Supreme Court Holds In-Charge SHO Competent To Conduct NDPS Search | High Court Manifestly Erred In Interpreting Section 42 Of The Act | Trial Directed To Continue Expeditiously
Kiran Raj
The Supreme Court of India Division Bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti set aside a High Court order that had quashed criminal proceedings under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Court held that an officer holding temporary charge as Station House Officer is competent to conduct a search under Section 42 of the Act. It directed that the trial shall continue in accordance with law and be concluded expeditiously. The appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan was allowed.
The appeal arose from proceedings in connection with FIR No. 552 of 2011, dated 10.09.2011, registered at Police Station Nimbahera, District Chittorgarh, Rajasthan. The charges against the respondents were framed under Sections 8/18, 25, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the Act”).
The respondents had filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the High Court of Rajasthan seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. The principal contention raised was that the search and seizure operation conducted against them was illegal and void ab initio, as it had been carried out by an officer not authorised under the law.
The High Court, vide order dated 01.09.2017, accepted the plea of the respondents and quashed the criminal proceedings. The court held that the search was conducted by an officer not authorised under Section 42 of the NDPS Act and hence vitiated the entire process.
Aggrieved by the High Court’s order, the State of Rajasthan filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. Upon condoning the delay in filing, the Apex Court granted leave and heard the matter on merits.
During the hearing, the appellant State submitted that the search in question was carried out by an officer who was duly authorised under the NDPS Act. It was stated that as per the relevant notification issued under Section 42 of the Act, all Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors posted as Station House Officers (SHOs) were authorised to conduct search and seizure under the provisions of the Act.
The factual backdrop revealed that on the date of the search, i.e., 09.09.2011, the designated SHO of the concerned police station, Veera Ram Choudhary, was on leave. In his absence, charge of the police station had been formally handed over to Circle Inspector (Sub-Inspector) Kamal Chand. It was this officer who conducted the search operation and initiated proceedings under the NDPS Act.
The State argued that Kamal Chand, being the In-Charge SHO at the relevant time, was legally empowered under the NDPS Act to conduct search and seizure. In support of this position, reliance was placed on a previous decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bheru Lal, (2013) 11 SCC 730. In that case, the Apex Court had held that an officer temporarily holding the post of SHO at the relevant time is competent to conduct search operations under the Act.
The respondents, through their counsel, contended that the statutory scheme under Section 42 required that only a regular and posted SHO could exercise such authority. They asserted that a person merely given temporary charge does not fulfil the legal standard of "empowered officer" under the NDPS Act. Hence, the search conducted by such an officer, it was argued, was in violation of the mandatory provisions of the law and was liable to be quashed.
They further submitted that the High Court had rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice.
The Supreme Court, after hearing both parties, took note of the submissions and examined the factual and legal matrix surrounding the appointment and powers of an In-Charge SHO under the NDPS Act.
The Court noted that the search had been carried out on 09.09.2011 by Circle Inspector (Sub-Inspector) Kamal Chand, who was acting as the In-Charge SHO at the time.
“Vide the notification issued under Section 42 of the Act, the State Government has authorized all Inspectors of Police and Sub-Inspectors of Police posted as Station House Officers to exercise the powers mentioned in Section 42 of the Act with immediate effect.”
The Bench stated: “In the case at hand, the SHO ‘Veera Ram Choudhary’, was absent on the relevant date and therefore, on 09.09.2011, he has handed over the charge of the SHO to the Circle Inspector (Sub-Inspector, ‘Shri Kamal Chand’) who has carried out the search.”
Referring to established precedent, the Court recorded: “In State of Rajasthan Vs. Bheru Lal: (2013) 11 SCC 730, vide paragraph ‘15’, it has been held that the person holding temporary charge as Station House Officer at the relevant time is competent to carry out the search.”
Based on this principle, the Bench rejected the respondent’s argument that only a permanently posted SHO can conduct search operations. It observed: “The submission that the Officer ought to be actually posted as SHO and not as In-Charge SHO is of no substance and cannot be accepted.”
The Supreme Court held that the High Court had incorrectly interpreted Section 42 of the Act. It stated: “The High Court manifestly erred in interpreting Section 42 of the Act and in holding that the In-Charge SHO was not competent to conduct the search.”
On this basis, the Court proceeded to consider the appropriate course of action. It concluded that the search conducted by the In-Charge SHO was lawful and in compliance with the provisions of the Act, as per both the statutory notification and binding precedent.
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and allowed the appeal. The Bench held that the search conducted by the In-Charge SHO was valid under law and did not warrant quashing of proceedings.
The Court ordered: “Accordingly, the order impugned dated 01.09.2017 passed by the High Court is hereby set aside and the trial is directed to continue in accordance with law, expeditiously.”
The Court further stated: “The present appeal is allowed in the above terms.”
Further, the Court disposed of all pending applications, stating: “Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
Advocates Representing the Parties
For the Petitioners: Mr. Shiv Mangal Sharma, Additional Advocate General; Ms. Shalini Singh, Advocate; Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, Advocate-on-Record
For the Respondents: Mr. Surya Kant, Advocate-on-Record; Mrs. Priyanka Tyagi, Advocate
Case Title: State of Rajasthan v. Gopal & Ors.
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. ___ of 2025)
Bench: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice S.V.N. Bhatti
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