Safiya Malik

The High Court of Delhi Single Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan held that criminal liability for causing death by negligence under Section 304A IPC cannot arise from mere lack of care and requires a clear element of culpable mental state. Applying this principle, the Court set aside the order framing charges and discharged the petitioner, the owner of a de-addiction centre, who had been implicated after an inmate died following an assault by an employee. The Court found that the record did not disclose material suggesting gross negligence attributable to the petitioner or credible evidence linking him to the alleged destruction of CCTV footage, and therefore no grave suspicion existed to justify continuation of proceedings.

The matter arises from proceedings initiated after the death of an individual inside a de-addiction centre operated by the petitioner. In June 2018, police arrived at the facility following a call and found the victim deceased. An eyewitness, who was also an inmate, stated that the victim had been brought to the centre in an intoxicated condition the previous night. It was alleged that a caretaker, accompanied by two others, consumed alcohol on the premises and later assaulted the victim with a bamboo stick after the victim passed stool and urine while lying on the floor. The eyewitness further stated that the caretaker cut the victim’s hair and threatened those present, and that the CCTV recording device was removed from the premises.

Also Read: No New Mining Until Aravali Mapping And Ecological Assessment Are Completed: Supreme Court Directs Centre To Prepare Sustainable Mining Plan

During investigation, disclosure statements of the caretaker and another accused indicated that CCTV equipment had been taken away, though the DVR could not be recovered. The initial charge sheet implicated the caretaker and another employee, placing the petitioner in column 12 for lack of evidence. Subsequent investigation directed in 2023 led to a supplementary charge sheet alleging offences under Sections 201, 302, 120B and 34 IPC against the petitioner. The petitioner contested the allegations, arguing absence of direct or circumstantial evidence, lack of corroboration for the disclosure statements, unavailability of CCTV footage, and non-existence of records due to the centre’s closure. The State opposed these submissions, maintaining that the material justified the charges.

The Court recorded at the outset that “the scope of interference by High Courts while exercising revisional jurisdiction… is well settled,” noting that interference may occur “if the allegations are patently absurd and the basic ingredients of the offence… are not made out.” It referred to precedent that a judge has the power “to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case… has been made out,” and that if two views arise, and only suspicion exists rather than grave suspicion, discharge is warranted.

The Court examined principles governing Sections 227 and 228 CrPC, noting that the judge must consider whether “the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion,” while not conducting a roving enquiry. It stated that before framing a charge, the judge “must be satisfied that the commission of offence… was possible,” examining whether the facts, taken at face value, contain all ingredients.

Addressing the petitioner’s implication six years after the incident, the Court recorded that the impugned order was “abysmally bereft of any cogent reasoning” on how a case was made out beyond ownership of premises and employment of the main accused. It stated that although the Trial Court need not conduct a mini-trial, it “is required to sift through the material on record.”

On Section 304A IPC, the Court discussed that negligence must be “gross or of a very high degree,” and that criminal negligence requires “mens rea.” It referenced that death must be the “direct result of a rash and negligent act… the proximate and efficient cause.” The Court noted that although the petitioner owed some duty of care as owner, this alone “cannot render him liable… merely on account of ownership of premises.”

Regarding alleged destruction of evidence under Section 201 IPC, the Court observed that the charge rested “merely on account of the disclosure statement of co-accused… which is not admissible as evidence.” It stated that the improved disclosure, recorded five years later, was uncorroborated, and that circumstances “merely cast suspicion… insufficient for framing charges.”

Ultimately, the Court concluded that “grave suspicion is not raised” and that in the absence of “any cogent material, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer trial.”

Also Read: Courts Cannot Carve Out Exceptions For ‘Near-Majority Consensual Relationships’ When Consent Is Irrelevant Under POCSO Act: Delhi High Court

The Court set aside “the impugned orders” relating to the framing of charges against the petitioner. It directed that “the petitioner is discharged of the charges framed against him in the case arising out of FIR No. 197/2018, registered at Police Station Govind Puri. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. The observations made in the present order are for the purpose of deciding the present petition and the same shall have no bearing on the case in relation to the other accused persons.”

Advocates Representing The Parties

For the Petitioner: Mr. Imran Ali & Ms. Misha, Advs.
For the Respondent: Mr. Raj Kumar, APP for the State.

Case Title: Om Prakash v. State of NCT of Delhi
Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:9640
Case Number: CRL.REV. P. 250/2025 & CRL.M.A. 19964/2025
Bench: Justice Amit Mahajan