Kiran Raj

The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held that the High Courts are vested with the jurisdiction to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to quash proceedings arising from an application under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court declared that the view taken by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in dismissing petitions for quashing such proceedings, on the ground that the nature of the proceedings is civil, was not legally sustainable. In consequence, the Supreme Court quashed the impugned High Court order and restored the dismissed petitions to the file of the High Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with its findings.

The two connected criminal appeals arose from a common order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore, whereby it rejected petitions filed under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings initiated under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The proceedings before the Magistrate originated from a domestic dispute between the respondent, Vidhi Rawal, and her in-laws including her husband, Prateek Tripathi.

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Vidhi Rawal and Prateek Tripathi were married on 12 December 2019 in Dewas, Madhya Pradesh, according to Hindu rites. On 8 December 2021, she submitted a written complaint to the Station House Officer, Police Station Women Consultancy Centre, Dewas, alleging dowry demands by her husband and father-in-law. An FIR bearing No. 3 of 2022 was registered on 7 January 2022 at Police Station Mahila Thana, Dewas under Sections 498A, 504, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The respondent alleged that after her return from Johannesburg, South Africa, she was subjected to harassment by her husband, Prateek Tripathi, his brother Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, and parents-in-law, Vivekanand Tiwari and Mira Tiwari. The harassment allegedly included demands for Rs. 20 lakhs and a luxury SUV. Subsequently, she filed an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act on 2 March 2022 before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, bearing MJCR No. 215/2022. She sought various reliefs under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the Act.

The appellants, in two separate proceedings, approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the said application. It was contended that the Magistrate under the DV Act is a criminal court and therefore the proceedings are amenable to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

They argued that the term "Magistrate" under Section 2(i) of the DV Act refers to a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or a Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the CrPC. Therefore, the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are before a criminal court. The senior counsel submitted that even though the reliefs available under Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act may resemble civil remedies, the nature of the court and its jurisdiction under CrPC make such proceedings subject to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

Citing decisions from the High Courts of Allahabad and Bombay, it was contended that applications under Section 482 CrPC are maintainable against proceedings under the DV Act to prevent abuse of the process of court and to secure the ends of justice.

The respondent opposed the petitions, asserting that the proceedings under the DV Act are civil in nature and not amenable to quashing under Section 482 CrPC. Reference was made to the Supreme Court's decision in Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Another, wherein it was held that proceedings under the DV Act are predominantly civil in nature. The respondent contended that Section 12 of the DV Act does not constitute a "complaint" under Section 2(d) of the CrPC and is therefore not covered under the procedures in Sections 200 to 204 of the CrPC.

The Supreme Court considered the legislative framework and observed that the DV Act was enacted to provide effective protection to women from domestic violence and defines "domestic violence" expansively under Section 3. The Act enables the aggrieved woman to seek a variety of reliefs including protection orders, residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody orders, and compensation orders. These can be granted either through a standalone application under Section 12 or in existing legal proceedings in civil, criminal, or family courts under Section 26.

The Court observed that under Section 12, an aggrieved person or others on her behalf may file an application before a Judicial Magistrate of First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate seeking one or more of the reliefs outlined in Sections 18 to 22. The Magistrate is required to fix a hearing within three days, and notices are issued under the DV Rules in prescribed formats, not summons under the CrPC.

The term "Magistrate" as defined in Section 2(i) of the DV Act denotes a criminal court as per Section 6 of the CrPC. Further, the DV Act, under Section 28, applies the CrPC procedures to proceedings under Sections 12 and 18-23, with flexibility to prescribe its own procedure.

It was held that although the reliefs under the DV Act are civil in character, the proceedings are before criminal courts governed by the CrPC, and therefore the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is attracted.

The Supreme Court recorded that "the answer to the question which arises for consideration is not dependent upon the nature of the proceedings or the nature of the relief that can be granted in those proceedings."

It noted that "Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 makes a provision enabling an aggrieved person, a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of an aggrieved person to make an application to the learned Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs provided in Chapter IV."

The Bench distinguished applications under Section 12 of the DV Act from complaints under Section 200 CrPC or Section 223 of the BNSS, stating that "an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be equated with a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the CrPC".

The Court observed that "when a notice is issued on an application under Section 12(1), the learned Magistrate does not pass any order under the CrPC. When orders granting any of the reliefs under Sections 18 to 23 are passed, the orders of the learned Magistrate are not under the CrPC".

Despite recognising the civil nature of reliefs under the Act, the Court noted: "the High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice".

The Bench further held: "Therefore, in a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005".

The Court stated that caution must be exercised in invoking such jurisdiction: "While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect".

The Court remarked: "Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated".

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The Supreme Court quashed the order dated 9 May 2024 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Miscellaneous Criminal Case Nos. 52308 of 2022 and 3363 of 2023. It restored the said petitions to the file of the High Court for a fresh hearing.

The Court stated: "We quash the order dated 9th May, 2024, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Miscellaneous Criminal Case Nos. 52308 of 2022 and 3363 of 2023 and restore the said petitions to the file of the High Court. The restored petitions shall be heard afresh and disposed of by the High Court in the light of what we have held in this Judgment."

The appeals were allowed accordingly.

Advocates Representing the Parties:

For the Petitioners: Mr. Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Kuldeep Rai, Adv.; Ms. Nandini Rai, Adv.; Mr. Aryan Dev Pandey, Adv.; Mr. Mayur Narang, Adv.; Mr. Km. Rimjhim Pandey, Adv.; Mr. Alok Mishra, Adv.; Mr. Ranjan Nikhil Dharnidhar, AOR

For the Respondents: Mr. Anurag Tandon, AOR; Mr. Pankaj Thakkar, Adv.

Case Title: Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 734

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024

Bench: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

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