S.469 CrPC | Limitation Period Commences From Date Identity Of Accused Becomes Known To Competent Authority, Not From Date Of Initial Complaint: Supreme Court
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India's Division Bench of Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti held that in criminal prosecutions, the limitation period commences from the date on which the identity of all accused persons becomes known to the competent authority, rather than from the date of the initial complaint. Setting aside the Kerala High Court's order that had quashed criminal proceedings against a pharmaceutical company for alleged misbranding of vaccines under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the Court further held that a Magistrate is not required to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the complaint is filed by a public servant acting in discharge of official duty.
A medical officer informed a private individual about an alleged discrepancy in the labelling of a vaccine manufactured and sold by a pharmaceutical company. The individual subsequently filed a complaint with the Drugs Inspector, alleging that while the outer carton of the purchased vaccine identified it as a pentavalent vaccine containing five components including a Hepatitis vaccine, the inner vial bore a label identifying it as a tetravalent vaccine containing only four components, omitting the Hepatitis component entirely.
Following receipt of the complaint, the Drugs Inspector conducted an inquiry, inspecting the premises of the medical agency from which the vaccine had been purchased, recording statements, and seizing invoices and credit notes. The identity of all persons involved in the chain of manufacture and sale was established through this process.
The Drugs Inspector thereafter filed a formal complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging misbranding under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, specifically invoking provisions relating to drugs not labelled in the prescribed manner and drugs bearing false or misleading claims on their outer packaging.
The pharmaceutical company approached the High Court seeking to quash the summoning order, contending non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry requirement applicable when accused persons reside outside the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction, as well as raising the plea of limitation.
The Court addressed the question of limitation, recording that the period would commence under Section 469(1)(c) of the Code from the first day on which the identity of the offender becomes known to the investigating authority. The Court observed that "the time for making a complaint to the Court would start ticking only therefrom."
On the specific facts, the Court recorded that "for the first time only on 18.04.2006, the identity of all the accused persons was before the Competent Authority." It further stated that "undoubtedly, the Competent Authority was required to file a proper complaint before the Court, which was, however, ultimately done only on 20.01.2009." The Court noted that "though there is an inordinate delay, between the period from 18.04.2006 to 20.01.2009, in making the complaint, whereafter cognisance was taken and summons issued on 29.01.2009, the said exercise was completed within the 3-year period, as per Section 468(2)(c) read with Section 469(1)(c) of the Code." The Court stated that "the limitation bar does not come in the way" and further recorded that "the limitation period would run out, in the present case, only on 17.04.2009, i.e., on completion of three years from the date the identity of the accused became known to the Competent Authority."
On the question of whether a Magistrate is obligated to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code when a complaint is filed by a public servant, the Court stated that Section 202 must be "construed harmoniously with Section 200 of the Code when considering postponement of the issue of process."
The Court relied upon its earlier decision in Cheminova India Limited, extracting the observation that "the legislature in its wisdom has itself placed the public servant on a different pedestal, as would be evident from a perusal of proviso to Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." It further recorded that "the object of holding an inquiry/investigation before taking cognizance, in cases where the accused resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of such Magistrate, is to ensure that innocents are not harassed unnecessarily." The Court additionally noted that "by virtue of proviso to Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate, while taking cognizance, need not record statement of such public servant, who has filed the complaint in discharge of his official duty."
The Court also observed that the accused who had actually sold the medicine to the complainant "was residing within the limits of the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned" and that "the allegation/prosecution story also commences with the purchase of the medicines by Mr. Mandi from such accused seller."
On the question of vicarious liability of directors under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, in the connected matter concerning substandard syringes, the Court observed that whether the respondent-directors were "in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company are questions of fact" and stated that these questions are "best left to be determined by the Trial Court, at the appropriate stage."
The Court concluded with a general caveat, recording that "the discussions hereinabove are purely for the purposes of deciding the questions raised in this set of appeals" and that "nothing therein shall be construed as a final adjudication/findings on the merits of the underlying Complaint Case(s) and will not prejudice any party."
The Court directed: "The Impugned Order is set aside, and the Order taking cognisance and issuing summons dated 10.07.2012 is held to be good in law. The Court concerned, upon appropriate application filed by the Appellants/Prosecution, shall array the said person(s) as accused and issue fresh summons."
"Since the date/s for entering appearance have already elapsed in all the matters, the Court(s) concerned shall issue fresh summons to all accused. Thereafter, the matter shall be proceeded with, strictly in accordance with law. Parties are at liberty to other issues of fact and law at trial at the appropriate stage."
Advocates Representing the Parties:
For the Appellants: Mr. S. S. Shroff, AOR Mr. Aashish Gupta, Adv. Mr. Aditya Mukherjee, Adv. Mr. Krishna Tangirala, Adv. Mr. Naman Kumar, Adv. Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv. Mrs. Ashly Harshad, Adv. Mr. Mahabir Singh, Adv. Dr. Arunender Thakur, Adv. Mr. Anshul Saharan, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. K. Rajeev, AOR Mr. Shinoj K. Narayanan, Adv. Ms. Niveditha R. Menon, Adv. Mr. Aditya Verma, Adv. Mr. Tarun Kumar, Adv. Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR Mr. S. S. Shroff, AOR Mr. Aashish Gupta, Adv. Mr. Aditya Mukherjee, Adv. Mr. Krishna Tangirala, Adv. Mr. Naman Kumar, Adv.
Case Title: The State of Kerala & Anr. v. M/s Panacea Biotec Ltd. & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 200
Case Number: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4524 of 2023, Diary No. 18999 of 2023, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 8867 of 2023
Bench: Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti
