dispute involving a 76-year-old individual and his son-in-law, the revision petitioner. The father-in-law had approached the office of the Tahsildar (LR) to effect mutation of three cents of property in his name. The petitioner contended that despite payment of land tax, the file remained pending for approximately one and a half years. The Tahsildar allegedly cited technical reasons for delay. Eventually, a hearing was scheduled at the Tahsildar’s office, which the petitioner attended with his father-in-law.
According to the petitioner, difficulties arose when the Tahsildar refused to conduct the hearing on the ground that the opposite party was represented by another person. The petitioner, disturbed by the situation faced by his elderly father-in-law, questioned the decision, leading to an altercation. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner entered the chamber of the Tahsildar, uttered obscene words, snatched a file from a clerk, threw the file onto the office table, and threw plastic chairs, thereby obstructing the official in discharge of her duties.
The First Information Report, FI statement, and scene mahazar were marked as Annexure I, while the final report of the police was produced as Annexure II. The petitioner received summons and subsequently filed a discharge petition before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Kollam, in CMP No. 6757/2024 in CC No. 2273/2020. The Magistrate allowed the discharge petition in part, discharging the petitioner from the offence under Section 294(b) IPC but holding that he must face trial under Section 353 IPC.
Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court in criminal revision. Counsel for the petitioner, Advocate P. Parameswaran Nair, submitted that even if the allegations were accepted as true, the offence under Section 353 IPC was not made out. The prosecution, represented by the State through the Public Prosecutor, contended that the ingredients of Section 353 IPC were satisfied, referring to statutory definitions of “force,” “criminal force,” and “assault.”
The allegations in the final report, recorded in Malayalam, stated that the accused entered the Tahsildar’s chamber, uttered obscene words, threw plastic chairs, and forcibly took a file from the hands of the clerk, throwing it onto the table, thereby obstructing official duty. The central issue before the Court was whether these acts constituted “criminal force” or “assault” sufficient to invoke Section 353 IPC.
Justice Kunhikrishnan undertook a detailed examination of the statutory definitions. The Court extracted Section 353 IPC, which prescribes punishment for assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of duty. The Court recorded: “To constitute an offence under Section 353 IPC, the accused should assault or use criminal force… Therefore, assault or use of criminal force on any person who is a public servant is the main ingredient to attract the offence under Section 353 IPC.”
The Court proceeded to analyse Section 349 IPC, which defines “force.” The provision was reproduced in full. The Court noted: “From the above section, the important ingredient is that the force should contact with any part of the other’s body or with anything that the other is wearing or carrying or with anything so situated that such contact affects the other’s sense of feeling.” Similarly, Section 350 IPC defining “criminal force” was examined. The Court stated: “To attract the definition of ‘Criminal force’, the accused should intentionally use force to any person without that person’s consent, in order to commit any offence or intending by the use of such force to cause or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force, he will cause injury, fear or annoyance.”
After applying the provisions to the allegations, the Court observed: “Even if the same is accepted in toto, it cannot be said that any criminal force is used by the petitioner towards CW1 and CW2.” The Court recorded that the petitioner snatched a file from CW2 and threw it onto the table of CW1, which led to files falling. He also hit a plastic chair on the floor. The Court concluded: “At that time also, there is no criminal force used against any person, nor is there any intention to use force to cause or knowing it to be likely that by such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance.”
On whether the acts constituted “assault” under Section 351 IPC, the Court stated: “To constitute ‘assault’, he who makes a gesture or preparation should create an apprehension in any other person that he is about to use criminal force on that person. In this case, CW1 or CW2 has no case that they have an apprehension that the gestures of the accused or preparation are made to use criminal force against them.” It further noted that mere words do not amount to assault, as clarified in the explanation to Section 351 IPC.
The Court relied on precedent. In Devaki Amma v. State of Kerala [1981 KHC 313], the Court had observed: “What is contemplated under S.353 IPC is not merely use of force but use of criminal force to any person mentioned therein… The criminal force contemplated under this section is intended to mean criminal force as applied to a person and not as applied to an inanimate object or substance.” Similarly, reliance was placed on Durga Prasad and Others v. State of Kerala [2014 (3) KHC 704].
The Court concluded: “It cannot be said that, even if the entire allegations are accepted, any criminal force is used by the petitioner.” It recorded that the petitioner’s actions appeared to be sudden gestures provoked by the plight of his father-in-law, but did not constitute a criminal offence.
The Court further observed on broader administrative responsibility: “A humane touch is necessary in every administrative act of bureaucrats. It is often said that every file has a face, and every decision has a consequence… Bureaucracy should serve democracy, not be its master.”
The Court’s final directives were clear and categorical. Justice Kunhikrishnan recorded: “The upshot of the above discussion is that this Criminal Revision Petition is to be allowed.” Accordingly, the Court stated: “Therefore, this Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order is modified, and the Revision Petitioner is discharged for all charges, including the offence under Section 353 of the IPC, by allowing the entire prayers in C.M.P. No.6757/2024 in C.C. No.2273/2020 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court – II, Kollam.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Sri. Sooraj T. Elenjickal, Smt. Helen P.A., Shri. Athul Roy, Shri. Indrajith Dileep, Smt. Amala Anna Thottupuram, Shri. P. Parameswaran Nair
For the Respondents: Sr. Public Prosecutor, Smt. Seetha S
Case Title: Manilal v. State of Kerala
Neutral Citation: 2025: KER:62163
Case Number: Criminal Revision Petition No. 490 of 2025
Bench: Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan
