Pranav B Prem

The Supreme Court, in Karan Singh v. State of Haryana [Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014], acquitted a man convicted under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and reiterated that despite repeated clarifications, trial courts continue to misinterpret the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC. The bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan emphasized that it is high time for State Judicial Academies to intervene to prevent such recurrent errors in judicial decision-making.

Factual Background

The appellant was married to the deceased on June 25, 1996. On April 2, 1998, she died by suicide. The postmortem report confirmed that the cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging. The prosecution relied on the testimonies of three key witnesses: the mother (PW-6), brother (PW-7), and maternal uncle (PW-8) of the deceased. The appellant, along with his parents, was charged under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC read with Section 34 IPC. While the trial court acquitted his parents, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of seven years for the offence under Section 304-B IPC and one year for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court subsequently upheld the conviction.

Legal Considerations and Supreme Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court examined the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, which states:

1. The death of a woman must have been caused by burns, bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances.

2. The death must have taken place within seven years of marriage.

3. The woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative soon before her death.

4. The cruelty or harassment must have been in connection with a demand for dowry.

The Court reiterated that “if the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband’s relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry death.” The Court further clarified the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, stating: “The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked.”

Analysis of Witness Testimonies

The Court scrutinized the testimonies of PW-6, PW-7, and PW-8 and found several inconsistencies and omissions.

• PW-6 (Mother of the deceased): The prosecution relied on her statements regarding demands for dowry, including allegations that the appellant and his family taunted the deceased for insufficient dowry, demanded additional items such as a refrigerator, a motorcycle, a mixi, a buffalo, and Rs. 60,000 for purchasing a jeep. However, the Court noted that all these allegations were omissions in her previous statements to the police, making them contradictions under the law.

• PW-7 (Brother of the deceased): He supported PW-6’s claims but failed to provide any specific incidents of cruelty or harassment linked to dowry demands. His testimony regarding demands for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi was also absent from his initial statements to the police, making them significant omissions.

• PW-8 (Maternal uncle of the deceased): The Court observed that PW-8 had no direct knowledge of the alleged dowry demands or any acts of cruelty. His statement was recorded over two months after the incident, leading the Court to view it as an afterthought.

Critical Observations by the Court

The Court noted: “There is something fundamental which goes to the root of the matter. While deposing about the demand of dowry, she has not deposed to any particular act of cruelty or harassment by the appellant. This is an essential ingredient of Section 304-B. It is not made out from the evidence of PW-6.” The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the key ingredient that “soon before her death” the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand. The mere presence of dowry demands without proof of harassment or cruelty was insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 304-B IPC.

Supreme Court’s Verdict and Concern Over Trial Court Errors

The Court, in setting aside the conviction, emphasized: “Section 304-B of the IPC was brought on the statute book in 1986. This Court has repeatedly laid down and explained the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B. But, the Trial Courts are committing the same mistakes repeatedly. It is for the State Judicial Academies to step in. Perhaps this is a case of moral conviction.” Since the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, the Court acquitted him and quashed the previous judgments. This judgment once again brings to light the misapplication of Section 304-B IPC by trial courts.

Cause Title: Karan Singh v. State of Haryana

Case No: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1076 OF 2014

Date: January-31-2025

Bench: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

[Read/Download order]