Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh allowed the State’s appeal, setting aside the Allahabad High Court’s bail-stage directions that required investigators to secure and place on record a medical age-determination report at the outset of POCSO investigations. The dispute arose from allegations by the victim’s mother that her minor daughter was taken from home and offences were committed by the accused, amid inconsistency over the victim’s age. While leaving the grant of bail undisturbed, the Court directed its judgment be sent to the Allahabad High Court and circulated to the Secretary (Law), Government of India, to consider steps including a “Romeo–Juliet” exception for consensual adolescent relationships despite both partners being under 18 where the age gap is small, and a mechanism to address misuse.

The prosecution case arose from an FIR lodged on 24 November 2022 at the instance of the victim’s mother, alleging that her 12-year-old daughter was abducted from home, and attributing to Respondent No. 1 offences under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

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On 29 September 2023, the Trial Court rejected the accused’s bail application. During bail proceedings before the High Court, an order dated 22 April 2024 directed the Chief Medical Officer, Jalaun to constitute a medical board to determine the victim’s age. On 8 May 2024, the High Court granted interim bail, noting a wide inconsistency between the victim’s age reflected in school records and her statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, along with other factors including statements concerning age/intimacy with the accused.

By final order dated 29 May 2024, the High Court confirmed bail and issued directions concerning medical age determination in POCSO investigations. The State challenged the correctness of that order before the Supreme Court, raising the issue of the High Court’s power under Section 439 CrPC to issue such directions. The statutory provisions discussed included Section 439 CrPC, Section 164-A CrPC, Section 27 POCSO Act, and Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015.

On the considerations governing bail, it stated: “the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

It also stated: “While considering an application for bail, detailed discussion of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits is to be avoided… Existence of a prima facie case is only to be considered. Elaborate analysis or exhaustive exploration of the merits is not required.”

On the limits of the bail court’s role, the Court recorded: “Section 439… is limited to granting bail or anticipatory bail and requires the Court to consider only prima facie evidence… Since Section 439 is narrower in scope, the Court cannot undertake a mini trial at the bail stage.”

Addressing the precondition for applying the POCSO framework, it stated: “Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines a child as any person below eighteen years. So, for the provisions of this Act to be applied, the person against whom the offence in question has been perpetrated must necessarily be below 18 years of age. This is the sine qua non.”

On the method for determining age, the Court quoted: “the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis… If, in the scheme of options… an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect… The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor… It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that [the rule] postulates the determination of age… on the basis of medical opinion.”

On the stage at which age disputes can be decided, it held: “determination of age of the victim is a matter of trial and not at the stage of bail. If the age is under question, the bail Court may examine the documents produced to establish age, but it will not enter into the question of those documents being correct or not so.” It added: “The mandate of Section 94 JJ Act is clear. The documents provided therein are to be utilized for determination of the age of the victim, and only in the absence thereof, will medical evidence be resorted to.”

In the context of the impugned directions, the Court recorded: “The Court could not have passed directions that go against clearly stated legislative intent under Section 94 of the JJ Act. The determination of the age of the victim is a matter for trial… not the bail Court… If the question of age is raised at the stage of bail, it is only open for the Court to… take a prima facie view as to the age of the victim, not one on the correctness of the documents since that would amount to a mini trial.”

On jurisdiction, it stated: “It could also not have fused statutory jurisdiction with a constitutional one, lifting one to the other, or downgrading the higher to the lower in order to grant itself the wherewithal… to do what could not be done.”

In the post-script, the Court directed: “Considering the fact that repeated judicial notice has been taken of the misuse of these laws, let a copy of this judgment be circulated to the Secretary, Law, Government of India, to consider initiation of steps as may be possible to curb this menace inter alia, the introduction of a Romeo – Juliet clause exempting genuine adolescent relationships from the stronghold of this law; enacting a mechanism enabling the prosecution of those persons who, by the use of these laws seeks to settle scores etc.”

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“In that view of the matter, we pass the following order:”

“(a) The appeal is allowed. The directions issued in the impugned judgment are set aside. (b) In view of ‘III)’ as extracted in para 5.6 as also in view of their intrinsic connection, such effect will extend to Aman (supra) and Manish (supra) (c) The bail granted in terms of these judgments and orders, is left undisturbed in view of the other factors considered by the learned Single Judge subject to judicial review, if any.”

“(d) Insofar as the cases listed in the appendices to these judgments are concerned, this Court refrains from making any comment. The effect of this judgment will be prospective and shall not therefore, impact negatively, any of those cases wherein, following the procedure laid down in the impugned judgment or its progenitors, bail has been secured.”

“(e) The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to dispatch forthwith a copy of this judgment to the learned Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, for necessary follow-up action, as also information to the Trial Courts.”

“Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.”

Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Ms. Ruchira Goel, AOR Mr. Sharanya, Adv. Ms. Veera Mahuli, Adv. Ms. Ritika Rao, Adv.

For the Respondents: Mr. D.S. Parmar, Adv.(A.C.) Mr. Saurabh Singh, Adv. Mr. Vedant Tiwari, Adv. Ms. Shambhavi Shrivastava, Adv. Ms. Archana, Adv.

Case Title: The State of Uttar Pradesh Versus  XXX & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 47
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No……………………… of 2026 (@ Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.10656 of 2025)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh