Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice R. Mahadevan on Thursday (January 29) held that any request to extend an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be moved only before the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e), namely the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the arbitrators were appointed by a High Court or by the parties. In the dispute arising from a family settlement that went to arbitration, the Bench set aside the Bombay High Court’s decision that had nullified a Commercial Court’s extension order on jurisdictional grounds, restored the Commercial Court’s order extending time, and left the parties free to seek further extension before that court.

The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Family Settlement executed between members of a family, under which arbitration was invoked to resolve subsequent disputes. During the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal did not complete the proceedings within the statutory time prescribed under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

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An application seeking extension of time was filed before the Commercial Court, which allowed the request and extended the mandate of the arbitral tribunal. During this period, owing to the resignation of the presiding arbitrator, an application under Section 11 of the Act was moved before the High Court, and an arbitrator was appointed.

The order of the Commercial Court extending time under Section 29A was thereafter challenged before the High Court on the ground that once the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11, the Commercial Court lacked jurisdiction to extend the mandate.

In view of conflicting decisions of various High Courts on the interpretation of the term “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) in the context of Section 29A, the matter was referred by a Single Judge to a Division Bench. The Division Bench held that where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court, the application under Section 29A would lie before the High Court. Based on this view, the Single Judge set aside the Commercial Court’s order. The correctness of these orders was examined by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with particular reference to Sections 2(1)(e), 11, 29A, and 42. The Court observed that “exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 stands exhausted upon the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.” It further stated that “there is no residual supervisory or controlling power left with the High Court or the Supreme Court over the arbitral proceedings after appointment is made.”

The Bench recorded that “…we are of the opinion that the conclusion on the ground that there will be hierarchical difficulties, conflict of power or jurisdictional anomaly if a Civil Court entertains application under Section 29A for extension of time of an arbitral tribunal if the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act has appointed the arbitrator(s) is untenable. This approach is hereby rejected.”

While analysing Section 29A, the Court observed that “the ‘Court’ under Section 29A shall be the Civil Court of ordinary original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e).” It further recorded that “the High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) does not fall within the definition of ‘Court’ for the purposes of Section 29A.”

Addressing the concern that permitting Civil Courts to extend the mandate may result in a conflict of jurisdiction, the Court stated that “interpretation based on a perception of status or hierarchy of Courts is opposed to the fundamental conception of rule of law.” It further recorded that “jurisdiction of courts comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised otherwise.”

The Court held that referral courts are not vested with jurisdiction to supervise the arbitral proceedings or to entertain and decide an application seeking extension of time for making the arbitral award. It held:“exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 stands exhausted upon the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. There is no residual supervisory or controlling power left with the High Court or the Supreme Court over the arbitral proceedings after appointment is made.”

The Court further observed: “It is a misconception to assume that the Supreme Court or the High Court keeps a watch on the Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings or on Making of the Arbitral Award like the Orwell's “Big Brother is watching you”, and that “the referral Court becomes functus officio once appointment has been made, it has no role or function as a Subjudice Sentinel.”

With respect to Section 42 of the Act, the Court observed that “applications under Section 11 are not made before a ‘Court’ as defined under Section 2(1)(e),” and therefore recorded that “Section 42 would not apply to applications made before the Chief Justice or his delegate.” Relying on the Constitution Bench precedent in State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co., (2018) the Court concluded that there was no contextual basis to depart from the statutory definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) for the purposes of Section 29A.

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The Supreme Court directed that “the appeals are allowed. The reference of the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 88 of 2024 dated 07.08.2024 and the subsequent judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 88 of 2024 dated 21.08.2024 are set aside. The judgment of the Commercial Court in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 20/2023/A dated 02.01.2024 is restored.”

“The parties are at liberty to move the Commercial Court for further extension under Section 29A(5) for exercising Court’s power under Section 29A(4). The Court shall consider the application, hear the parties and pass appropriate orders.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Appellants: Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, Adv. Mr. Dhruv Tank, Adv. Mr. Aniruddha Awalgaonkar, Adv. Mr. Sarthak Mehrotra, Adv. Mr. Bhagwant Deshpande, Adv. Ms. Surbhi Kapoor, AOR.

For the Respondents: Mr. Amit Pai, Adv. Mr. Omkar Jayant Deshpande, AOR Mr. Ashok Poulo Paul, Adv. Mr. Mukul Reedla, Adv. Ms. Shaneen Parikh, Adv. Ms. Sanskriti Sidana, Adv. Mr. Rahul Mantri, Adv. M/S. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, AOR Mr. Parag Rao, Adv. Mrs. Shambhavi Rao, Adv. Mr. Akhil Parikar, Adv. Mr. Salvador Santosh Rebello, AOR Mr. Raghav Sharma, Adv. Ms. Kritika, Adv. Mr. Jaskirat Pal Singh, Adv. Ms. Moulishree Pathak, Adv. Mr. Shiven Desai, Adv. Mr. Vivek Jain, AOR Ms. Suchitra Kumbhat, Adv. Mr. Sadiq Noor, Adv. Mr. Rohit H Nair, Adv. Ms. Benila B M, Adv.

Case Title: Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 92
Case Number: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 10944–10945 of 2025
Bench: Justice P.S. Narasimha, Justice R. Mahadevan