Supreme Court Slams Suspension Of Rape Convict’s Sentence | Says High Court's Reasoning Falls Far Short Of S. 389 CrPC Standards | Fair Chance Of Acquittal A Must For Bail
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice K.V. Viswanathan set aside the order of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, which had suspended the sentence of a convict held guilty under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The apex court directed the respondent to surrender before the Court of Special Judge (POCSO), Karauli, Rajasthan, by 30th August 2025, failing which the State was ordered to take him into custody. The Court found the High Court’s reasoning legally unsustainable and lacking the necessary examination required under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed by the father of the prosecutrix challenging an order dated 3rd September 2024, passed by the High Court of Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur. The order under challenge had been issued in the S.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application (Appeal) No. 852 of 2024 in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 2024. It suspended the sentence of the second respondent, who had been convicted under Section 3/4(2) of the POCSO Act and Section 376(3) of the IPC by the Special Judge (POCSO), Karauli, on 7th February 2024.
Respondent No.2 was sentenced to undergo 20 years of rigorous imprisonment under the POCSO Act and fined ₹50,000, with an additional two years of rigorous imprisonment in case of default. No separate sentence was imposed under Section 376(3) IPC due to the operation of Section 42 of the POCSO Act. After serving one year and three months, the High Court suspended his sentence.
The prosecutrix, examined as PW-3 during trial, deposed that on 13th June 2023, at approximately 4:00 PM, while she had gone to a field to defecate, Respondent No.2 threatened her at gunpoint, closed her mouth, and forcibly took her to a nearby house, where he committed rape. She stated she informed her mother and other family members and that an FIR was filed by her father at the police station shortly after the incident. Her statement under Section 164 CrPC reaffirmed these allegations.
The prosecution presented several documents to establish the victim’s age. Exhibit P-1 (admission form), Exhibit P-2 (original school register), and Exhibit P-9 (birth certificate) recorded her date of birth as 7th March 2009, confirming she was 14 years and 3 months old at the time of the incident. The Trial Court, by applying Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, concluded she was a child under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act.
The prosecutrix was medically examined. The medical report indicated no external injuries or recent trauma and noted an old, healed hymenal tear. The medical expert could not provide a conclusive opinion due to the absence of FSL and DNA reports, which had not been submitted by the prosecution during trial. Despite this, the Trial Court observed that the case was not weakened by the absence of DNA evidence, which was only corroborative.
The Trial Court relied on the oral testimonies of PW-2 (mother) and PW-4 (father), along with the prosecutrix’s own deposition. By invoking Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, it applied the statutory presumption of guilt against the accused, holding that the burden had shifted to the defence.
The High Court, while suspending the sentence, noted certain evidentiary observations: absence of signs of sexual assault per medical examination, non-availability of FSL and DNA reports, and skepticism about the prosecutrix going outside to defecate despite the presence of toilets in the house. It also noted the delay in disposal of the appeal.
Before the Supreme Court, the State submitted an affidavit detailing the antecedents of the second respondent. He was involved in eleven criminal cases: five had ended in acquittal, and six were pending. The details included FIRs under various provisions of the IPC and Arms Act, including Sections 457, 380, 323, 341, 394, and 120B IPC, and Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act.
The respondent contended that there was no post-bail misconduct. The State refuted this, arguing that the issue at hand was not cancellation of bail but the legal justifiability of the High Court's bail order.
The State also informed the Court that a DNA/FSL report had since become available, identifying male DNA/semen of the accused on the victim’s private parts and clothing. However, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to comment on its contents or admissibility, leaving it to the prosecution to seek appropriate legal recourse.
The Supreme Court began by stating in italics: “One would have expected the High Court hearing an application under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence to examine whether prima facie there was anything palpable on the record to indicate if the accused had a fair chance of overturning the conviction.”
The Court referred to its previous ruling in Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Another (2023) 6 SCC 123 and recited the principle that: “Once the accused is held guilty, the presumption of innocence gets erased.”
It further noted that: “The endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal.”
Criticising the High Court’s evaluation, the Bench stated: “The High Court has not adverted to any of the relevant factors for considering the case for suspension under Section 389.”
Addressing the affidavit about the respondent’s past cases, the Court said: “Taking into account the antecedents, we are of the opinion that High Court was not justified in suspending the sentence.”
On the respondent's contention regarding lack of forensic corroboration, the Court noted: “Independent of the FSL and DNA report and considering the nature of the case and the antecedents of Respondent No.2 and after carefully examining the judgment of conviction, we feel that the High Court was not justified in suspending the sentence.”
On the High Court’s interpretation of the medical findings, it remarked: “The finding that no sexual assault was found, without considering the overall nature of the evidence of the case, is completely untenable.”
The Court further stated: “All that the medical evidence said was that no conclusive opinion about the crime could be given since FSL Report was awaited. That does not mean that the ocular evidence could be ignored.”
Addressing another High Court observation, it said: “The reasoning that despite the availability of washrooms in the house it was difficult to believe that the prosecutrix could go out for the toilet, is conjectural in nature.”
The Bench cited its ruling in Vijay Kumar v. Narendra and Others (2002) 9 SCC 364, stating: “The High Court has neither given any reason nor has indicated any exceptional circumstance for granting bail to the respondents.”
It concluded this section by clarifying: “We make it clear that the observations made herein are only for the purpose of setting aside the order of suspension of sentence.”
The Court issued the following directive: “We set aside the order of the High Court dated 03.09.2024 in S.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application (Appeal) No. 852 of 2024 in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 2024. The appeal is allowed.”
It further ordered: “Respondent No.2 is directed to surrender before the Court of Special Judge (POCSO) Karauli, (Rajasthan), on or before 30th August 2025, failing which, the State shall take Respondent No.2 into custody.”
The judgment concluded with the following clarification: “The observations made herein are only for the purpose of setting aside the order of suspension of sentence.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. K. L. Janjani, Advocate-on-Record (AOR)
For the Respondents: Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Additional Advocate General (A.A.G.); Ms. Shagufa Khan, Advocate; Mr. Aman Prasad, Advocate; Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, Advocate-on-Record (AOR); Mr. Namit Saxena, Advocate-on-Record (AOR)
Case Title: Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan and Another
Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 935
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2025 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 69 of 2025)
Bench: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
