Supreme Court Quashes FIR In Delkar Suicide Case | S. 306 IPC Test Is Clear Mens Rea | No Abetment Without Intent To Drive Victim To Suicide
Kiran Raj
The Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Chief Justice B. R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran dismissed a set of criminal appeals challenging the quashing of proceedings initiated under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court held that no case of abetment to suicide was made out and affirmed the High Court’s order, which had quashed the First Information Report against the respondents. The appeals arose from allegations that a Member of Parliament, who committed suicide in 2021, was driven to take the extreme step due to harassment and humiliation by various administrative officials and individuals named in a purported suicide note. The Supreme Court, after extensively reviewing the allegations, the statements made before the Parliamentary Committee of Privileges, and the precedents on abetment of suicide, concluded that the factual circumstances did not disclose the essential ingredients of abetment under Section 306 IPC. The bench specifically noted that the alleged acts lacked a proximate and conscious instigation amounting to mens rea. Accordingly, the court directed that the appeals be dismissed and that the quashing of the FIR by the High Court required no interference.
The appeals concerned a criminal prosecution initiated after the suicide of a seven-time Member of Parliament on 22 February 2021. A suicide note, allegedly left behind by the deceased, contained names of several persons including officials in the administration and the police, claiming they conspired to defame and degrade him with the intent of bringing down his political career and social standing. According to the note, this sustained harassment left him with no option but to take his life.
On the basis of the suicide note and statements by the informant—his son, who also filed the First Information Statement (FIS) on 9 March 2021—an FIR was registered. The allegations included humiliation in public functions, denial of protocol due to a sitting Member of Parliament, circulation of defamatory content on social media, and attempts of extortion connected with the management of an educational institution run by a Trust founded by the deceased. The informant asserted that the respondents, acting under the instructions of the Administrator, harassed and threatened the deceased to such an extent that it drove him to suicide.
Prior to this, the deceased had raised complaints before the Lok Sabha Committee of Privileges, alleging that administrative officials and police officers repeatedly humiliated him by denying him opportunities to participate in public functions, spreading misinformation, and refusing to follow parliamentary protocol. The committee had recorded statements and had initiated inquiry into the allegations shortly before his death.
The High Court, upon petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by the named accused, quashed the FIR, holding that the allegations did not constitute abetment to suicide under Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC. The informant, dissatisfied with the quashing order, filed appeals before the Supreme Court.
The appellant, represented by senior counsel, argued that the harassment was sustained, deliberate, and designed to break the political standing of the deceased, culminating in his death. It was submitted that the statements before the Committee of Privileges as well as the suicide note provided prima facie material for trial, and that quashing at the threshold under Section 482 was unwarranted.
The appellant relied on precedents including Dammu Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, State of Haryana v. Surinder Kumar, and Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan, asserting that a proximate incident immediately preceding the suicide was not always necessary and that the totality of circumstances ought to be considered.
The respondents, represented by multiple senior counsel including the learned Solicitor General and senior advocates for the individual accused, countered that the allegations were vague, inconsistent, and in several respects raised for the first time in the suicide note. They pointed out that before the Committee of Privileges there was no reference to extortion or to the Administrator’s alleged role. The respondents argued that mere allegations of disrespect or humiliation, without a proximate act amounting to instigation or aid to suicide, could not constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC. They also stated that the deceased had recently written to the Administrator seeking help, which undermined the allegation of a conspiracy.
The High Court, agreeing with the respondents, held that the allegations in the FIR did not constitute an offence of abetment to suicide and quashed the proceedings. The present appeals before the Supreme Court challenged this quashing.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by framing the central issue: “Whether every allegation or accusation levelled, a reprimand or rebuke made, an insinuation or insult voiced or even continuous acts of ill-treatment, harassment and defamation; as alleged in this case, would lead to a charge of abetment, if the person at the receiving end commits suicide.” The court noted that this was a recurring question when charges under Section 306 IPC were raised.
The bench reviewed the precedents cited by the parties. Referring to Surinder Kumar, the court noted: “There cannot be any dictum ferreted out from the said decision but for the broad principle that ordinarily a case will have to proceed for trial and be decided on the evidence led and the closure at the initial stage can only be on the principles laid down regarding invocation of the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.”
Discussing the judgement in Dammu Sreenu, the bench observed: “It was found that there was proximate instigation and intimidation which led to the suicide, which acts of the accused 1 and 2 had a direct nexus to the death of the deceased.” The court contrasted this with the present case where no such proximate act was discernible.
In relation to Munshiram, the court recorded: “It was found on a reading of the FIR, as also the FSL report; which categorically found similarity in the handwriting on the suicide note, to the admitted handwriting of the deceased, that the case was not one which could be quashed at the initial stage and requires evidence to be led.”
The bench further referred to Ude Singh v. State of Haryana, noting that in that case, “the public humiliation meted out and the canard spread by the accused resulted in her engagement being broken off. There was a proximate incident on the previous day of the suicide… It is on the unwavering testimony of the witnesses regarding the continued harassment and the just prior incident, which led to the suicide that the conviction entered was upheld by this Court.”
On the importance of proximate acts, the court stated: “Always a proximate incident or act prior to the suicide was held to be a very relevant aspect in finding the death to be a direct causation of the acts of the person accused of abetting the suicide.”
Referring to Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, the court quoted: “Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’… A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.”
The judgment also reproduced the principle from State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal: “If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged… the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.”
The bench cited Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, observing: “Mere allegation of harassment without any positive action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused that led a person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.”
Quoting Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, the court reiterated: “Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.”
The bench underlined the principle from S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan: “…in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option.”
The bench observed that harassment, however severe or continuous, did not automatically constitute abetment: “Merely because the victim was continuously harassed and at one point, he or she succumbed to the extreme act of taking his life cannot by itself result in finding a positive instigation constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely by what goes on in the mind of the victim.”
The court further clarified: “The real intention of the accused and whether he intended by his action to at least possibly drive the victim to suicide, is the sure test.” The bench explained that absent such conscious intention, abetment cannot be inferred.
The court also found inconsistencies in the evidentiary record, particularly regarding the suicide note. “There is nothing produced either by the appellant or the State to show that the suicide note was recovered along with the body… There is also no verification carried out of the handwriting in the suicide note, juxtaposed with the admitted handwriting of the deceased.” The court noted that allegations of extortion and conspiracy against the Administrator appeared for the first time in the suicide note and had not been raised earlier before the Privileges Committee or in complaints to the Speaker.
After a detailed review, the court concluded: “We are not convinced that there is any modicum of material in the case to find abetment of suicide.”
In its final directions, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision to quash the FIR. The bench stated: “We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly quashed the proceedings, finding the charge of abetment to commit suicide to be absent.”
On the contention that the statements of the son and others warranted a full-fledged trial, the court held: “We are not convinced, since we cannot incorporate those statements made by others, a clear hearsay, into the written complaint. The statements made by the deceased himself, bereft of the various allegations in the suicide note, do not sketch out a case for abetment of suicide.”
The court added: “We have found the suicide note to be suspect and we are not convinced that there is any modicum of material in the case to find abetment of suicide. The High Court was not in error, when it quashed the FIR, when no case is made out from the FIS.”
Concluding the matter, the bench directed: “The Criminal Appeals stand dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.”
Case Title: Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 990
Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 2177-2185 of 2024
Bench: Chief Justice B. R. Gavai, Justice K. Vinod Chandran
