Kerala High Court | Seizure of Forest Produce and Vehicle Used in Offence Must Be Effected Within ‘Reasonable Interval’ | Clarifies Scope of Section 52, Kerala Forest Act
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Kerala Division Bench of Chief Justice Nitin Jamdar and Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan delivered an order on 18 August 2025 clarifying the interpretation of Section 52 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961. The Bench held that the decisions in two earlier Division Bench cases, Divisional Forest Officer v. Amina [1999 (1) KLJ 433] and DFO, Kothamangalam v. Sunny Joseph [2002 (3) KLT 641], did not express divergent views. Instead, both judgments were based on the same legal principle, namely, that a vehicle alleged to have been used in transporting forest produce must be seized within a reasonable period and there must exist a reasonable nexus between the vehicle and the alleged offence. The Bench further recorded that a reference to a Full Bench was not required and directed the matter back to the Single Judge for disposal.
The matter arose from an intra-court reference in a Criminal Miscellaneous Case. The petitioner, aged 46 years, claimed to be the owner of a vehicle that had been taken into custody by the Range Forest Officer on 1 August 2024. The allegation against the petitioner was that the vehicle had been used for the illegal transportation of timber from the forest. The petitioner approached the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class–I, Thodupuzha, seeking interim custody of the vehicle. The petitioner’s position was that he had no connection with the cutting or removal of timber, nor was he aware of its transportation.
The Judicial Magistrate of the First Class–I, Thodupuzha, rejected the petitioner’s request for interim release of the vehicle. The petitioner subsequently challenged this order before the High Court by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7505 of 2024. The petitioner argued that he was innocent of the alleged offence, that the vehicle was lying idle and deteriorating in value, and that the interim release ought to have been granted.
The petitioner’s counsel contended that under Section 52 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, a vehicle could only be seized if it was found transporting forest produce. Since the timber was seized several days before the vehicle, the counsel argued that the seizure of the vehicle was invalid. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench in Divisional Forest Officer v. Amina, which was argued to support this contention.
The Special Government Pleader for the Forest Department countered this argument by relying on the Division Bench decision in DFO, Kothamangalam v. Sunny Joseph. In that case, it was held that even if the vehicle is not seized simultaneously with the timber, the Forest Officer is not divested of the power to seize the vehicle under Section 52 of the Act. The Bench observed that the seizure of a vehicle need not be simultaneous, provided it is within a reasonable time and backed by evidence connecting the vehicle to the forest offence.
The Single Judge, upon examining both precedents, opined that there appeared to be divergent views between the two Division Bench decisions. Though Sunny Joseph attempted to distinguish Amina, the Single Judge considered that an authoritative pronouncement was necessary. Consequently, the matter was referred to a Division Bench to determine whether the issue required reference to a Full Bench.
Pursuant to an administrative order, the reference came before the present Division Bench of Chief Justice Nitin Jamdar and Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan. The Bench heard arguments from both sides, including submissions from the petitioner’s counsel and the Special Government Pleader.
The statutory provision central to the case was Section 52 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, which empowers Forest Officers or Police Officers to seize timber or forest produce when there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed. The section also authorises seizure of tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles, and cattle used in the commission of the offence. Section 61A of the Act provides that property seized under Section 52(1), including vehicles, must be produced without unreasonable delay before an officer not below the rank of Assistant Conservator of Forests, who is empowered to order confiscation.
The Bench examined the two earlier Division Bench judgments in detail. In relation to Amina, the court recorded: “On a plain reading of S.52, it is clear that the vehicles could be seized by the forest authorities or police officers if it was found that they were involved in committing the offence. S.52 does not confer any power on the forest authorities to ask the owner of the vehicle to produce the same in the forest office much after the offence allegedly committed.” The Division Bench in Amina had concluded that seizure after an unreasonable delay was not permitted.
The Bench then turned to Sunny Joseph, where the facts involved transportation of timber on 24 March 1993 and seizure of the vehicle on 27 March 1993. The Division Bench there had examined whether simultaneous seizure was mandatory. The court recorded: “A reading of this Section does not indicate that there should be simultaneous seizure of the timber or forest produce and tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles, etc. It may happen that the forest offence would have been committed with respect to timber. The Forest Authorities would have got information only later. By the time the timber would have been stored in some place as had happened in this case. It cannot be said that because the timber has been stored in a particular place, the vehicle which was used for conveying the timber cannot be seized when it was really involved in the commission of offence.”
The Bench also noted the further observation in Sunny Joseph: “We make it clear that in cases where the forest produce and the vehicle are not seized simultaneously, the vehicle can be seized only if there is evidence to connect the vehicle with forest offence and that the seizure is not to be done after a long time. The seizure of the vehicle after a long time will put the owner and driver of the vehicle into great hardship with regard to discharging their burden which is imposed on them under S.52 and 61A of the above Act.”
The present Bench observed that the principle in Amina and Sunny Joseph was the same. “In the case of Amina, the seizure of the vehicle occurred long after the seizure of the forest produce, and consequently, the seizure was set aside. In the case of Sunny Joseph, the Division Bench interpreted the phrase ‘together with’ occurring in Section 52 of the Act of 1961 and held that seizure of the vehicle cannot occur long after the seizure of the forest produce.”
Further, the Bench recorded: “Not only is there no conflict between the decisions in the cases of Amina and Sunny Joseph, but both the judgments are founded on the same principle. The principle being that the seizure of a vehicle, following the seizure of forest produce, has to be effected within a reasonable period of time. The decision in the case of Sunny Joseph develops this principle laid down in the case of Amina further by elaborating its scope and application.”
The Bench stated that both judgments required a reasonable nexus between the seized vehicle and the forest produce. “From both the judgments, same principle emerges that there has to be a reasonable nexus between the vehicle and the forest produce seized, as well as a reasonable interval between the seizure of the produce and the seizure of the vehicle, otherwise the seizure of the vehicle after a long time will prejudice the owner and driver of the vehicle with regard to discharging their burden under the statute.”
The Bench also clarified that the reasonableness of seizure would depend on the facts of each case: “The question of whether seizure of the vehicle after the seizure of the forest produce is within the reasonable time and with justifying reasons for the delay, and whether there is evidence to connect the vehicle to the seized products, will depend on the facts of each case which the Court will have to decide.”
The Division Bench concluded that neither Amina nor Sunny Joseph laid down any absolute principle regarding the interpretation of the phrase “together with” in Section 52. The Bench stated: “Neither the decision in the case of Amina nor the decision in the case of Sunny Joseph has laid down any absolute principle in this regard that the words ‘together with’ in Section 52 of the Act of 1961 means simultaneously or that it can mean any time.”
Finally, the Bench addressed the issue of binding precedent: “Having dealt with the decision in the case of Amina in detail and further having expounded the same basic principle, the subsequent decision in the case of Sunny Joseph of the Division Bench is the binding law insofar as the Single Judge is concerned. The law laid down in the case of Sunny Joseph is in field for more than twenty three years. Generally, a long-standing interpretation of a statutory provision need not be re-opened unless compelling reasons exist.”
On the basis of its analysis, the Division Bench delivered its order. The Bench stated: “Thus, the decisions in the cases of Divisional Forest Officer v. Amina and DFO, Kothamangalam v. Sunny Joseph do not express divergent views. On the other hand, both the decisions lay down the same legal principle that the phrase ‘together with’ in Section 52 of the Act of 1961, in respect of vehicle and the forest produce, does not mean that the seizure of both has to be simultaneous, nor does it permit the seizure at any time later.” The Bench clarified that the seizure of a vehicle must be within a reasonable time and have a reasonable nexus with the forest produce.
The court further stated: “If the vehicle is not seized along with the forest produce, it has to be seized within a reasonable time and nexus. This aspect of reasonableness will depend on the facts of each case. Therefore, a reference to the Full Bench is not required.”
Finally, the Bench ordered that: “Crl.M.C. No.7505 of 2024 be placed before the learned Single Judge as per roster for disposal.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Sri. P. Shanes Methar, Shri. N. Krishna Prasad, Shri. Harkish Sreethu V.S.
For the Respondents: Special Government Pleader Sri. Nagaraj Narayanan
Case Title: A.M. Noushad v. State of Kerala & Anr
Neutral Citation: 2025: KER:62045
Case Number: ICR (Crl.MC) No.16 of 2025 arising from Crl.MC No.7505 of 2024
Bench: Chief Justice Nitin Jamdar, Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan
