Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan dismissed appeals by transferees pendente lite who objected to execution of a decree for specific performance and delivery of possession, upholding the Bombay High Court’s dismissal of their challenge. The Court directed the purchasers to hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to the decree-holder on or before 15 February 2026. The dispute arose after the judgment-debtor sold parts of the property during the suit despite a pending claim for conveyance, and the decree-holder later sought possession through a court-executed sale deed. Treating the transfers as subject to the decree, the Court said such purchasers cannot impede execution and remain bound by the case’s outcome.

The dispute concerns execution of a decree for specific performance arising from an agreement for sale of immovable property executed in 1973. The plaintiff, who later became the decree holder, instituted a civil suit in 1986 seeking execution of a sale deed and delivery of possession after the vendor failed to perform contractual obligations. A notice of lis pendens was registered shortly after institution of the suit.

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During pendency of the suit, the judgment debtor transferred portions of the suit property through multiple registered sale deeds to third parties, from whom the present appellants subsequently derived title. One transferee constructed a permanent structure on part of the property.

The suit was decreed in 1990 directing execution of the sale deed and delivery of vacant possession. Upon failure of the judgment debtor to comply, the Executing Court authorised execution of the sale deed through a Court Commissioner in 1993. Multiple attempts by the judgment debtor to challenge the decree and execution were dismissed, and the decree attained finality.

When execution proceedings progressed to delivery of possession, the appellants resisted execution, claiming independent ownership and possession. The Executing Court adjudicated the obstruction under Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 CPC and directed removal of obstruction. Appeals and revisions challenging the execution orders were successively dismissed by the appellate court and the High Court, leading to the present civil appeals.

The Court stated: “In short, the doctrine of lis pendens, which Section 52 of the TPA encapsulates, bars the transfer of a suit property during the pendency of litigation.” “The only exception to the principle is when it is transferred under the authority of the court and on terms imposed by it.” “Where one of the parties to the suit transfers the suit property (or a part of it) to a third-party, the latter is bound by the result of the proceedings even if he did not have notice of the suit or proceeding.”

On the Maharashtra requirement concerning registration of notice of pendency, the Court recorded: “This additional requirement of registration of notice of pendency is for the benefit of the party claiming any right in such subject-matter property and also for the benefit of any third-party interested in such subject-matter property by enabling the former to claim the benefit of lis pendens as an absolute right after having duly taken steps towards ensuring that the public is well-aware of the impeding litigation in respect of such property by registering a notice of pendency and to enable the latter to ascertain the veracity of title of such property by exercise of its due diligence.”

“Although, the said provision is for the benefit of the third-party, yet such subsequent purchasers cannot as a matter of absolute right claim any title to such property solely on the ground of want of any notice of pendency being registered.” “To hold otherwise would undermine the object and purpose of the doctrine of lis pendens which is based on the principle of equity, good conscience, and public policy and discourage any thwarting or frustration of rights of the parties so litigating by unscrupulous and unanticipated transactions.”

The Court stated: “However, it is evident that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to institution of a suit or proceeding.” It then stated: “However, the moment a suit or proceeding is instituted by a party to the contract whereafter there is transfer of the suit property, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in which event the doctrine of lis pendens would come into force.”

On resistance to execution and the confined adjudication where the objector is a transferee pendente lite, the Court quoted: “A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree.” The Court also quoted: “No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such a transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102.” The Court further quoted: “Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.”

Applying this to the case before it, the Court stated: “All the courts have recorded a clear finding of fact that the appellants were fully aware of the pendency of the suit. However, even that is not necessary.” It then stated: “As has been held by this Court in Silverline, the scope of adjudication is limited to the only question as to whether the objector who has resisted execution is a transferee pendente lite or not and if the finding is in the affirmative, then such a transferee has no right to resist.” The Court also stated: “In so far the present case is concerned, the rights of the appellants have been duly adjudicated under Order XXI Rules 97 to 102 CPC to the complete satisfaction of the Executing Court.” The Court stated: “That being the position, there is no merit at all in the case projected by the appellants and the Executing Court rightly passed the order dated 29.02.2020.”

On the nature and consequence of a transfer pendente lite after the decree and conveyance attain finality, the Court stated: “There is no dispute to the proposition that transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio.” It stated: “But it remains subservient to the decree that may be passed by the court.” It then stated: “Now that the decree and conveyance in favour of respondent No. 1 have attained finality, the transferee pendente lite i.e. the appellants have to give way and hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to respondent No. 1.”

On reliance placed on Lala Durga Prasad, the Court stated: “Mr. Navare, learned senior counsel for the appellants also placed heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in Lala Durga Prasad.” The Court stated: “According to us, given the facts of this case, Lala Durga Prasad will have no application at all.”

While approving the impugned order, the Court reproduced the High Court’s reasoning and recorded: “Thus, it is clear that in the said decision Section 52 of the TP Act and the parameters concerning the same are not under consideration and in fact in those cases Section 52 is not even applicable.” It recorded: “In the said decision, admittedly the sale in favour of subsequent purchaser by the Defendant/Vendor is before filing of the Suit by the Plaintiff.” It recorded: “Thus, the said decision of Lala Durga Prasad (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case.”

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The Court recorded the High Court’s concluding analysis as follows: “Concluding the analysis, the High Court held that if the subsequent transferee acquires right, title and interest with respect to the subject property before filing of the suit, the law laid down in Lala Durga Prasad would be applicable.” “In paragraph 41 of the impugned judgment, the High Court noted that since in the present case, the transfers are pendente lite, such transactions are covered by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and hence the law laid down in Lala Durga Prasad would have no application.” The Court then stated: “We are in complete agreement with the views expressed by the High Court.”

The Supreme Court directed that “Appellants are directed to hand over actual physical possession of the suit property to respondent No. 1 (decree holder) on or before 15.02.2026.”

“Accordingly, we direct that no further application(s) or petition(s) either by the appellants or by the judgment debtor i.e. respondent No. 2 or by any other person claiming right qua the suit property through them shall be entertained by any court. Consequently, both the appeals are dismissed in the aforesaid terms. No cost.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Appellants: Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav, AOR Mr. Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv. Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav, Adv. Mr. R.d. Barve, Adv. Mr. Mahesh Barve, Adv. Mr. Brij Kishor Sah, Adv. Ms. Apurva, Adv. Mr. Vignesh Singh, Adv. Mr. Aditya S. Jadhav, Adv.
For the Respondents: Caveator-in-person, AOR

Case Title: Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 52
Case Number: Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 27660 of 2025 and 27868 of 2025
Bench: Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan