S.263 Succession Act | Grounds For Revocation Or Annulment Of Probate Are Illustrative, Not Exhaustive: Bombay High Court
Safiya Malik
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Division Bench of Justices M. S. Karnik and N. R. Borkar held that the explanations (a) to (e) under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, are illustrative and not exhaustive in determining what constitutes “just cause” for revoking or annulling a grant of probate or letters of administration. The Court clarified that while the section deems “just cause” to exist in the listed circumstances, it does not restrict the Court’s authority to identify other situations where such cause may arise. The judgement came in a dispute over the revocation of a probate granted for a will executed abroad, where the petitioner sought cancellation citing procedural lapses and defects in attestation of the will.
The proceedings arose from a testamentary dispute relating to the probate of an alleged will executed by the deceased, Rajesh Chowdhary. According to the judgment, the respondent had filed a testamentary petition seeking probate of a will purportedly executed on 3 March 2022. The deceased had passed away in Ecuador on 25 July 2020, and the cause of death recorded in the certificate was suicide by hanging. The petitioner filed a caveat and an affidavit in support, and although the delay in lodging the caveat was condoned, the caveat ultimately came to be dismissed due to non-removal of office objections. Upon the dismissal of all caveats, probate was issued.
The petitioner thereafter filed proceedings for revocation of the grant under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act. Before the learned Single Judge, the petitioner submitted that the will’s execution raised serious doubts, particularly because the attesting witnesses stated that the testator had signed the will in Ecuador while they signed it in India. It was further contended that Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act had not been complied with and that the dismissal of the caveat occurred due to the advocate’s lapse. The respondent, in turn, argued that the petitioner’s grounds did not fall within explanations (a) to (e) of Section 263 and that the court could not exercise its jurisdiction outside the confines of those explanations.
The learned Single Judge held that an important question concerning the scope of Section 263 and the nature of the explanations arose and referred three questions of law to a Division Bench for authoritative determination. These questions centred on whether the explanations were exhaustive or illustrative, whether circumstances outside them could constitute just cause, and whether two earlier decisions—George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer and Sharad Shankarrao Mane v. Ashabai Shripati Mane—correctly stated the law.
The Division Bench observed that “a plain reading of Section 263 indicates that revocation or annulment of a grant is permissible for a ‘just cause’.” It noted that the shift in language from earlier enactments, which stated that “just cause is,” to the present text, which states “just cause shall be deemed to exist where,” was significant. The Bench recorded that “there has been a departure in the phraseology used” and considered the legislative intent and principles of statutory interpretation governing explanations.
The court stated that “an Explanation clause neither expands nor restricts the meaning of a Section” and that “the Explanation must be read harmoniously with the main Section to clear any ambiguity.” Relying on established interpretative principles, the Bench observed that “the expression ‘just cause’ cannot be construed in a manner that would restrict the scope of Section 263 to only those specific cases provided by the Explanation clause.” It recorded that the Explanation provides only those cases where just cause shall be assumed, not an exhaustive list of circumstances.
The Bench stated that “there may be myriad situations where a ‘just cause’ exists,” and that the jurisdiction of the court “cannot be stifled by giving a restrictive meaning to ‘just cause’ in Section 263.” It further noted that “the purpose of Section 263 is to preserve the integrity of probate proceedings and to ensure that grants are not obtained by fraud, concealment, or procedural unfairness.”
The Division Bench stated that it agreed with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge and recorded that his view was “in tune with the legislative intent.” It concluded that the earlier judgments taking a restrictive approach did not lay down the correct position of law.
The Division Bench concluded the reference by answering the three questions posed. It held that “the Explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are illustrative, in the context of ‘just cause’ for revoking or annulling grant of Probate or Letters of Administration.” It further directed that “the circumstances not covered under explanations (a) to (e) to Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, can become the basis for ‘just cause’ for the Court to revoke or annul grant of Probate or Letters of Administration.”
“The judgments of learned Single Judges of this Court in George Anthony Harris vs. Millicent Spencer… and Sharad Shankarrao Mane… do not lay down the correct position of law in the context of Section 263 of the Succession Act.” It additionally stated that “we uphold the view of the learned Single Judge (Manish Pitale, J.) from which order the present reference arises.”
Finally, the Bench ordered that the matter be placed before the learned Single Judge for further consideration following the clarification of law provided by the Division Bench.
Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Petitioner: Ms. Yashvi Panchal
For the Respondent: Ms. Sonal, Rohit Gupta, Kinnar Shah, Ms. Aditi Bhargava, Mr. Vaibhav Singh, Mr. Shikha Jain, Mr. Saurabh Jain i/b Divya Shah Associates
Case Title: Sarwan Kumar Jhabarmal Choudhary v. Sachin Shyamsundar Begrajka
Neutral Citation: 2025: BHC-OS:19505
Case Number: Misc. Petition (L) No. 6300 of 2024 in Testamentary Petition No. 109 of 2021
Bench: Justice M. S. Karnik and Justice N. R. Borkar
