S. 32(1) Evidence Act | Mere Fact That Death Not Imminent Does Not Make Dying Declaration Irrelevant: Supreme Court
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh on Thursday, December 4, allowed the appeal in a case concerning the alleged shooting of a wife by her husband and directed that her in-laws be summoned as additional accused under Section 319 CrPC. In proceedings arising from the incident at the matrimonial home, involving the husband as the principal accused and his mother, brother and brother-in-law as proposed co-accused, the Court restored the summons to the in-laws and held that statements given by the injured woman during investigation may operate as dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, and that the fact her death was not imminent when they were recorded does not, by itself, deprive such statements of legal relevance.
In March 2021, the brother of an injured woman lodged an FIR under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, alleging that his sister had been shot by her husband at her matrimonial home on information from the couple’s nine-year-old daughter. During treatment at hospitals in Bulandshahr and Noida, the woman’s statements were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, naming her husband as the shooter and alleging that he acted at the instigation of his mother, brother and brother-in-law.
The woman died in May 2021. Her brother then submitted a further complaint seeking action against the husband’s relatives named in her statements. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed only against the husband under Sections 302 and 316 IPC. Trial commenced, charges were framed, the informant was examined as PW-1, and the minor daughter as PW-2, stating that the father shot the mother at the instigation of the relatives.
Relying on this evidence and the woman’s recorded statements, the prosecution applied under Section 319 CrPC to summon the relatives as additional accused. The Trial Court dismissed the application, and the High Court, treating the recorded statements as not constituting dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and finding the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 inadequate for summoning, affirmed that decision.
The Court first delineated the standard for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, stating that “it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial and not based on conjectures or speculations.”
On the evidentiary use of the minor daughter’s account, the Court recorded that “While a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC is not substantive evidence in itself, it may be used to corroborate the evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC, as held in S. Mohammed Ispahani (supra). Therefore, conjointly reading PW-2’s deposition along with her Section 161 statement, we find that a specific and overt act has been assigned to the respondents.”
Assessing the two statements of the deceased, the Court noted that “A perusal of both these statement s reveals that while the former primarily narrates the incident, the latter elaborates on the circumstances that culminated in the fatal act and brings forth the complicity of the respondents. The mere omission of their names in the first statement, or the lack of the Magistrate's presence or medical certification, does not undermine the relevance of these statements.”
Clarifying the law on dying declarations and correcting the High Court’s approach, the Bench observed that “Additionally, in our considered view, the High Court erred in holding that these statements cannot be treated as dying declaration (s) merely because the death of the deceased occurred after a substantial lapse of time from their recording s. Such an approach is clearly untenable since the law does not require that a declarant, at the time of making the statement, to be under the shadow of death or the expectation that death is imminent. In any event, Section 32 of the Evidence Act, contains no such limitation. What is pertinent is that the statement relates either to the cause of death or the circumstances leading to it. Consequent to the above discussion, we find that the material on record, i.e. the depositions of PW -1 and PW -2, along with the statements of the deceased recorded during the investigation, prima facie suggests the complicity of the respondents in the commission of the said offence.”
The Court directed: “Therefore, the appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court, as referred to in Paragraph 2, is set aside. Parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 08 th January 2026. We direct them to fully cooperate and not take any unnecessary adjournments. The trial is expedited. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
Case Title: NEERAJ KUMAR @ NEERAJ YADAV Versus STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1386
Case Number: SLP(Crl.) No. 7518 of 2025
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
