Sanchayita Lahkar

The High Court of Delhi Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Renu Bhatnagar dismissed an appeal challenging a decree of divorce granted by the Family Court under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court upheld the lower court's finding that the conduct of the appellant, including the filing of derogatory complaints against the respondent to his employer and high-ranking authorities, constituted mental cruelty.

In a detailed judgment, the Bench affirmed that both parties had failed to substantiate mutual allegations of adultery. However, based on corroborated evidence of repeated complaints and abusive behaviour, the Court concluded that the respondent had been subjected to cruelty. The Division Bench found no infirmity in the Family Court's order and held that prolonged separation of approximately fifteen years further indicated irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed, and the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court was sustained.

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The appeal arose from an order passed by the Family Court, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, which granted a decree of divorce to the respondent under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The appellant challenged this decision before the High Court under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

The parties were married on 7 May 1989 according to Hindu rites and customs. Two children were born from the wedlock: a son on 7 May 1992 and a daughter on 22 April 1995. The appellant alleged that the respondent deserted the matrimonial home in June 2011 after selling it without her knowledge and did not provide any financial assistance or alternative accommodation.

According to the appellant, the respondent failed to support the children financially or emotionally, compelling her to raise them by incurring significant debts. She further asserted that the respondent attempted to dispossess them from the matrimonial property and obstruct their efforts to seek redress under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

In response, the respondent filed for divorce alleging mental cruelty and adultery on the part of the appellant. He claimed that she had filed multiple frivolous complaints and legal actions against him before various authorities including his employer, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), and other constitutional functionaries.

The Family Court, upon examining the evidence and testimony, allowed the divorce petition. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court, contending that the Family Court had wrongly accepted unproven allegations and misapplied the law.

The appellant argued that the Family Court erred by relying on allegedly vague and frivolous claims of cruelty that were not properly rebutted during cross-examination and by failing to recognize that filing complaints to seek redress is not inherently cruel. She further argued that the respondent had not substantiated allegations of adultery and that these baseless accusations themselves amounted to cruelty.

The appellant also contended that her complaints to BPCL were motivated by the need to secure justice in the face of abandonment and denial of basic necessities. She maintained that she had acted out of desperation rather than malice.

She challenged the reliance on audio recordings presented by the respondent, arguing that they were not authenticated under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), and hence, inadmissible.

The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the complaints were defamatory and intended to harm his reputation professionally. He submitted that they were accompanied by abusive conduct and physical assault. He supported his claims with medical records and recordings.

The Family Court held that the allegations made by the appellant in her complaints to BPCL and other authorities, including accusations of adultery, were unfounded and amounted to mental cruelty. It also considered corroborative medical records and audio evidence to support the respondent's allegations of physical cruelty.

The High Court was called upon to assess whether the Family Court's findings were perverse or warranted interference.

The High Court observed that, "cruelty under Section 13(1) (ia) of the HMA can be physical or mental. It is a settled position of law that the instances of cruelty are not to be taken in isolation, instead, a cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances, emerging from the evidence on record, is to be taken up and only then a fair inference as to whether the petitioner has been subjected to mental cruelty or not, due to conduct of the other spouse, is to be drawn."

In referring to established precedents, the Bench cited N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326, stating, "The inquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent."

Further, the Court stated, "It is difficult to comprehend, and it is inconsistent with natural human conduct, that a husband would maintain cordial family relations with a man with whom he believes his wife is involved in an extramarital relationship."

Regarding the complaints filed by the appellant, the Bench noted, "making such derogatory and defamatory remarks in the form of complaints to the employer of the spouse are nothing but cruelty."

Addressing the appellant’s argument that the complaints were a reaction to neglect and abuse, the Court recorded, "The complaints made by her to the employer of the respondent, more specifically of the unfounded allegation of adultery, cannot be treated so as to address the issues of any wrong done to her, as the employer of the respondent has nothing to do with all such wrongs and lead to the irresistible conclusion that they were made to harass the respondent-husband and to humiliate him in his workplace before his colleagues."

The Court cited Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, observing, "making derogatory complaints to the Employer of spouse, with intent to harm professional reputation and financial well-being, is nothing but cruelty."

The Court addressed the admissibility of the CDs submitted by the respondent, observing that, "under Section 14 of the FC Act, a Family Court may receive as evidence, any report, statement, document, information, or other matter that, in its opinion, may assist it in effectually dealing with a dispute, regardless of whether the same would be admissible under the Indian Evidence Act."

The Court noted that the allegations of cruelty by the appellant against the respondent lacked medical or documentary corroboration, whereas the respondent’s claims were supported by medical evidence and audio recordings. The Court recorded, "The findings of the learned Family Court, accepting the allegations of cruelty raised by the respondent, are not only based on the CDs but also on medical evidence corroborating the oral testimony of the respondent."

On the prolonged separation of nearly fifteen years, the Court stated, "a marital relationship which has only become more bitter and acrimonious over the years, does nothing but inflict cruelty on both the sides."

Referring to Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, the Court observed, "To keep the façade of this broken marriage alive would-be doing injustice to both the parties. A marriage which has broken down irretrievably, in our opinion spells cruelty to both the parties."

The Division Bench of the High Court upheld the Family Court’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court directed: "In view of the foregoing discussion of facts and law, we find no infirmity in the Impugned Judgment passed by the learned Family Court."

"The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of as being rendered infructuous."

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The Court concluded that the complaints filed by the appellant were defamatory and that they, along with corroborated acts of abuse, constituted mental cruelty as per Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. It held that the Family Court was within its jurisdiction to accept electronic evidence under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, and its findings based on corroborative materials were legally sustainable.

Additionally, the Court noted that long-standing separation reinforced the case for divorce and stated, "the fact that the parties have been living separately for a long time period of time, that is, around fifteen years now, without any resumption of marital cohabitation between the parties, can also be considered as an added ground while deciding the divorce petition."

Thus, the Court found no cause to interfere with the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court.

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Appellant: Mr. Prashant Machanda, Ms. Nancy Shah & Ms. Isha Baloni, Advocates

Case Title: Anita Sharma v. Naresh Kumar Sharma

Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:5066-DB

Case Number: MAT.APP. (F.C.) 160/2025

Bench: Justice Navin Chawla, Justice Renu Bhatnagar