Supreme Court Directs High Courts To Fast-Track UAPA Trials Involving Reverse Burden Of Proof, Monitor 5+ Year Pending Cases
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held that the “half-sentence” undertrial release provision cannot be applied where the offences alleged carry a possible death sentence, but declined to cancel the bail already granted to the accused in a prosecution linked to the 2010 derailment of the Jnaneshwari Express that caused 148 deaths and 170 injuries. Noting no claim that the accused misused liberty after release, the Court directed the trial court to proceed day-to-day and avoid routine adjournments. On Thursday, it also issued directions to all High Courts to review pending trials under reverse-burden statutes such as the UAPA, assess special courts and special public prosecutors, and prioritise cases pending over five years for day-to-day trial.
On 9 June 2010, an FIR was registered against unknown persons in relation to the derailment of Train No. 2102 (Jnaneshwari Express) on 28 May 2010 between Khemasuli and Sardiha railway stations, which resulted in 148 deaths and 170 injuries. The alleged motive was linked to opposition to the deployment of joint forces in the Jhargram Police Station area.
According to the chargesheet narrative recorded in the judgment, the accused were alleged to have conspired to pressurise the Government to withdraw the joint forces and to create terror by damaging railway tracks near Rajabandh on the intervening night of 27–28 May 2010, including removal of pandrol clips, leading to the derailment and a subsequent collision with an oncoming goods train. The investigation, as summarised, relied on material such as call detail records and telephonic conversations, including an alleged recorded conversation, and a house search in one instance; one accused was described as a railway employee, and others were attributed coordinating or location-linked roles through phone records around the time of the incident. Charges were stated to include multiple IPC provisions, provisions under the Railways Act, and Sections 16/18 of the UAPA; the trial had commenced and 176 of 204 witnesses had been examined.
The investigating agency contended that the High Court erred in applying Section 436A of the CrPC to offences punishable with death, while the accused relied on Article 21 and prolonged incarceration to support the grant of bail.
On Section 436A CrPC, the Court recorded that “Excluded from the application of this section are those offences in which death is one of the possible punishments prescribed;” It referred to prior precedent stating, “Section 436-A of the 1973 Code, is a wholesome beneficial provision, which is for effectuating the right of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution…” and “[Be it noted, this provision (Section 436-A of the 1973 Code) is not available to the accused who is facing trial for the offences punishable with death sentence.]” It then stated, “For these offences, one of the possible punishments prescribed is death. That, in and of itself, excludes these offences from the ambit of Section 436A-IPC.”
On the High Court’s approach in granting bail by invoking Article 21, the Court stated, “The approach adopted by the High Court is fallacious, and the impugned orders would, to that extent warrant interference.” It further recorded, “the rights of fairness, dignity and liberty apply to each and every prisoner, irrespective of the nature of offence that they stand charged for.” It added, “In the case of the former, should these rights not be granted to them or be available to them in their full extent, it would in a sense render them guilty without it being so. To state the obvious, such a position is wholly impermissible.” The Court also observed, “The scales of Lady Justice must balance on the one hand-the constitutionally consecrated and jealously guarded right under Article 21 and on the other, the recognition that individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to just exceptions i.e. the paramount considerations of national interest, sovereignty and integrity of the nation.”
On reverse-burden regimes, it stated, “a reverse burden of proof essentially means that at the outset of trial, the prosecution is only required to establish certain foundational facts. Once these foundational facts are established, the presumption of guilt kicks in and the accused then is to dispel/rebut the presumption in order to establish innocence…” It recorded, “A constitutional democracy does not legitimise burdens by simply declaring them; it must ensure that those burdened are meaningfully equipped to bear them, even those who are accused of the worst offences imaginable. If the State, in spite of all its might presumes guilt, then the same State must also, with the employment of all the resources at its command, create pathways through which the accused can reclaim their innocence.”
It then stated, “Delay is an un-ignorable reality of the Indian criminal adjudication system which on its own raises significant issues, but when this delay is in cases such as the UAPA, where a reverse burden of proof is in place, it acquires a qualitatively different, and more insidious, character. Courts, bound by legislative intent and statutory language, ask for, even before the trial begins, the accused to be able to establish preliminarily, that they will be able to rebut the presumption against them. This doctrinal inversion becomes all the more pernicious on account of procedural delays and very liberty of a person becomes hostage to clogged dockets, overworked judges, a lax prosecution, repeated adjournments by members of the bar and much more.”
It added, “The institutions of justice must, therefore, act not as passive observers but as active guarantors of fairness: ensuring real access to counsel, enabling effective preparation of defence, and preventing the presumption from hardening into an irreversible verdict long before the trial ends. For if the system imposes an extraordinary burden yet denies the tools to discharge it, the promise of constitutionalism fades into symbolism. Ultimately, a democracy is judged not by how it treats the unquestionably innocent, but by how it safeguards the rights of those it suspects. In that moral balance, the justice system must ensure that even under a reverse burden regime, the accused is not abandoned to the weight of presumptive guilt but supported in the pursuit of truth and justice.”
On interference with bail already granted, the Court recorded, “It is a well-established position however that this Court does not interfere against the grant of bail unless circumstances warranting such an exercise of power are plainly present in a given set of circumstances.” and “we are of the view that interfering with the liberty of the accused, at this stage, particularly when nothing else holds against them, would not be justified.” It also recorded, “From that day forth, the matter shall be taken up on a day-to-day basis.” and “The granting of adjournments shall be eschewed unless exceptional circumstances are shown.”
The Court directed: “The Trial Court shall take stock of the matter and record in its order, the status thereof and the reasons for the trial having remained pending for many years, prior to the matter having been taken up after this judgment.”
“From that day forth, the matter shall be taken up on a day-to-day basis. The granting of adjournments shall be eschewed unless exceptional circumstances are shown. We request the learned Administrative Judge of the High Court, as nominated by the learned Chief Justice, to seek a report, every four weeks, from the Trial Judge and ensure that the directions are being complied with.”
“The State Legal Services Authority shall take steps to make aware, each undertrial of his right to representation, either by counsel of their own choice or through a legal aid counsel. For those who choose the latter, assignments to their cases to the counsel should be made expeditiously so that the proceedings can start/continue at the earliest.”
“The learned Chief Justices of all High Courts are requested: (a) to examine the number of cases pending within their States under laws such as the UAPA, posing a reverse burden of proof on the accused;”
“(b) to ascertain the number of special courts designated to try the said offences, and if special courts have not been designated, the number of Sessions courts dealing with matters under these legislations and to take up the matter with the appropriate authority if it is found that they are not sufficient;”
“(c) to discern, whether posting of judicial officers in these courts as also staffing is sufficient, thereby foreclosing a ground for delay and adjournment, and if not, then suitable order for posting be issued expeditiously;”
“Further, it is hereby directed: (a) that the list prepared in accordance with (a) shall be organised in order of case registered, to the extent possible and permissible, from the earliest to latest. Requisite directions be issued to the special courts/sessions courts to take up the matters registered earliest, first, unless otherwise warranted.”
“(b) In consultation with the appropriate authority, the High Court to ascertain the position with respect to appointment/allotment of prosecutors/special public prosecutors, as may be applicable, to ensure that the matters, once taken up, are not further delayed on that count;”
“(c) For those cases that have been pending for more than five years, the concerned court be directed to take stock of the situation as and when they are taken up, record detailed order taking note of the previous reasons for adjournment if available, refrain from granting adjournments on routine requests and take up the matter on a day-to-day basis.”
“(d) The High Court concerned will periodically, seek reports from the concerned Courts dealing with these matters and take up issues that may be confronting the said courts, on the administrative side so as to ensure smooth functioning.”
“The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to transmit electronically, a copy of this judgment to the Registrars General of each of the High Courts who shall then place the same before the learned Chief Justices and solicit requisite orders in accordance with the directions issued hereinabove.”
“Let a copy also be sent to the Chief Secretaries of the States for necessary information/compliance and necessary actions.”
Case Title: Central Bureau of Investigation versus Dayamoy Mahato etc.
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1418
Case Number: Cr. Appeal @ SLP (Cr) No. 12376-12377 of 2023; (Arising out of SLP(Crl) Nos. 12376-12377/2023); (Arising out of SLP(Crl) Nos. 12656-12657/2023); (Arising out of SLP(Crl) No. 2669/2024)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
