Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih directed the Speaker of the Telangana Legislative Assembly to adjudicate pending disqualification petitions filed under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution “within a reasonable period.” Disposing of writ petitions invoking Article 32, the Court held that while it is impermissible to prescribe rigid timelines for such adjudications, a constitutional obligation rests on the Speaker to act without unreasonable delay. The Court further cautioned that any attempt by MLAs subject to disqualification proceedings to protract the matter shall warrant adverse inference by the Speaker. The Court declined to issue a writ of mandamus but underscored that continued inaction undermines the Tenth Schedule’s object. Pending applications were disposed of with no order as to cost

The petitions before the Supreme Court concerned the failure of the Speaker of the Telangana Legislative Assembly to adjudicate disqualification petitions filed under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The disqualification petitions alleged that several MLAs elected on the ticket of the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) had defected to the Indian National Congress (INC) in violation of the anti-defection law.

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On October 30, 2023, the petitioners, who were members of the BRS, submitted formal disqualification petitions before the Speaker. These petitions alleged that the MLAs in question had voluntarily given up membership of the BRS by associating with the INC, attending meetings, and engaging in political conduct inconsistent with party affiliation. The petitions were not disposed of over the ensuing months, prompting the petitioners to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus directing the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions within a fixed timeline. They contended that the prolonged inaction of the Speaker effectively defeated the objectives of the Tenth Schedule and allowed defectors to continue in office unimpeded, undermining the sanctity of the democratic process. They relied on precedents including Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Hon’ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020) and Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007), which recognized judicial review over inaction by constitutional authorities in similar contexts.

The petitioners submitted that while Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule confers finality on the decision of the Speaker, it does not preclude judicial scrutiny in instances of unjustified delay. They argued that the delay in the present case was deliberate and sought an enforceable outer limit for the Speaker’s decision-making power. They further argued that the Court should not merely express a moral or advisory position, but issue a binding directive to ensure compliance with constitutional obligations.

The respondents opposed the petitions on the ground that judicial interference in the internal functioning of the legislature would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. They contended that Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule, read with Article 212 of the Constitution, precluded courts from issuing directions to the Speaker in the exercise of his adjudicatory functions under the Tenth Schedule.

It was submitted by the respondents that the Tenth Schedule itself did not prescribe a fixed timeline for the disposal of disqualification petitions and that the Speaker’s office was entitled to determine the procedural course of the inquiry. They further stated that the delay, if any, did not warrant judicial intrusion since the power under Article 32 was not intended to oversee day-to-day legislative affairs.

During the hearing, the Supreme Court noted that this was not the first instance where disqualification petitions had remained pending before the Speaker for extended periods. The Court recorded that in Keisham Meghachandra Singh, it had earlier expressed concern over the tendency of constitutional functionaries to delay adjudication in politically sensitive matters. The Court observed that such delays are antithetical to the spirit of the Tenth Schedule, which was enacted to curb opportunistic defections and to uphold democratic integrity.

In this case, the petitioners highlighted that disqualification petitions were pending for over eight months without even the commencement of preliminary hearings. They argued that such prolonged inaction enabled the MLAs in question to influence the electoral process, hold office, and participate in proceedings of the House, thereby defeating the very object of the disqualification mechanism.

The respondents stated that no constitutional provision expressly mandates a timeline, and therefore, any judicially imposed deadline would amount to judicial legislation. They also raised objections to the maintainability of the writ petitions under Article 32, arguing that the relief sought could only be pursued in a legislative or political forum, not through judicial fiat.

In reply, the petitioners stated that judicial precedents had firmly established that while courts cannot direct the Speaker on how to decide disqualification petitions, they can certainly ensure that the decision is made within a reasonable time. They stressed that the principle of constitutional accountability applied equally to all constitutional functionaries, including the Speaker.

The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the constitutional scheme of the Tenth Schedule and the institutional role of the Speaker in adjudicating disqualification petitions. It stated: “A Constitution Bench of this Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh has specifically ruled that disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule should ordinarily be decided by the Speaker within three months.”

While recognizing the authority of the Speaker, the Court emphasized that constitutional functionaries are not immune from accountability: “The Speaker, while discharging the functions under the Tenth Schedule, acts as a tribunal. As such, the decisions of the Speaker are amenable to judicial review.”

The Court underscored that the purpose of the Tenth Schedule was to prevent unprincipled defections and protect democratic mandates. It recorded: “The object and purpose of the Tenth Schedule would be frustrated if a disqualification petition is neither decided expeditiously nor within a reasonable period.”

On the issue of delay, the Court made the following key observation: “Permitting a disqualified member to continue to function and cast votes in the House contrary to the Tenth Schedule, merely because of inaction on the part of the Speaker, would be unacceptable and a betrayal of constitutional trust.”

In addressing the Speaker’s discretion, the Court reiterated: “Though the Constitution does not prescribe a timeline for the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions, the phrase ‘reasonable period’ must be read into the provision to ensure constitutional efficacy.”

The Court rejected the argument that Article 212 barred judicial scrutiny in this context, stating: “The power of judicial review under Article 32 or Article 226 is not ousted when a constitutional functionary fails to discharge their duty.”

Responding to the objection that courts cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Speaker, the Court clarified: “This Court does not seek to direct the Speaker on how to decide the petitions, but only that the petitions must be decided. That limited exercise is well within the bounds of judicial power.”

The Court further elaborated on the necessity of time-bound adjudication: “The mere existence of political sensitivity or the pendency of a session of the Assembly cannot be a reason to indefinitely defer adjudication of disqualification.”

It cautioned against strategic delay: “Delay on the part of the decision-making authority can itself be a cause for constitutional breakdown.”

While the petitioners had requested that the Court fix an outer time limit of three months in all cases, the Court declined to impose a strict timeframe across the board. However, it reiterated the standard established in earlier rulings: “We reiterate that ordinarily, disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule should be decided within a period of three months from the date on which they are filed, unless exceptional circumstances exist.”

On the scope of judicial restraint, the Court stated: “The restraint exercised by courts in interfering with the proceedings before the Speaker is based on constitutional comity, not on constitutional prohibition.”

The judgment also noted: “Constitutional courts must act as the guardians of the Constitution and cannot allow legislative mechanisms to be subverted by inaction.”

Importantly, the Court reaffirmed: “Failure to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period will defeat the very object of the Tenth Schedule and result in an erosion of public confidence.”

The Court distinguished between legislative privilege and constitutional duty: “The privilege of the House and the functional independence of the Speaker do not translate into immunity from accountability under the Constitution.”

In the final part of its reasoning, the Court summarized: “While we do not issue a writ of mandamus to decide the petitions within a fixed period, we expect the Speaker to discharge the duty of deciding the disqualification petitions within a reasonable period, which should ordinarily not exceed three months.”

The Supreme Court began its directions by noting that it was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution and was mindful of the principle that the Speaker, while acting as an adjudicating authority under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule, does not enjoy constitutional immunity under Articles 122 or 212 of the Constitution.

The Court recorded: “We are therefore inclined to allow the present appeals/petition.”

The following order was passed:

(i) The present appeals/petition are allowed;

(ii) The impugned judgment and final order dated 22nd November 2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is quashed and set aside;

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(iii) We direct the Speaker to conclude the disqualification proceedings pending against the 10 MLAs pertaining to the present appeals/petition as expeditiously as possible and in any case, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment; and

(iv) We further direct that the Speaker would not permit any of the MLAs who are sought to be disqualified to protract the proceedings. In the event, any of such MLAs attempt to protract the proceedings, the Speaker would draw an adverse inference against such of the MLAs.”

The Court further ordered: “Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. In the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.”

Case Title: PADI KAUSHIK REDDY ETC. VERSUS THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND OTHERS ETC.

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 912

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 2353-54 of 2025) with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 82 of 2025 Civil Appeal No. of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. of 2025) Diary No.14577 of 2025

Bench: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai; Justice Augustine George Masih