Supreme Court Dismisses Justice Yashwant Varma's Challenge To Lok Sabha Speaker’s Unilateral Constitution of Inquiry Committee In Impeachment Motion
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dismissed a writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker’s decision to admit a motion seeking his removal and to constitute a three-member inquiry committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The petition arose after a fire at the judge’s official residence, during which burnt currency notes were allegedly discovered, leading to allegations of misbehaviour and subsequent service of a charge memo by the committee. The Court declined to interfere, holding that a joint committee is required only when motions are admitted in both Houses, and that the Speaker could proceed once the Lok Sabha motion was admitted.
On 14 March 2025, while Justice Yashwant Varma was serving as a judge of the Delhi High Court, a fire occurred at his residence; during efforts to douse it, burnt currency notes were allegedly discovered. Allegations of misbehaviour followed, and a three-member committee was constituted on 22 March 2025 under the “In-House Procedure.” That committee submitted a report on 3 May 2025 stating that the allegations were substantiated and warranted initiation of removal proceedings, after which the report was forwarded to the President and the Prime Minister.
On 21 July 2025, notices of a motion seeking his removal were given in both Houses: the Lok Sabha notice was received at 12:30 pm with 146 signatories, and a Rajya Sabha notice with 62 signatories was raised later the same day. The Rajya Sabha Secretariat sought confirmation from the Lok Sabha and verified signatures, recording that three signatures did not match specimen signatures.
On 11 August 2025, the Rajya Sabha notice was scrutinised by the Secretary-General, who noted deficiencies (including reliance on documents not enclosed) and treated it as not “in order”; the Deputy Chairman, acting in the Chairman’s absence, concurred and recorded non-admission, which was communicated to the Lok Sabha the same day. On 12 August 2025, the Speaker admitted the Lok Sabha notice and constituted a three-member committee under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; the committee thereafter served a memo of charges on the petitioner.
The petition challenged the Speaker’s unilateral constitution of the committee despite notices having been given in both Houses on the same day, invoking the first proviso to Section 3(2), and also questioned the Deputy Chairman’s authority to act under Article 91 in relation to functions attributed to the “Chairman” under the Act.
The Court recorded the statutory text: “Provided that where notices of a motion referred to in sub-section (1) are given on the same day in both Houses of Parliament, no Committee shall be constituted unless the motion has been admitted in both Houses and where such motion has been admitted in both Houses, the Committee shall be constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman.”
On the purpose and point of interpretation, the Court stated: “Section 3 of the Inquiry Act, inter alia, prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Parliament in considering a motion and in conducting an investigation into the allegations made against a Judge.” “The first proviso to Section 3(2) addresses the specific situation where notices of motion are given in both Houses but on the same day.” “There is no dispute that the object of the said proviso is to provide an additional safeguard to the Judge by requiring the constitution of a Joint Committee of the Speaker and the Chairman and to prevent a situation where the Judge is made to attend proceedings before two separate committees constituted by the Speaker and the Chairman.” “The question before us, however, is: when precisely is this safeguard triggered?”
The Court recorded the petitioner’s construction and its rejection: “We are unable to accept the interpretation of the first proviso, as advanced by Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, namely, that where notices of motion have been given in both Houses on the same day, the rejection of a notice in one House would automatically result in the notice in the other House failing for the following reasons.”
On the scope of the proviso, the Court stated: “The first proviso does not address all possible permutations but is confined to one specific situation, namely, where notices of motion given in both Houses on the same day have been admitted in both Houses.” “It is only in that limited situation that the statute mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee.” “The said proviso does not prescribe a condition precedent for the formation of a Committee in cases other than the one expressly provided.”
The Court then stated: “In other words, the first proviso is not exhaustive but situational in nature.” “It does not contemplate a scenario where a notice of motion is accepted in one House and rejected in the other.” “To interpret the said proviso in the manner suggested by Mr. Rohatgi would require us to read into it a disabling consequence, namely, that the motion pending in the other House must also necessarily fail.” “Such an interpretation would amount to judicial legislation, a course we are neither empowered nor inclined to undertake.”
Linking the proviso to the main provision, the Court stated: “It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that a proviso cannot be read in a way which nullifies the provision to which it is a proviso, unless such an intention is manifest.” “The main part of Section 3(2) vests the power to constitute a Committee in the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, upon admission of the notice of motion.” “The first proviso cannot be read to curtail this power except in one clearly defined circumstance, namely, the admission of notices in both Houses.” “In all other cases, the power of the Speaker or the Chairman to constitute a Committee remains unaffected.”
On the consequence of rejection in one House, the Court stated: “There is nothing in the Inquiry Act to suggest that rejection of a motion in one House would render the other House incompetent to proceed in accordance with law.” “The argument, therefore, lacks any legal foundation.” “Had the Parliament intended such far-reaching consequences, it would have articulated the first proviso in clear and unambiguous terms.” “The absence of any express provision to that effect is, in our opinion, determinative.”
The Court stated that accepting the petitioner’s reading would distort bicameral autonomy: “Looked from another angle, accepting such an argument would produce absurd results where the individual capacity of one House in initiating a motion under Article 124(4) becomes contingent upon the outcome in the other House, even at the stage of admission of such a motion.” “Taking away the autonomy of one of the two Houses of the Parliament could not have been the intent behind the first proviso.”
On the risk of misuse, the Court stated: “Such an interpretation must also be rejected on the ground that it renders the first proviso open to abuse.” “It would permit a situation where, upon getting the wind of a notice of motion being given for removal of a Judge with a real likelihood of the same being admitted by the Presiding Officer of one House, certain members of the other House not inclined to have the process of removal initiated against the Judge may deliberately give a defective notice on the same day, solely with the intention of scuttling the proceedings.”
“Upon such notice subsequently being found to be defective and not admitted, the mere fact that such a notice was introduced on the same day would lead to the first proviso being set in action mandating constitution of a Joint Committee, as argued by the petitioner, thereby leading to frustration of the proceedings in the first House.” “Furthermore, it is also possible that upon introduction of the notice of motion in the second House, the Speaker or the Chairman does not admit or reject the motion.” “Such an act, on a literal application of the first proviso, would be sufficient to trigger the requirement of Joint Committee.” “The proviso cannot be allowed to be used as a weapon for scuttling proceedings or giving a veto to the Houses of Parliament.”
The Court rejected the argument that the Deputy Chairman had no authority to act on the Rajya Sabha notice. It reasoned that the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 must be read alongside the Constitution, and that Article 91 preserves institutional continuity by allowing the Deputy Chairman to discharge the Chairman’s functions when that office is vacant. It further stated that where a vacancy would otherwise create an institutional standstill, the doctrine of necessity can justify performance of the function so that the constitutional and statutory process does not stall.
The Court also held that, even if the Deputy Chairman’s refusal to admit the Rajya Sabha motion were assumed to be unlawful on some ground other than competence, it would not affect the validity of the Speaker’s constitution of an inquiry committee after admitting the Lok Sabha motion. It explained that the joint-committee requirement in the first proviso to Section 3(2) arises only when motions are admitted in both Houses, and that condition was not satisfied in the absence of an admitted motion in one House. The Court indicated that any flaw in the refusal decision could, at most, require reconsideration within the Rajya Sabha, without curtailing the Speaker’s authority to proceed once the Lok Sabha motion stood admitted.
Separately, the Court noted that Justice Yashwant Varma had not formally sought to set aside the Deputy Chairman’s refusal on the pleadings and therefore could not secure its invalidation through oral submissions alone. It also found no concrete, irreversible prejudice from a committee constituted by one House rather than a joint committee, particularly in view of the safeguards built into the removal framework, including the requirement of special majorities in both Houses before any removal can occur.
In addition, the Court held that the Article 32 jurisdiction invoked in the petition is confined to enforcement of fundamental rights and does not extend to seeking advisory or corrective directions concerning Parliament’s internal statutory mechanisms in the absence of a present or inevitable infringement of any fundamental right, and on that basis concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to relief.
“For the foregoing reasons, no interference is called for. The present writ petition stands dismissed.”
Case Title: X v. Office of the Speaker of the House of the People & Ors.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 65
Case Number: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1233 of 2025
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
