Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Surya Kant and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held that non-disclosure of income as per income tax returns for four financial years in the Form 26 Affidavit does not amount to a defect of substantial character warranting the invalidation of the election of the returned candidate. The Bench directed that the appeal be dismissed as devoid of merit, affirming the acceptance of the nomination by the Returning Officer and the election result as valid. The Court further directed that parties bear their own costs and that the Registry notify the concerned authorities under Section 116C (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The appeal arose from the dismissal of Election Petition No. 10 of 2024 by the High Court for the State of Telangana. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant invoked Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, assailing the High Court’s judgment dated 25 October 2024 which had rejected the challenge to the returned candidate’s election.

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The Supreme Court framed the central controversy as whether the non-disclosure of income (as shown in income-tax returns for four of the last five financial years) in the Form 26 affidavit at the time of filing the nomination paper, and the Returning Officer’s acceptance of that nomination, amounted to improper acceptance, corrupt practice, and/or non-compliance with the Act and rules so as to render the election void under Section 100.

As to the background, the record shows that prior to the impugned 2023 election the returned candidate had served as MLA for Asifabad (ST) from 2014–2018, was elected ZPTC member on 2 May 2019, and thereafter served as Chairperson of the Kumuram Bheem Zilla Parishad until 3 December 2023, following which she was re-elected as MLA.

Upon notification of the 2023 Telangana Legislative Assembly election, the returned candidate filed her nomination with Form 26 on 9 November 2023 as a nominee of the Bharat Rashtra Samithi. Seventeen candidates contested, including the appellant. Polling occurred on 30 November 2023 and the result was declared on 3 December 2023. The returned candidate polled 83,036 votes; the appellant polled 60,238; the margin was 22,798 votes.

The appellant thereafter filed an election petition before the Telangana High Court to declare the returned candidate’s election void and to declare himself elected. The pleas included that the returned candidate, while submitting Form 26, did not disclose income shown in income-tax returns for FY 2018–2019 to FY 2021–2022 (four completed financial years out of the last five), instead stating “Nil,” thereby violating Rule 4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.

The appellant further alleged improper acceptance of nomination under Section 100(1)(d)(i), commission of corrupt practice warranting voidance under Section 100(1)(b), and non-compliance with the Act, rules or orders attracting Section 100(1)(d)(iv). These questions were squarely articulated by the Supreme Court as issues for consideration.

The returned candidate, in her written statement/counter-affidavit, did not specifically deny that the income figure for four years was not provided but contended that she had disclosed all assets (immovable and movable), PAN details, occupation, and source of income; therefore any omission did not constitute a material defect; her nomination was not improperly accepted; and the alleged omission did not materially affect the election. She also stated that latest ITR for FY 2022–23 and PAN were furnished and that there was no deliberate suppression constituting corrupt practice.

On the specific allegations concerning honorarium and pension, the returned candidate contended she had disclosed her income source as Chairperson of the Zilla Parishad and had not received ex-MLA pension during 4 July 2019 to 3 December 2023; she produced a Non-drawal Certificate dated 20 June 2024 issued by the Assistant Secretary to the State Legislature.

It was also urged on her behalf that the nomination underwent scrutiny by the Returning Officer; no objection was raised by the election petitioner at scrutiny; and, therefore, having accepted the process, the election petitioner was estopped from later challenging the acceptance of nomination. In addition, it was argued that the election petition failed to show how the result was materially affected and that the petition did not comply with Section 83 RPA read with Rule 94A (affidavit in Form 25 where corrupt practice is alleged).

The High Court rejected the election petitioner’s case, holding that the omission in ITR income for four of the last five years was not of a significant nature; that such non-disclosure did not constitute corrupt practice materially affecting the result; and that the returned candidate did not deliberately suppress information. The election petition was dismissed.

In appeal, the Supreme Court set out the legal contours for declaring an election void under Section 100, distinguishing grounds under clauses (a), (b) and (d), and noting the statutory context including Sections 8, 8A, 9, 9A, 10, 10A, 11, and Rule 4A, as also the jurisprudence on voter’s right to information and disclosure requirements derived from Association for Democratic Reforms and PUCL.

The Court then examined the trial record on the pleaded omissions and supporting material, including the Non-drawal Certificate, and the absence of objections at scrutiny, before proceeding to its conclusions.

The Court recorded the settled approach to election disputes and standards of proof by quoting, inter alia, precedents on the gravity of setting aside an election and the quasi-criminal nature of corrupt practice charges: “The success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with. Any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law… the setting aside of an election involves serious consequences… re-election involves an enormous load on the public funds and administration.”

“Charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal in character… the charges when put to issue should be proved by clear, cogent and credible evidence… The charge shall have to be proved to the hilt, the standard of proof being the same as in a criminal trial.”

On the statutory architecture of voiding an election, the Court stated: “As regards the ground contemplated under Section 100(1)(a) of the Act… there is no scope for judicial consideration as to whether such a deficiency is substantial or not… once a candidate is found ineligible or disqualified… the election shall be declared void.”

“As regards the other grounds concerning improper acceptance or rejection of nominations, or the non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, or the Act, or rules, or orders made under the Act, it is observed that these issues are mainly technical and involve some element of subjectivity, since no nomination paper can be rejected for a defect that is not of a substantial character as provided under Section 36(4) of the Act.”

Addressing the nature and purpose of disclosure obligations, the Court quoted PUCL and related jurisprudence: “A little man — a citizen — a voter is the master of his vote. He must have necessary information so that he can intelligently decide in favour of a candidate… information to voters is a necessity.”

The Court then contrasted disclosure of criminal antecedents with disclosure of assets/education: “However, the Court has made a subtle distinction between non-disclosure of criminal antecedents and that of assets and educational qualifications… disclosure of assets and educational qualifications were considered as attending supplementary requirements… should not be unreasonably stretched to invalidate an otherwise validly declared election over minor technical non-compliances that are not of substantial character, and should not be the basis for nullification of the people’s mandate.”

Applying these principles to the record, the Court observed: “Respondent No.1 did not make a false statement or attempt to mislead the voters… This is not a case of providing false information or engaging in disinformation, but rather a failure to provide certain information… which… does not amount to a defect of substantial character warranting declaration of Respondent No.1’s election as void.”

“The present case does not involve any concealment or misrepresentation of criminal antecedents… The issue here is of lack of full disclosure of information concerning income tax returns… which is of inconsequential import.”

On the absence of objections at scrutiny and its bearing, the Court recorded: “It can, therefore, be inferred that no objection was raised regarding any such deficiency during scrutiny… having participated in the election… the election petitioner’s attempt now to challenge… on a technicality… lacks substantial basis… The Court’s proceeding should not be reduced to a legal gamble, when electorally defeated.”

As to the pleaded grounds under Section 100, the Court stated: “the penal clause cannot be invoked to invalidate Respondent No.1’s election under Section 100(1)(d)(i)… As we have held that the defect of non-disclosure… is not of a substantial nature… the election of Respondent No.1 cannot be rendered void under Section 100(1)(b)… [and] cannot be said that the Respondent No.1 did not comply with the relevant provisions… to attract… Section 100(1)(d)(iv).”

On the specific allegations regarding honorarium and ex-MLA pension, the Court recorded: “the allegation that the Respondent No.1 did not disclose the income from honorarium… or that she did not disclose receiving ex-MLA pension—cannot be considered to have been proved or established, nor these are of any material consequences.”

Finally, the Court summed up the dispositive finding on the nature of the alleged defect: “the non-disclosure of income in the income tax return for four financial years… is not a defect of substantial character… hence, no illegality was committed by the Returning Officer in accepting the nomination.”

The Bench recorded: “the non-disclosure of income in the income tax return for four financial years by Respondent No.1, is not a defect of substantial character. Therefore, the nomination could not have been rejected under Section 36(2)… and hence, no illegality was committed by the Returning Officer in accepting the nomination of the Respondent No.1. Resultantly, the penal clause cannot be invoked to invalidate Respondent No.1’s election under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act on the ground that the nomination… was improperly accepted.”

The Court further stated: “As we have held that the defect of non-disclosure mentioned is not of a substantial nature, for the same reason the Respondent No.1 cannot be considered to have indulged in a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act, and thus, the election of Respondent No.1 cannot be rendered void under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act.”

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The Bench also recorded: “on the same consideration, it cannot be also said that the Respondent No.1 did not comply with the relevant provisions of the Act or any rule or order made under the Act, to attract the provisions of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act.”

As to the specific factual allegations tied to honorarium and pension, the Court directed: “the allegation that the Respondent No.1 did not disclose the income from honorarium… or that she did not disclose receiving ex-MLA pension—cannot be considered to have been proved or established, nor these are of any material consequences.”

Finally, the disposal reads: “For the reasons stated above, the present appeal, Civil Appeal No.13015 of 2025, is dismissed as devoid of merit. Parties to bear their own costs. Registry to notify the concerned authorities by taking necessary steps as required under Section 116C(2) of the Representation of the People Act 1951.”

Advocates Representing the Parties

For the Appellant(s): Mr. B. Rajendran, Senior Advocate; Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, Senior Advocate; Mr. Somanadri Goud Katam, Advocate-on-Record; Ms. Neha Agarwal, Advocate; Mr. Rahul Jayapal Reddy, Advocate; Mr. Sirajuddin, Advocate.

For the Respondent(s): Mr. Vipin Sanghi, Senior Advocate; Mr. P. Mohith Rao, Advocate-on-Record; Ms. J. Akshitha, Advocate; Mr. Eugene S. Philomene, Advocate; Mr. J. Venkat Sai, Advocate.

Case Title: Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laxmi & Ors.

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 992

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 13015 of 2024

Bench: Justice Surya Kant; Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh